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            <lastBuildDate>2026-07-26 07:42:48</lastBuildDate>
            
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            <id>rkmurnzbgg</id> 
            <title>Trump makes the requests, Riyadh supplies the money: Mohammed bin Salman’s regional strategy</title> 
            <description>Commentary: The US president calls the Saudi crown prince his ‘friend,’ while Riyadh blocks Saad Hariri’s political comeback, prepares investments in Syria and Lebanon, backs a new Palestinian leadership and keeps Netanyahu’s office at arm’s length</description>
            <author>Smadar Perry</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rkmurnzbgg</link>
            <pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 01:18:46 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Every year in mid-February, former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri attends memorial ceremonies for his father, former prime minister Rafik Hariri.
From his base in Abu Dhabi, the younger Hariri had announced his retirement from political life. But during this year’s visit to Beirut, he met politicians, senior military officers and businesspeople and said he intended to “return to the picture.”
 
When word reached Saudi Arabia, Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan sent Hariri a clear message: Do not test us. Riyadh stands with President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.
For now, Hariri’s comeback dream has been shelved.
In November 2017, he was summoned to Saudi Arabia and taken from the airport for a series of interrogations under harsh conditions of confinement. He was presented with a resignation letter from his post as Lebanese prime minister and placed on a stage to deliver the bizarre announcement of his departure.
French President Emmanuel Macron sent a special plane, and the “deposed” Hariri flew to France before returning to his office in Beirut as though nothing had happened. Less than a year later, he returned to Saudi Arabia and smilingly dismissed reports that Mohammed bin Salman had forced him from office.
Trump asks, Riyadh provides
Trump and Mohammed bin Salman have found common ground in the world of investment. Like a customer at a neighborhood store, Trump points to what he needs, and the royal palace in Riyadh moves quickly to provide it.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia is attacking the Houthis in Yemen while turning a blind eye to Iranian strikes against U.S. military bases on its territory. The Houthis are targeting two sites in Saudi Arabia, both facilities belonging to oil giant Aramco.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers are now in Sanaa, Yemen, directing the campaign against Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi ambassador in Tehran remains at his hostile posting, much like his Iranian counterpart in Beirut. Neither leaves his embassy building. Both know intelligence agencies are watching them and that authorities are waiting for the moment they receive orders to depart.
 
Trump describes Mohammed bin Salman as “my friend.” But in March, during a speech at an investment forum in Miami, the U.S. president claimed that the crown prince “kisses my ass.”
Mohammed bin Salman remained silent, and his advisers were instructed not to respond.
After the presidents of Syria and Lebanon visited the White House, Trump’s advisers called Riyadh and instructed their Saudi counterparts to begin planning economic investments in both countries.
The meeting Netanyahu leaked
The Saudi crown prince has not forgotten the leak by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu concerning their secret meeting on November 22, 2020, in the Saudi city of Neom.
The historic encounter was held in the presence of then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who managed to evade the journalists traveling with him to Saudi Arabia.
Pompeo said nothing. The Saudis issued a forceful denial. Only one side, and it was not difficult to guess which, rushed to leak the meeting to the Israeli media.
Since then, the Saudi royal palace has boycotted Netanyahu’s office.
A path toward a Palestinian state
Mohammed bin Salman and his advisers have adopted a path toward establishing a Palestinian state, without defining its borders or informing the West Bank leadership of their plan.
Until two or three years ago, the Saudis appeared indifferent to the Palestinians’ fate. They also refused to absorb Gaza residents in the kingdom’s vast, sparsely populated desert areas.
Trump applied pressure but received no response, while European leaders tried to appeal to the crown prince.
Under the revived plan of Riyadh’s “fantastic guy,” as Trump has called him, authority in the Palestinian territories would be handed to the leadership in Ramallah.
The question is what will happen in the November elections for a new West Bank parliament. Two months later, after a younger leadership emerges, a presidential election is expected to be held.
The crown prince knows whom he wants to see at the top of the pyramid.
He must now contend with Trump’s latest ultimatum: Join the Abraham Accords, or tell the U.S. president that Saudi Arabia intends to wait until it becomes clear who will be Israel’s next prime minister.</full-text>
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            <id>s1jvakmsze</id> 
            <title>LeBron James is exhausting — and his endless need for attention is becoming sad</title> 
            <description>Opinion: One of basketball’s greatest players has turned every career decision into a carefully staged spectacle; even at 41, LeBron James’ relentless demand for attention remains exhausting — and increasingly sad</description>
            <author>Tzippy Shmilovitz, New York</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/s1jvakmsze</link>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 22:26:48 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>“I would like him to make his announcement already, so we can finish the schedule,” NBA Commissioner Adam Silver said last week of LeBron James. “As you might imagine, the teams are calling us, the networks are calling us, and everybody wants to lock in the schedule. But it will influence how we set the schedule, how we set opening week, Christmas Day, etc. So I need him to make a decision.”
According to reporting in Cleveland, LeBron had already been preparing to announce where he would play next season. But Silver’s remarks irritated his camp, so the announcement was delayed — a way of demonstrating that nobody could pressure him and that LeBron James still operated entirely on LeBron James’ timetable. The claim came from Cleveland radio host Andy Baskin and was never independently confirmed.
 
It is exhausting just to read that paragraph. But late-career LeBron James has become an exhausting person.
He is one of the greatest athletes in history. His career is without parallel. He is recognized in every corner of the world. He is a businessman. A billionaire. A happily married family man. He is 41 years old and has gray in his beard. And despite all of that, LeBron James still appears to require a constant supply of attention.
It is difficult to know whether Silver’s comments truly angered him. The commissioner had just announced that the entire league was waiting for LeBron’s decision — and that, after all, is precisely the position LeBron has wanted to occupy throughout his career.
The festival surrounding every James “decision” has always been meticulously planned and carefully orchestrated. In that respect, the man has not changed by a millimeter since he was 25 and took his talents to South Beach.
LeBron has now made his choice, signing with the Philadelphia 76ers and describing it as his “last decision.” The identity of his new team inevitably shaped the reaction, and the internet received the news with its customary restraint.
But even had he chosen to return home to Cleveland — the one decision that would have been almost impossible not to embrace — it would not have erased the deeply sour aftertaste left by yet another migraine-inducing LeBron drama.
Advanced-stage narcissism
In 2010, after a season in which Cleveland finished with the NBA’s best record but lost in the Eastern Conference semifinals, LeBron decided that he no longer had the patience — and perhaps not the character — to keep trying with his hometown team.
So he left for Miami.
Naturally, he did not do so before staging an exceptionally ugly reality-television spectacle, culminating in an hourlong ESPN special. “The Decision” was a public-relations catastrophe that pursued James for years.
He eventually overcame it for one simple reason: He was an extraordinary basketball player. He led the Heat to four consecutive NBA Finals and won two championships.
LeBron finally left the soap opera surrounding his move to Miami behind when he decided to return home to Cleveland in 2014. That festival was excessive too, but at least it felt authentic and moving.
James published a personal essay in Sports Illustrated, explaining that his connection to Ohio was greater than basketball and that he wanted to bring Cleveland a championship.
 
That is exactly what he did. Along the way, he built an exhilarating rivalry with Stephen Curry and the Golden State Warriors before delivering the Cavaliers’ championship in 2016.
Nothing else LeBron has accomplished, before or since, approaches that one title — won in the only place that has ever loved him completely and unconditionally.
LeBron’s move to the Los Angeles Lakers came with comparatively little noise. He was already 33, and it felt somewhat like the beginning of a gradual transition into retirement. His Hollywood production company was growing, and his family liked the California weather.
But with every passing year, the true scale of the physical anomaly known as LeBron James became clearer. He remained one of the league’s best players and did what every great star who joins the Lakers is expected to do: He brought them a championship.
Today, LeBron is no longer one of the NBA’s best players, and even his seemingly impossible body has begun to creak. He remains an excellent player, however, and one who could certainly complete the puzzle for a championship contender.
Players belonging to James’ exceedingly rare category find retirement extraordinarily difficult. But difficulty walking away does not justify staging another chapter of this ritual — especially when it accompanies the powerful impression of narcissism that LeBron has projected in recent years.
 
That includes pressuring the Lakers to draft his son and then waiting to leave until Bronny James’ guaranteed contract for the following season had taken effect. Bronny’s $2.29 million salary became fully guaranteed shortly before LeBron informed the Lakers that he would play elsewhere. There is no verified evidence proving that LeBron timed his departure for that reason, but the sequence inevitably fueled that perception.
It is such small behavior from such a monumental player.
A player like LeBron James should never have needed a career encompassing five separate stints with three — and now four — different teams. LeBron should have been like Michael Jordan, Stephen Curry or Kobe Bryant: the defining player of one franchise, winning four or five championships there and ending his career unconditionally loved by that team’s supporters and admired by everybody else.
LeBron will always receive the immense respect he deserves. He has built a reasonable case for the greatest basketball career in history, one whose longevity and accumulation of achievements may never be matched.
But the relentless need for attention, even now, is exhausting.
More than anything, it is sad.</full-text>
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            <id>h1y0xyzhme</id> 
            <title>Israel’s reservists are still reporting for duty, but the system around them is breaking</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Behind the impressive turnout are hollowed-out units, exhausted families and declining readiness; the IDF must cut service days, stop changing orders and return reserve forces to training before the damage becomes irreversible</description>
            <author>Ariel Heimann</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/h1y0xyzhme</link>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 03:26:45 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>In recent weeks, instead of attending their children’s end-of-year ceremonies or sitting university exams, many reservists once again put on their uniforms and joined their companies in southern Lebanon, Gaza, Syria or the West Bank. They are doing so not because the personal cost has become easier to bear, but because they are unwilling to leave their comrades alone. 
Israel’s reserve system continues to function because of solidarity, a sense of mission and the willingness of its personnel to pay a heavy personal price. After nearly three years of war, the fact that they are still reporting for duty is remarkable.
 
That is precisely why their commitment must not be treated as an unlimited resource. The reserve system is still showing up. That is both the good news and the dangerous news.
As long as battalions continue arriving for their missions, it is easy for the IDF and the state to assume that the system is holding and that they can continue relying on it, stretching the commitment of its personnel to the limit.
But behind the attendance figures lies a far harsher reality: an exhausted system, units with very low turnout that are becoming hollow in practice, and a civilian support structure that is approaching its breaking point.
The IDF tends to count formations, battalions and companies, but that accounting does not tell the full story. A battalion may still formally exist, yet some of its soldiers do not report for justified reasons, others have announced that they will no longer come, and many of those who do arrive require frequent leave simply to survive. The result is a unit that appears complete on paper but is hollow in reality.
Its mission falls on too few soldiers, accelerating their exhaustion and damaging the unit’s operational effectiveness. In the armored corps, the problem is compounded by shortages of vehicles caused by combat damage and maintenance difficulties. Yet the person now closest to collapse is not necessarily the reservist himself. It is the entire support system that allows him to report for duty.
Families have carried an enormous burden. Even the most committed and supportive partners struggle to endure another holiday alone, another Friday without a father at home, another school ceremony he misses and another prolonged period of managing the household while constantly fearing for his safety.
Employers are also struggling. Some repeatedly lose key workers, while reservists who are not dismissed may nevertheless discover that their practical place within an organization has gradually eroded. Students miss courses, exams and entire semesters, and not every institution or lecturer provides the understanding they need.
After nearly three years, everyone has had enough, not of their commitment to the country, but of living under an emergency with no clear limits.
An intolerable inequality in the burden
All this is compounded by an intolerable inequality in the national burden. At the very moment reservists and their families are being worn down, measures approved by the Knesset, including the Basic Law on Torah study and legislation intended to freeze the arrest of ultra-Orthodox draft evaders, have not brought a large new population into military service. They have pushed it further away.
Instead of adding more shoulders beneath the stretcher and easing the load, the state is signaling to angry reservists that they will continue carrying it almost alone.
I have written before that the prolonged use of emergency call-up orders is extremely convenient for the IDF. Too convenient. It allows the military to change enlistment and release dates, extend service and revise plans on short notice.
In a genuine emergency, there is no alternative. But a reserve force cannot be managed for years as though every change were an emergency. The IDF must impose limits on itself even when those limits are not written into law.
It should commit to a fixed quota of service days and honor it, certainly during ceasefires and periods of relative calm. It should refrain from changing call-up orders except in truly exceptional cases. It should also determine in advance when service begins, when it ends and what reservists can expect during it. Certainty is not a luxury. It is a prerequisite for soldiers, families, employers and commanders to endure.
At the same time, the total number of reserve-duty days must be reduced. The IDF is deployed across many fronts and is understandably still acting under the trauma of October 7, unwilling to take unnecessary risks.
But risk management does not mean seeking zero risk. During periods of relative calm, the military must reassess the number of formations deployed in each sector, reduce forces where possible and release units. At times, accepting a limited operational risk is preferable to allowing a far greater strategic risk to grow: the erosion of the reserve system itself.
 
Above all hangs the issue of operational readiness. The reserve system has barely trained since October 7. It is either fighting or holding defensive lines. Regular-service soldiers now being discharged are also entering the reserves after years of combat, but without a continuous and orderly training cycle. Command courses have been shortened, and it is increasingly difficult to find officers willing to assume positions that require dozens of additional service days.
The result is dangerous: the best commanders are not always the ones taking command. Sometimes it is simply those who are still able to agree. Reservists have proved beyond doubt that they will come when they are needed.
Now it is the turn of the state and the IDF to prove that they know how to protect them. That means more than thanking them. It means creating certainty, reducing service, restoring training and rebuilding the command structure. The reserve system has not collapsed. But Israel must stop testing how much more it can demand from some of its best people before the system is emptied from within.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Ariel Heimann is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and a former chief reserve officer</full-text>
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            <id>bjh11vnbbzl</id> 
            <title>The generation that will shape America's future is losing faith in Israel</title> 
            <description>As young Americans increasingly view Israel unfavorably, recent polls point to a sharp decline in the country's image, with potentially far-reaching consequences as today's students become tomorrow's leaders</description>
            <author>Amir Bogen</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bjh11vnbbzl</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 22:04:54 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Wish congratulations to the four million American college students who graduated this summer from thousands of universities and colleges across the country. Soon they will begin new careers at prestigious law firms, on Wall Street, in Hollywood and on Broadway, as well as at Google, Microsoft and the world's other leading technology companies. These talented young men and women in their 20s will go on to lead the economy, science, culture and politics in the United States and beyond. They are America's future, and it is worth asking now what that future will mean for Israel.
Since October 7, and against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Gaza, the pro-Palestinian movement has established itself on American campuses and in the hearts of many students who see themselves as passionate and courageous activists. The instinctive response to this loud and visible activism is often one of contempt and disgust toward idealistic young people who are, at best, naïve and, at worst, ignorant. They are manipulated by progressive opinion leaders, financed by Qatar and know nothing about the Middle East conflict or its history.
 
That condescending view may be justified. Or it may not. Either way, it does nothing to solve the existential crisis now facing Israel as a growing share of the American public distances itself from the country and the support Israel has long enjoyed from members of the administration and Congress begins to erode. Today, most Americans support ending U.S. military aid funded by their tax dollars.
America's growing aversion to Israel and its increasing treatment as an international pariah extend far beyond chants of "Free Palestine" on college campuses. Recent polling points to a dramatic collapse in the value of the Israel brand in the United States. The situation is especially severe among young Americans. Seventy-five percent of those ages 18 to 29 now hold an unfavorable view of the ally on the other side of the world that for decades enjoyed the status of America's favored partner.
In Jerusalem, of course, there are those who believe the exact opposite, as though the eyes of the entire world are fixed on Israel as a light unto the nations. Perhaps that was once true, at least among Jews in the Diaspora, who showered Israel with love, support and generous financial contributions. Their beloved nation-state was Jewish and democratic.
A weakening bond
America's diverse Jewish communities still feel a strong connection to Israel, but that bond is weakening. Older generations of Zionists look back nostalgically on the Israel of pioneering young men and women who made the desert bloom and sought to realize the liberal ideals of the Zionist movement while remaining open to the world. Their Israel is a nation that longs for peace, fights for its survival and always aspires to integrate into its region.
According to that increasingly outdated image, the failure to achieve peace rests with the Palestinians and the Arab world. October 7 seemed to provide conclusive proof of that belief. So how did the date of that horrific massacre become, for many, a day commemorating the mass killing of tens of thousands of Palestinian men, women and children?
The horrors of the war in Gaza and the attacks carried out by extremist Israeli settlers in the West Bank have transformed how the younger generation views Israel. Older Jews may cling to nostalgia, but their sons and daughters are turning away from the country. As Israelis like to say, they have "woken up."
Those students, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, who marched in the streets chanting "Not in our name," set up tent encampments at Columbia University and voted for Zohran Mamdani for mayor of New York City were born about two decades ago. The Israel they know is Benjamin Netanyahu's Israel: right-wing, nationalist, brutal, dismissive of the Palestinians and committed to preserving the occupation through a policy of maintaining the status quo.
They were around 8 years old the last time Israeli and Palestinian Authority representatives met for political negotiations in 2014, talks that largely took place under pressure from the White House and produced little of substance. Some of them had not yet been born when Israel withdrew from Gaza. Others were not even conceived during the Oslo peace process in the 1990s.
Many Israelis were astonished that actress Odeya Pinto did not live through the Yitzhak Rabin era. Well, Americans her age belong to a generation that never knew Joseph, or Rabin, but knows Netanyahu. In their eyes, he is a murderous war criminal, Israel's equivalent of Vladimir Putin.
The immediate response from many Israelis is to dismiss these young people as antisemites or, in the case of Jews, self-hating Jews. Some undoubtedly fit those descriptions, perhaps even many of them. But among them are also brilliant scholars, knowledgeable people and thoughtful minds. As noted, they are disillusioned. Their understanding of reality is more complex and certainly more current than that of their parents, perhaps even more so than that of many Israelis who remain convinced there is no occupation, deny the existence of the Palestinians and ignore the collapse of Israel's standing in international public opinion.
This is a fundamental crisis, not a failure of public diplomacy. Young Americans are perceptive. They see through propaganda and reject forced sympathy or obligatory loyalty while listening carefully to what Israel's current government says openly. Once, Israel argued that the turbulent Middle East was not Switzerland. Today, its leaders proudly declare they have no interest in being Switzerland: peaceful, liberal and prosperous.
Not only has Israel failed to resolve its conflict with the Palestinians, over the past decade it has made clear that it has no desire to pursue a peace agreement. In the name of preserving the diplomatic status quo, the Palestinian Authority has been branded a burden while Hamas has been treated as an asset.
 
For Netanyahu's Israel, the occupation is not the problem. The problem, in its view, is the way the world portrays the occupation as a problem. But it is not that the world has forgotten Israel. Israel has forgotten the world.
The truth is that Israel cannot exist without it. Not everything depends on Israel alone. International public opinion has become increasingly hostile, but the country's existential threat stems not from the hatred of outsiders but from excessive self-love: complacency, arrogance, national pride and an unshakable belief in the righteousness of its cause.
It is the narcissistic drift of the Netanyahu, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich government, which shapes policy as though it can bypass reality on the road to messianic redemption. It prefers deliberate blindness in the present over recognizing the trends unfolding in the real, practical world that point toward the future.
And when today's students become tomorrow's leaders, they may turn their backs on an Israel that has already turned its back on the better Israel their parents once believed in. Once.</full-text>
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            <id>hjnadz04zx</id> 
            <title>The new proxy: how hostile states exploit organized crime</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Hostile states and terrorist groups increasingly use existing criminal networks for intelligence, logistics, financing and covert operations, forcing governments to rethink where law enforcement ends and national security begins</description>
            <author>Liran Segal</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hjnadz04zx</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 15:03:15 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>One of the most significant shifts in modern national security is not taking place on the battlefield. It is unfolding through the growing convergence of hostile states, terrorist organizations and organized crime.
This shift is forcing governments to reconsider where organized crime ends and national security begins.
 
In recent years, several countries have uncovered attempts by hostile states and terrorist organizations to use local actors for intelligence gathering, logistical support and even the execution of hostile operations.
Increasingly, adversaries no longer need to infiltrate operatives or establish an entirely new infrastructure in every country where they seek to act. Instead, they can exploit criminal ecosystems that already exist.
Terrorism, espionage and organized crime were once treated as separate domains. Today, the boundaries between them are becoming increasingly blurred.
Organized crime groups are no longer merely profit-driven criminal enterprises. Under certain conditions, they can become operational, logistical and financial platforms capable of serving the strategic interests of hostile states and terrorist organizations.
From the adversary’s perspective, this is an efficient model. Rather than infiltrating operatives, crossing multiple borders and constructing networks from scratch, hostile actors can rely on existing criminal infrastructure. 
That may include smuggling routes, money-laundering networks, forged documents, illicit arms trafficking, logistical capabilities and local facilitators motivated primarily by money rather than ideology.
Organized crime groups also stand to benefit. Access to funding, resources, technology, international supply chains and new operational opportunities can strengthen their capabilities and expand their influence.
What emerges is not necessarily an ideological alliance. It is a mutually beneficial relationship driven by converging interests. 
This is no longer merely a law enforcement challenge.
Once a criminal organization becomes a potential platform for hostile-state activity, it ceases to be solely a police target and becomes a national security concern. Under these conditions, the traditional distinction between criminal investigations and national security threats is increasingly inadequate.
 
The same smuggling routes, financial networks, logistical infrastructure and local facilitators may support organized crime today and hostile-state activity tomorrow.
This does not mean that every criminal organization acts on behalf of a hostile state. It does mean that criminal infrastructure can become a strategic asset for hostile actors. At a time when states increasingly seek indirect, deniable and low-cost methods of projecting power, this possibility can no longer be treated as a secondary concern.
The implications extend far beyond policing.
National intelligence assessments should systematically examine the points of convergence among organized crime, terrorism, hostile-state activity, financial crime and illicit logistical networks. These connections should be identified before they develop into operational threats.
National security assessments should also routinely evaluate how criminal infrastructure could be exploited by hostile actors, just as governments already assess terrorism, cyber threats and foreign influence operations. 
Policymakers must also reconsider whether the traditional institutional boundaries separating law enforcement from national security remain adequate for the current threat environment.
As organized crime becomes part of the operational toolkit of hostile states, countries should consider establishing permanent national mechanisms dedicated to confronting this converging threat landscape.
The distinction between organized crime and national security is no longer operationally sufficient. As hostile states increasingly exploit criminal infrastructure as a strategic proxy, intelligence priorities, legal frameworks and national security doctrine must evolve accordingly.
The threat has evolved. Our doctrine must evolve with it.
The author is an intelligence specialist, strategic risk adviser and lecturer specializing in intelligence, homeland security, privacy protection and executive risk management</full-text>
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            <id>bkba11olrze</id> 
            <title>The nuclear mirage: why Israel cannot bet its security on the House of Saud</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Allowing Riyadh to develop nuclear infrastructure in exchange for diplomatic ties would abandon Israel’s non-proliferation doctrine and leave permanent capabilities vulnerable to future regime change</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bkba11olrze</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 11:49:11 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The geopolitical enthusiasm surrounding proposals to integrate Saudi Arabia into a broader regional framework through normalization rests on a profound miscalculation of strategic risk. Proponents within diplomatic quarters depict a realignment across the Middle East, offering Israel normalized relations across the Gulf in exchange for binding security guarantees from the United States and a civilian nuclear infrastructure for Saudi Arabia. 
Yet for Israeli security planners charged with safeguarding the nation against existential threats, this proposal demands cold analytical rigor rather than diplomatic optimism. To sanction domestic nuclear capabilities for Saudi Arabia, whether through fuel cycle control, indigenous enrichment or state-administered reactor facilities, represents an indefensible departure from defense doctrine. Israel has long maintained that non-proliferation across its periphery is an absolute strategic imperative, non-negotiable regardless of economic or diplomatic inducements.
 
The Begin Doctrine remains an unyielding principle dictating that no regional state harboring structural political instability or potential future hostility can be permitted to acquire weapons of mass destruction or the dual-use industrial capacity to produce them. Surrendering this standard to accommodate nuclear ambitions in Saudi Arabia would permanently erode the regional balance of power. 
While diplomatic advocates argue that international safeguards can mitigate proliferation risks, history demonstrates that technical safeguards are administrative constructs designed for static political environments. They provide no security against a state that chooses to nationalize facilities, expel inspectors or pivot toward weaponization. 
Once a nation acquires fuel cycle control or enriches uranium, the threshold between peaceful nuclear energy generation and military application becomes a matter of political intent rather than technological barrier. 
Proponents of nuclear development rely on the narrative of an irreversible societal transformation in Saudi Arabia. External observers point to entertainment, the curtailment of religious police and social relaxations as evidence of a post-Islamist transition. However, this perspective confuses tactical autocratic modernization with institutional secularization. 
For three centuries, monarchical authority has been tied to Wahhabism, a puritanical strain of Sunni Islamism providing the ideological foundation for state cohesion. Although current leadership has suppressed senior clerics to consolidate authority, it has not eradicated the entrenched religious consciousness of the populace. The religious establishment has been coerced into silence rather than converted. In moments of acute crisis, autocratic rulers routinely capitulate to religious zealotry to restore standing. 
The strategic hazard of trusting Saudi Arabia with nuclear capabilities becomes even more pronounced when examining structural economic vulnerabilities across the country. The ambitious restructuring plan known as Vision 2030 was conceived to liberate the nation from its reliance on oil exports. 
Years after its announcement, the initiative faces severe execution shortfalls and fiscal strain. Flagship megaprojects like NEOM have suffered extraordinary cost overruns, capital shortfalls and execution delays, forcing financial authorities to scale back construction targets and quietly reallocate capital reserves. 
Although absolute foreign direct investment inflows have shown modest statistical growth from a low base in recent years, foreign investment continues to fall drastically short of official state targets. The kingdom remains bound to global hydrocarbon cycles. Persistent fiscal deficits occur whenever crude prices drop below budgetary break-even thresholds, severely undercutting the government's ability to sustain public subsidies.
This structural economic decline threatens internal stability. For decades, the monarchy sustained political compliance by distributing oil revenues through public sector employment, energy subsidies, healthcare and tax exemptions. Today, fiscal imperatives have forced the government to introduce value-added taxation, curtail public sector benefits and compel a historically protected populace into an uncompetitive private job market. 
Although official figures for youth unemployment show statistical improvement, severe structural underemployment and a profound skills mismatch between traditional educational output and private sector demands remain deeply entrenched. This economic transition disproportionately impacts younger demographics who face limited career mobility. While an urban elite attends state-sanctioned cultural events, substantial populations in peripheral provinces experience stagnant living standards and mounting financial pressures in daily life. 
The governance model in Saudi Arabia intensifies these regime fragility risks by centralizing state authority into a single individual. By dismantling the traditional consensus-driven decision-making process among royal family members, current leadership has eliminated internal checks and balances, creating a single point of failure. 
In an autocratic system lacking democratic mechanisms, a free press, or an independent judiciary, public grievances cannot be mediated or absorbed. Internal pressures accumulate silently within the state until reaching a critical breaking point. 
Israel must confront the historical precedent of Iran in 1979. The Pahlavi monarchy was celebrated by the United States as a stable, modernizing ally and a pillar of stability in the Middle East. Iranian nuclear development was supported by Western powers through technical cooperation programs. In months, popular anger and religious mobilization swept the monarchy away, transferring nuclear infrastructure to a hostile regime in Iran.
 
The flaw in current diplomatic calculus is the failure to recognize that political regimes are transient, whereas industrial infrastructure and technical knowledge are permanent. Diplomatic commitments bind only the specific administration that signs them, but physical reactors, enrichment facilities and domestic engineering expertise endure across political transitions. 
If Saudi Arabia acquires a complete nuclear fuel cycle, indigenous enrichment or research facilities, the strategic balance of the Middle East is irrevocably altered. A future convulsion, whether induced by palace rivalries, economic collapse or popular revolt, could instantly transform a civilian nuclear footprint into a weapons program. Once a state possesses the material baseline and expertise to enrich uranium, crossing the threshold to atomic weaponry requires only a political decision. 
Israel's strategic posture must account for a geopolitical asymmetry between its position and that of the United States. Foreign policy priorities in the United States fluctuate according to domestic electoral cycles and global realignments, allowing strategic planners to absorb the long-term risk of a nuclearized Middle East behind oceanic distance. 
Israel, possessing no strategic depth and situated within immediate strike range, enjoys no such luxury. Accepting nuclear capability in Saudi Arabia in exchange for a normalization agreement sacrifices security requirements for temporary diplomatic capital. 
Regional architecture constructed upon the decrees of an autocratic sovereign is intrinsically vulnerable to historical shifts. Israel cannot base its national survival on the multi-generational stability of a foreign ruling house whose domestic durability remains uncertain.
Israel must maintain an uncompromising, permanent stance against any nuclear proliferation across the Arabian Peninsula. Non-proliferation is not a flexible bargaining chip to be traded for temporary diplomatic ceremonies, but a non-negotiable, existential prerequisite for enduring long-term national survival and regional stability. 
Israel's strategic doctrine has always rested on self-reliance, credible deterrence and the decisive operational capacity to prevent neighboring states from acquiring capacity or infrastructure for mass destruction. Surrendering this foundational defense posture for the fleeting promise of formal diplomatic ties would represent a catastrophic historical error. 
True security in the Middle East is forged through unyielding national strength, strategic denial, regional vigilance and the absolute preservation of non-negotiable red lines, never through fragile diplomatic bargains built upon the precarious, deeply unpredictable and transient foundations of an autocratic rule.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <title>Mamdani’s Israel stance sends a warning to Jews beyond New York</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Mamdani’s call to arrest Israel’s prime minister highlighted a growing divide between political rhetoric and actual authority, raising broader concerns among Jews about the normalization of anti-Israel narratives in American politics and public institutions</description>
            <author>Yuval David</author>
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            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rjvgplxsfg</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 06:28:46 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Zohran Mamdani stood before the cameras and said Israel's prime minister should be arrested the moment he lands on American soil. He knew he had no power to do it. He said it anyway—because the goal was never enforcement. It was applause. That gap — between what a mayor can actually do and what he wants the world to believe he stands for — is the story Jews need to understand, in New York as much as in Israel.
This is not really about one politician or one news cycle. It is a preview of where a rising wing of American politics is heading.
 
A mayor of New York cannot execute an International Criminal Court warrant. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, and matters involving foreign heads of government belong to the federal government, not City Hall. Mamdani knew this. The statement was never meant to function as policy. It was meant to perform as political theater—and it performed exactly as intended: international headlines, applause from ideological allies, another opportunity to cast Israel as uniquely deserving of global condemnation.
That should worry Jews everywhere, because this is no longer an isolated event. Ideas that once lived at the fringe of campus protests and UN resolutions are migrating into City Hall, state legislatures, and eventually, national office. It is a pattern that has moved from the margins into institutional power, and Mamdani's election is proof that the pattern now wins elections.
Increasingly, Israel is not treated as one democracy confronting terrorism under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. It is cast as the world's defining human-rights offender.
 
If universal human rights were truly the guiding principle, where is the same relentless energy directed at what the U.S. State Department and a UN fact-finding mission have both formally called genocide—the Rapid Support Forces' campaign of mass killing, starvation, and systematic rape against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities in Darfur, Sudan? Where is it for the genocide the United States government has determined Beijing is committing against the Uyghurs, over a million of whom have been swept into internment camps and forced labor programs? Where is the outrage over the Taliban's near-total erasure of Afghan women from public life, or over Nigeria, where Boko Haram and Fulani militias have destroyed hundreds of churches this year alone and, according to the United Nations' own human rights office, forced Christian women and girls into conversion, child marriage, and sexual slavery?
Where is it for the Islamic Republic of Iran, which executes its dissidents and openly calls for the destruction of the USA and Israel, or for Russia's continued military occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory?
These are not abstractions. They are genocide, enslavement, forced religious conversion, and occupation, happening now, verified by international bodies—and met with a fraction of the sustained global outrage reserved for Israel.
To be clear, this is not whataboutism, and it draws no equivalence. Israel is a democracy that holds elections, permits a free press, allows its own citizens to protest its government in the streets, and answers to independent courts—including for its own conduct in war. It operates under the same international laws of war that govern every other democratic military, and it investigates and prosecutes its own violations rather than covering them up. None of the regimes named above can say the same.
Yet Israel alone is held to a standard demanded of no other nation on earth—and much of what it is condemned for is not even accurate. Disinformation and misinformation campaigns, amplified across social media and echoed by hostile state and non-state actors alike, routinely blame Israel for atrocities it did not commit and casualty figures it did not cause. Naming these regimes' actual, documented atrocities is not a defense of anything Israel has done; it is a demand for a single, consistent standard of judgment and of fact, applied evenly rather than reserved almost exclusively for the one Jewish state on earth. The disparity in outrage is not proof that Israel is blameless. It is proof that the outrage was never really about human rights, or the truth, to begin with.
 
None of that happened by accident, and none of it happened without willing amplifiers. Mamdani himself is not an aberration within his party—he is a symptom of where a growing wing of it is headed. He is a longtime member of the Democratic Socialists of America, whose New York chapter has explicitly branded Israel an apartheid, colonialist state and pushed the boycott movement against it, even those facts and statistics prove that Israel is definitely not an apartheid colonialist state. That is no longer a fringe caucus arguing among itself. In 2026, DSA-backed candidates whom Mamdani personally endorsed won Democratic congressional primaries in New York, expanding the group's foothold in Washington itself. A mayor who built his political career inside a movement that treats Israel's delegitimization as a founding principle is now positioned to shape how the Democratic Party approaches the Jewish state for a generation. That is not incidental. It is the machinery behind the arrest headline.
Nor is this only a story about socialism. Mamdani's coalition has consistently elevated voices and causes aligned with Islamist politics—rhetoric that treats Israel's existence itself, not merely its policies, as the injustice to be corrected. When a mayor's political alliances run through a movement that chants for the "globalization" of armed resistance and cannot bring itself to condemn a massacre of Israeli civilians, the question is no longer whether he is antisemitic by intent. It is whose agenda he is amplifying, and why.
The amplifiers were not only ideological. There is also the matter of who was cheering loudest online. The New York Post reported that in the month before the primary, Mamdani's Instagram following exploded by more than 1,200 percent, and that engagement from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh reportedly outnumbered engagement from New York City itself. His campaign attributes the surge to savvy organic strategy, and that may well be part of the story. But whether the enthusiasm behind his rise was generated by New Yorkers or manufactured well beyond America's borders is a question Jews have every reason to ask—because it goes to the heart of whose interests his politics actually serve.
That is why this reaches far beyond New York. The battle over Israel's legitimacy no longer lives only at the UN or on university quads. It now reaches city halls, state legislatures, newsrooms, boardrooms, and cultural institutions across the democratic world—and it is shaping how the next generation of American leaders will approach the U.S.-Israel relationship before they ever take national office.
And here is what should alarm Jews in New York most of all: the same forces reshaping politics abroad are already at work on the streets these Jews call home, and the city is where that happens in real time. "Anti-Zionist, not antisemitic" has become the password that lets open hostility toward Jews travel under a respectable name. A synagogue is not attacked — a "Zionist institution" is targeted. A Jewish student is not harassed for being Jewish — she is confronted for her "complicity."
The line between opposing a government's policy and hating the people who share its faith and heritage has not blurred by accident. It has been blurred deliberately, and a mayor who came up inside that political culture, and who has treated calls to "globalize the intifada" as a legitimate expression rather than an incitement to violence, is now the one setting the tone for how his city treats its Jewish residents. This is not only a warning about Israel's image abroad. It is a warning about what is being normalized on Jewish New Yorkers' own doorsteps.
 
The strongest friendships are built on honesty, shared values, and a common commitment to democracy, not ideological performance. The question was never whether Zohran Mamdani had the authority to arrest Israel's prime minister. He did not, and he knew it. The more important question is why the mayor of America's largest city chose to spend his office on a promise he could never keep, instead of the crises he was actually elected to solve.
When political theater replaces principled leadership, the first casualty is not diplomacy. It is credibility.
And when Israel alone is held to a different moral standard, the issue is no longer justice. It is prejudice dressed in the language of justice.
Yuval David is an Emmy Award–winning journalist, filmmaker, actor, and international news commentator specializing in U.S., Israeli, and Middle Eastern affairs — with a focus on Jewish and Zionist issues, human rights, and the fight against antisemitism and Islamic extremism. A political advisor and strategic communications expert, he advises government leaders, diplomatic missions, NGOs, and policy organizations on advancing democratic values, civil rights, and the U.S.-Israel relationship. He is a Fellow at the Middle East Forum, and appears regularly across major American, Israeli, and international news networks.
Instagram.com/Yuval_David_
X.com/YuvalDavid 
Facebook.com/YuvalDavid 
Youtube.com/YuvalDavid</full-text>
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            <id>hklux8xrgl</id> 
            <title>After Israel-Lebanon deal, can Lebanon win back its Shiite community?</title> 
            <description>Opinion: The agreement’s true test lies beyond Hezbollah’s disarmament: whether Lebanon can rebuild Shiite communities, restore livelihoods and prevent alienation from deepening among those left displaced and vulnerable</description>
            <author>Noa Riven</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hklux8xrgl</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 06:03:13 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>On June 26, 2026, Israel and Lebanon signed a U.S.-brokered framework agreement to end the confrontation and restore Lebanon’s sovereignty over all of its territory. The agreement brings with it hope and a new spirit: a gradual Israeli withdrawal, the disarmament of Hezbollah and the transfer of security responsibility to the Lebanese army.
Yet amid the diplomatic and security discussions, the Shiite community has almost disappeared from the conversation — the community that bore the brunt of the fighting and paid the heaviest price. The question is not only whether the agreement will weaken Hezbollah, but whether it will bring the Shiites back into the Lebanese state or deepen their sense of alienation from it.
 
The agreement’s Article 3 stipulates that the Lebanese army will gradually assume security responsibility in “pilot areas” alongside the withdrawal of the IDF. Only after the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure are verified will international reconstruction efforts begin: rebuilding homes, repairing infrastructure and restoring civilian services.
This is the key to the agreement, but also its weakness. Reconstruction is conditional on disarmament and security progress, while in the meantime Israel continues to hold territory, villages remain inaccessible and thousands of Shiites continue to live as displaced people. The agreement promises them a future, but does not provide a solution to the problem.
For secular Shiites and opponents of Hezbollah, the agreement is a historic opportunity. It could return control of the border and decisions on war and peace to the state, finally separating Shiite identity from dependence on an armed organization subordinate to Iran’s regional agenda.
The agreement’s major gap
Lebanese Shiite journalist Mohammad Barakat, one of Hezbollah’s prominent critics, views the agreement as a wake-up call for the Shiite community. In his view, it could allow the community to return to the state, the army and civilian institutions, while exposing the failure of the model Hezbollah offered: promises of security, victory and reconstruction that in practice left behind destruction, displacement and loss.
But this is where the agreement’s major gap becomes clear: Even if the state commits to reconstruction, it remains unclear who will rebuild the villages, compensate families, restore livelihoods and assist those who cannot return as long as Israel remains in the area. A promise of reconstruction is not a reconstruction plan, especially not in a country suffering from economic collapse and deep institutional weakness.
This is also the difference between weakening Hezbollah and creating a genuine alternative to it. The organization can be pushed away from the border and responsibility can be transferred to the Lebanese army, but it cannot be replaced with declarations and words written on a page. If the state does not provide security, aid and reconstruction in practice, it will not separate the Shiite public from the organization. Instead, it will leave them weaker, more vulnerable and convinced that they have once again been abandoned.
 
The danger is particularly acute among Hezbollah supporters. In their eyes, they are being asked to give up the force seen as the community’s protector, while Israel remains on the ground and the state has yet to prove that it is capable of defending them. The agreement could therefore be perceived not as a restoration of sovereignty, but as an Israeli-American move that the Lebanese government is helping impose on the Shiites.
This is the real test of the agreement: not only whether Hezbollah will be disarmed, but who will fill the vacuum that emerges. Sovereignty is not limited to raising a flag, deploying soldiers or words written on a page. The state must provide shelter for the displaced, compensate families and establish a dedicated reconstruction authority to oversee rebuilding villages, restoring livelihoods and returning life to them.
If the state succeeds in doing so, the agreement could open a genuine path for the Shiites back into the Lebanese state. If it fails, it will not only miss a historic opportunity — it will give Hezbollah its strongest argument: The state demands that the Shiites give up their weapons, but once again leaves them to fend for themselves.
Dr. Noa Riven is a research fellow at MECARC at Ariel University, a member of the Dvorah Forum and a lecturer on the Middle East and Islam.</full-text>
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            <id>sjzltzghgl</id> 
            <title>Who is Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’ new leader and Sinwar’s successor?</title> 
            <description>Khalil al-Hayya, a Gaza-born Hamas leader who survived Israeli assassination attempts and lost four sons in the fighting, takes the helm after a narrow Shura Council victory, as he seeks to balance ties with allies and preserve Hamas’ independence</description>
            <author>Dr. Michael Milshtein</author>
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            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/sjzltzghgl</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 02:05:34 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>“Altogether, we lost 17 family members in wars, including four sons and five grandchildren. Praise be to God, who granted us the honor of their martyrdom. I am very proud that my sons became martyrs.” The words of Amal al-Hayya, wife of Hamas’ newly appointed political bureau chief Khalil, shortly after the killing of their fourth son last May, offer a glimpse into the fanatical world shaped by the family’s patriarch, who this week became the organization’s leader.
Al-Hayya’s selection is first and foremost a victory for Hamas’ leadership in Gaza, the place where the organization was founded and the only arena in which it controls territory (even if limited) and a population. Al-Hayya continues to carry the banner of Gazan leadership previously held by Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, even after nearly all of the region’s senior leaders were eliminated following October 7 and amid growing internal criticism over the decision-making that preceded the attack.

 
Al-Hayya takes the baton from Sinwar. He is not beholden to Tehran and is likely to insist on preserving Hamas’ independence.
However, the path to victory was complicated, coming after a second round of elections (and possibly a third) in the Shura Council. In the first round, Al-Hayya and Khaled Mashaal, one of the movement’s founders who is from the West Bank and served as political bureau chief for 21 years (1995-2017), ended in a tie. At the initial stage, none of the candidates managed to secure the 36 votes required out of the council’s 69 members, as stipulated in Hamas’ bylaws. In the final round, Al-Hayya succeeded in adding the support of 23 representatives from Gaza along with representatives from the West Bank and abroad, enough to win.
The latest elections are another chapter in the long-running competition between Hamas’ leaderships in the West Bank and Gaza. There is no difference between Mashaal and Al-Hayya regarding the long-term vision of establishing a state throughout historic Palestine while eliminating Israel. The gap lies in their short-term goals and stems from the regional arenas each represents: Mashaal seeks to strengthen the West Bank leadership and may therefore be considering participating in general elections (expected to take place in November) or advancing reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority, while Al-Hayya is focused on rebuilding Gaza alongside preserving Hamas’ position in the area, including strengthening its military wing.
“Gaza’s suffering will be the first thing Al-Hayya addresses. He has a personal connection to the issue as someone from the area,” explains Iyad al-Aqra, a Gazan commentator identified with Hamas.
Al-Hayya did not rise through the military ranks like Sinwar, but through political activity, similar to Haniyeh and Mashaal. He was born in 1960 into a native Gazan family (unlike Sinwar and Haniyeh, who come from the refugee community), joined the Muslim Brotherhood before it became Hamas in 1987, spent about three years in Israeli prison in the early 1990s, earned degrees in Islamic law (including a doctorate from a university in Sudan), was elected as a Hamas lawmaker in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006 and served as chairman of the faction.
Since 2017, Al-Hayya served as Sinwar’s deputy in Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza. On the eve of October 7, he traveled abroad, apparently to manage political activity from there after Gaza was expected to be drawn into an “apocalyptic war.” Following Sinwar’s assassination in October 2024, Al-Hayya was appointed Hamas’ leader in Gaza.
Documents seized from an underground command compound in Khan Younis early in the war shed light on his central role in planning the October 7 attack. In July 2023, Sinwar sent him to Lebanon to meet with Saeed Izadi, a senior commander in Iran’s Quds Force, to request assistance in attacking sensitive sites in Israel at the start of the offensive. Izadi responded that Tehran and Hezbollah supported the plan in principle but needed additional time to prepare. Sinwar ultimately decided to carry out the attack even without guaranteed support from Iran’s allies, based on the assumption, which proved exaggerated in hindsight, that they would join the confrontation once it began.
Although he does not have a military background, Al-Hayya has acquired the image of someone standing at the forefront of the struggle against Israel. This image is reinforced by the fact that he lost four sons (all members of Hamas’ military wing) and that he himself was targeted in Israeli assassination attempts. The latest came in September 2025, when a building in Doha where Hamas’ leadership was meeting was attacked. Al-Hayya was wounded and his son was killed, and the strike later contributed to pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump to end the war in Gaza.
“Al-Hayya represents the hard-line and hawkish core of Hamas’ leadership, although he knows how to demonstrate pragmatism when required,” Adi Rotem, a former senior Shin Bet official who served on the hostage negotiations team and effectively operated in parallel to Al-Hayya, who headed Hamas’ team, said in a conversation. A senior security official added: “Al-Hayya is expected to maneuver between his desire on one hand to justify the militant image on which he was elected and, on the other, to show awareness of the distress among Gaza’s population, which has not erupted so far but remains at the center of Hamas’ concerns and monitoring, while also demonstrating relevance on the diplomatic level.”
Al-Hayya’s areas of focus are not expected to differ from those he handled until the moment he was elected political bureau chief. His main objective will likely be advancing the second phase of the Gaza arrangement.
As part of this, Hamas has already announced its willingness to relinquish governing authority in the Strip and accept a technocratic government, but has strongly opposed a complete and immediate disarmament. Against this backdrop, the three mediators — Qatar, Turkey and Egypt — have recently promoted a compromise proposal under which a technocratic government would begin operating in Gaza, the IDF would withdraw from most of the Strip and reconstruction would begin, even without Hamas fully disarming.
The proposal is being blocked by Maladnov, Trump’s envoy to Gaza, but the mediators continue trying to persuade him to adopt the initiative, mainly to prevent a scenario in which Israel returns to intense fighting.
Al-Hayya’s selection also carries regional and international significance. Like previous senior Gazan Hamas officials, he has warm ties with Tehran, unlike Khaled Mashaal, who is despised by the so-called resistance camp. However, Al-Hayya is not beholden to Tehran and is likely to insist on preserving Hamas’ independence.
He maintains close ties with Qatar, where he lives, as well as with Turkey and Egypt, whose intelligence chief was quick to congratulate him. Another notable phone call came from Hussein al-Sheikh, Mahmoud Abbas’ deputy, who also signaled a desire to develop stable ties with Al-Hayya while granting him legitimacy in the process.
Against this backdrop, Al-Hayya’s unique relationship with Steve Witkoff stands out. The relationship developed during negotiations to end the Gaza war and included, among other things, condolences expressed by the senior American official over the killing of the Hamas leader’s son in the Qatar strike. At the time, the relationship was explained by Witkoff as a bond forged by shared loss, since Witkoff also lost his son, who died of an opioid overdose.
Al-Hayya’s election was announced shortly before the “Returning to Gaza” festival, which reflected the messianic dreams held by some Israeli officials of conquering, settling and emptying Gaza. It would be better to distance ourselves from such fantasies, which cause serious damage domestically and abroad, and focus instead on sober plans for confronting a bitter enemy that is not about to disappear and which, from this week, is led by a man no less fanatical than his predecessors.
Dr. Milshtein is a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.</full-text>
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            <title>The $25 billion pipeline that changes the balance of power in North Africa</title> 
            <description>Analysis: From Nigeria to Morocco and onward to Europe: How the new Atlantic Gas Corridor delivers energy security, weakens Algerian leverage and creates a major strategic win for Western-aligned partners</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/byrfqojbze</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 17:33:54 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>A strategic watershed along the Atlantic coast
The signing of an intergovernmental agreement by member states of the Economic Community of West African States in Sierra Leone in July 2026 marks a decisive geopolitical turning point. By formally endorsing the Nigeria-Morocco Atlantic Gas Pipeline, West Africa's primary regional bloc has cleared the way for a transformational 6,900-kilometer energy corridor.
Designed with a total annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters and an estimated cost of $25 billion, this hybrid offshore and onshore infrastructure project will transport natural gas from West Africa through 13 coastal nations before terminating in Morocco. Of that total capacity, 15 billion cubic meters per year will be directed to Moroccan industry and European energy grids through existing maritime connections to Spain.
 
Following years of feasibility studies and advanced engineering work, the agreement converts a long-term strategic vision into a concrete infrastructure project. Beyond its obvious utility in expanding electricity generation and accelerating industrial development across West Africa, the pipeline fundamentally alters the balance of power in North Africa.
It anchors the region to a stable, Western-aligned energy network, disrupting older patterns of energy dependence and geopolitical vulnerability.
The Israel-Morocco strategic axis and cold realpolitik
From the perspective of Israeli national security, the realization of this energy corridor represents a direct triumph of pragmatic realpolitik. The relationship between Israel and Morocco, built on the solid foundation of the Abraham Accords, is not merely a product of symbolic diplomacy, but a calculated alignment of fundamental state interests.
In an increasingly unstable international environment, Israel requires reliable partners capable of projecting stability, maintaining intelligence superiority and securing critical trade corridors.
Morocco's position as an economic and infrastructure hub along the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean directly serves those core strategic interests. A financially robust, energy-independent Morocco provides a formidable anchor against regional destabilization.
Enhanced defense cooperation, shared intelligence architecture and joint technological initiatives between Israel and Morocco become far more effective when supported by a thriving Moroccan economy. As Morocco integrates West African energy reserves into European supply chains, it solidifies its standing as an indispensable security partner, helping ensure that the western flank of the Arab world remains in the hands of a constructive regional power.
Neutralizing Algerian revisionism and energy coercion
The endorsement of the Atlantic corridor deals a major blow to the strategic calculations of Algeria's military-backed regime. For decades, Algeria has functioned as a revisionist spoiler in North African politics, dedicating vast national resources to destabilizing its neighbor and financing the separatist Polisario Front.
When global energy markets tightened in recent years, Algeria sought to weaponize its gas exports, using energy supplies as a tool of political coercion against European nations that recognized Moroccan territorial integrity. This strategy relied on leveraging its direct Medgaz submarine pipeline to Spain while attempting to isolate its western neighbor from regional energy flows.
That strategy of energy blackmail has now largely collapsed. Algeria unilaterally shut down the Maghreb-Europe pipeline in an attempt to strangle Moroccan energy supplies and intimidate European capitals, yet it was ultimately forced to absorb the geopolitical loss.
The recent official visit of the Spanish prime minister to Algeria, accompanied by senior energy executives seeking gas allocations through the Medgaz pipeline, demonstrated this reality. Algeria resumed diplomatic and commercial ties out of economic necessity, failing to extract a major concession or alter Spanish support for Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
Morocco neutralized Algeria's earlier maneuvers by reversing pipeline infrastructure to import gas through Spain and accelerating the Atlantic pipeline project with Nigeria. At the same time, Algeria's alternative proposal for a trans-Saharan pipeline through Niger crumbled under the weight of military coups, expanding terrorist networks and chronic instability in the Sahel.
The July 2026 agreement in Sierra Leone seals Algeria's strategic encirclement and deepens its economic isolation. It demonstrates that state power in the modern era is built on cross-border economic integration rather than coercive manipulation of natural resources.
Countering the Iran-Russia-Polisario axis
The strategic significance of neutralizing Algerian leverage extends directly to the global security balance. Algeria's regime has increasingly positioned itself as a hub for anti-Western powers, building deep military ties with Russia and cultivating dangerous operational links with Iran.
Tehran's strategy of deploying asymmetric threats across the Middle East has expanded into North Africa, where Iranian operatives have reportedly provided tactical training, advanced equipment and uncrewed aerial vehicles to the Polisario Front operating from Algerian territory.
This alignment among Algeria, Russia, Iran and the Polisario Front poses a direct security challenge to both Israel and Western countries. The construction of the $25 billion Atlantic pipeline creates an economic framework that actively displaces hostile foreign influence.
By bringing 13 West African nations into a shared energy network tied to Western markets, the project reduces the economic instability on which subversive networks thrive. It reinforces the territorial integrity of stable states and deprives the Iran-Russia-Algeria alignment of political and economic leverage across West Africa.
Western Sahara integration and transatlantic security
A critical dimension of the pipeline route is its passage through Western Sahara, directly integrating the territory into a major international infrastructure network. This physical infrastructure would further entrench Moroccan administrative and economic control over its southern provinces.
It would also operationalize the diplomatic recognition granted by the United States under the Trump administration and later reinforced by key European nations. The presence of a $25 billion energy artery running through the territory would weaken the Polisario Front's claims by replacing low-intensity conflict with a durable economic reality.
 
For the United States and Europe, the benefits are immediate and substantial. Delivering 15 billion cubic meters of non-Russian natural gas annually to Southern Europe would provide an essential buffer against energy-market manipulation by hostile powers.
Furthermore, by expanding power generation and industrial capacity across West Africa, the pipeline would directly address the economic deprivation that fuels radicalization and illegal migration toward Europe. It aligns transatlantic security goals with African economic development under the leadership of a trusted regional partner.
Strategic inevitability and lessons for Western policy
The signing of the West African pipeline agreement offers crucial lessons for Israeli and Western grand strategy. In the modern international arena, lasting influence is achieved through tangible infrastructure, hard-power alignment and economic interdependence.
Morocco's successful execution of this strategy demonstrates how pragmatic vision can systematically weaken revisionist threats without firing a single shot.
For Israel, the lesson is clear: long-term security depends on deepening ties with regional powers that build, innovate and secure vital global infrastructure. By supporting Morocco's economic and territorial stabilization, Israel and its Western allies can secure a critical Atlantic bastion, neutralize hostile proxy networks and establish a model of regional cooperation that may shape North African dynamics for decades to come.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>bk8hi7kbzl</id> 
            <title>From the ghetto window to the perfect storm: What I learned about our future</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Israel’s future depends on confronting internal division and international isolation, strengthening shared service and U.S. ties, and choosing unity, resilience and strategic thinking at the ballot box </description>
            <author>Sir Frank Lowy</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bk8hi7kbzl</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:38:55 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Our history has demonstrated time and again the unique strength of Israeli resilience and the remarkable ability of our society to emerge stronger from even the gravest crises, rebuild itself and work toward a better future.
The State of Israel is currently going through the most consequential election campaign in its history, under the shadow of an ongoing war and profound public and national security uncertainty. The succession of military events, the condition of our nation, and the political turmoil have at times blurred the distinction between our understanding of security and the threats themselves. Amid competing narratives, confusion and political propaganda, the conference organized by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and the Yedioth Ahronoth Group seeks to hold up a sharp and sober mirror to our current reality.
 
As someone who fought in Israel’s War of Independence and was privileged to witness the birth of this nation, I wish to hold up a moral and historical mirror to Israeli society and its leaders. To understand the existential threats now facing us, I must return to the earliest memories that have shaped my life.
In 1944, during the darkest days of the Budapest Ghetto, I was a 14-year-old boy. My brother risked his life to bring a small amount of food to the cramped apartment where nearly 40 people were sheltering. Overwhelmed by hunger, I pleaded with my mother to keep the food for ourselves—after all, who knew what tomorrow would bring? My mother said nothing. She simply opened the basket and shared the little we had with everyone in the room.
It was there that the defining lesson of my life was etched into my memory: when you have little, give little; when you have much, give much. That spirit of mutual responsibility - the ability to see others even under the harshest conditions - is what sustained us as a people, and it is what ultimately enabled us to build our home: the State of Israel.
Four years later, in 1948, we transformed that sense of mutual responsibility into the concrete duty of defending the young State of Israel against its enemies. At the age of 17, I found myself under fire at Kibbutz Gesher on Israel’s northern frontier. During those days, we learned of the Ma’apilim: Jewish immigrants who, after disembarking from ships in Haifa, had been sent directly to the bloody battles of Latrun, and fallen in defense of their homeland.
Today, nearly 80  years later, neither our national resilience nor our national security can be taken for granted. Two principal threats concern me above all:
The first threat: Internal division
The first is the internal threat: the erosion of our democracy through deepening polarization that could descend into violent conflict, together with the growing crisis surrounding military service.
When I reflect on the total sacrifice made during the founding years of the state - when an entire generation gave everything it had - and compare it with the challenges of the past three years, including the events of October 7 and everything that has followed since, I find myself deeply troubled by voices in the public debate questioning the necessity of mandatory national service for all Israeli citizens.
 
Do we no longer have enemies? Given our history, how can anyone conclude that not everyone should share the responsibility of serving the country? Such thinking represents a complete departure from the solidarity of the generation that founded the State of Israel and from the values my mother taught me in the ghetto.
The second threat: International isolation
The second threat is the danger of international isolation, particularly the possible loss of the United States’ strategic support, both today and for generations to come. Damage to this critical alliance could become the first falling domino, setting off a chain reaction that could bring other threats to fruition - from Iran’s nuclear ambitions to a prolonged multi-front war-creating the “perfect storm” that could genuinely endanger the future of the State of Israel, which is so precious to us.
For all these reasons, I believe participation in the upcoming elections is of the utmost importance. These are exceptionally consequential elections. Democracy is not a spectator sport. Only a high voter turnout will enable Israel’s citizens to genuinely shape the identity of the next government, its values and its ability to meet both the immediate challenges before us and those that lie ahead.
 
This is the deepest civic expression of our shared responsibility for our collective future, and only in this way can we safeguard Israel’s national security over the long term.
National security is certainly built on the battlefield through the courage of soldiers and the strength of arms. But in the modern era, it is also built, preserved and guided through sound judgment, innovative strategic research and long-term policy thinking. This is the institutional way of contributing to the future of our country by providing the tools needed by those entrusted with leading it.
I remain optimistic.
Our history has repeatedly demonstrated the extraordinary strength of Israeli resilience and the remarkable ability of our society to emerge stronger from even the most difficult crises, rebuild itself, and shape a better future.
Our strength lies in our proven ability to create a better tomorrow. Israel’s economy remains strong and resilient, thanks in part to its world-leading high-tech sector, but above all because our country is home to a rare concentration of brilliant, creative, and deeply committed people.
Our military remains strong despite extraordinary challenges.
Israel’s third sector and philanthropic community, in which I am privileged to play a part, continue to invest tremendous effort in strengthening Israeli society and nurturing all that is good within it.
Countless public servants who place Israel’s future above all else are working tirelessly to ensure that this spirit prevails over the current storm.
As we approach the elections and the inauguration of the next government, we must remember that the miracle called the State of Israel will not endure on its own. We must remain faithful to the foundational values of generosity, unity, partnership, and social cohesion. Only through principled and thoughtful strategic planning will we be able to confront these threats and secure our future for generations to come.
We can build. We can repair. It depends on us.
Sir Frank Lowy is chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
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            <id>byurrkjbmg</id> 
            <title>Israel’s endless Iran war anxiety has become the new normal</title> 
            <description>Opinion: As Israelis wait for the next confrontation with Iran, the constant state of emergency has pushed elections, policy debates and ordinary life into the background</description>
            <author>Einav Schiff</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/byurrkjbmg</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:18:18 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Four words have come to symbolize a near-catatonic, almost surreal state in which even the appearance of normality boards a plane, takes off and disappears before the skies close again: “Do you know something?”
Of course, the “something” does not refer to one of humanity’s many unanswered mysteries. It is not about whether aliens exist, when Rihanna will release a new album or why the prime minister suddenly looked as if he had seen a ghost when he was asked about his son.
 
It refers to the only question that matters right now: whether, and perhaps when, the war with Iran will resume.
After all, it is July and August. The hottest months of the year. And people like to say that the third time is the charm.
This distorted existential state, after nearly three years of emergency atmosphere and constant anxiety, has become as essential as the magnesium missing from the water coming out of the tap.
There are the hourly, increasingly frantic updates about what is happening at the airport, which during the summer months has become almost as sacred as Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and as strategically important as Israel’s nuclear facility in Dimona.
There are just over three months left until the election, yet the election itself feels like a secondary event in a much larger story. At any moment, campaign meetings, living-room gatherings and political events may have to be moved from crowded homes into cramped bomb shelters.
In such a reality, it becomes almost impossible to discuss serious questions about security doctrine, foreign policy, economics or society.
The “mountain of missiles” waits around the corner, forced upon an exhausted, frightened public like a bathtub suddenly dumped over its head.
Even the supposedly critical media, and much of the Jewish opposition, sit in studios biting their nails and sleeping with their shoes on, waiting for the signal that will allow everyone to once again stare in awe at the “performance” of the air force, the “intimate” coordination with the U.S. military and the “penetration” of the ayatollahs’ regime.
One can only hope this entire ritual is not taking place without a safety net.
And as usual, during the waiting period for the next Home Front Command alert, there is almost no serious discussion of the basic questions: the cost versus the benefit, possible alternatives, or even the legitimacy of a leadership that announced a “victory that would stand for generations” and turned confrontation with Iran, a country of 90 million people, into a recurring rivalry played out several times a year.
It is almost as if even asking the question is forbidden: Is a person who is equally focused on Iran and on whether the “security situation” could be used to postpone internal party elections really the person who should once again send millions of Israelis into shelters, knowing that some of them may emerge without homes to return to?
And that, of course, is the best-case scenario.
Beyond the danger of death, the destruction of property and the damage to livelihoods, more and more data is emerging about the psychological price being paid not only by soldiers, their families and those directly involved in the fighting, but by ordinary citizens as well.
The country has become trapped in a loop of military confrontations with no clear exit strategy and no clear answer for how to help lost children and broken parents.
And still, somehow, public discourse fills with a disturbing combination of panic and excitement ahead of that great, extraordinary and completely routine moment when the thing called life simply comes to a halt.
It is entirely possible, and it is a shame that this failure may never be investigated either, that the enemy is one small step away from an irreversible shift in the regional and global balance of power.
Perhaps all this poison and fury are necessary to guarantee the country’s survival.
But that does not mean doubts should be dismissed, minimized or buried. Nor should we ignore the enormous damage caused by losing the basic ability to go to sleep knowing, more or less, what tomorrow will look like.
This is not fate.
And if, nevertheless, there truly is “no alternative,” then it is the result of a colossal failure, one that a nation determined to survive should demand accountability for, rather than wag its tail in approval.
And no, I do not know something.</full-text>
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            <id>hyyslt0vze</id> 
            <title>The Jews who preach unity while humiliating other Jews</title> 
            <description>Opinion: A video mocking MK Gilad Kariv alongside Palestinian flags, pigs and bacon reflects contempt for non-Orthodox Jews, even as Israel depends heavily on the support of Reform and Conservative communities abroad</description>
            <author>Oz Bin Nun</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hyyslt0vze</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 23:18:08 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Some people chose to present Knesset member and Reform rabbi Gilad Kariv as Gilad 'bar mitzvah for dogs' Kariv,  with Palestinian flags, pigs and bacon shown alongside him. All this just two days before Tisha B’Av.
I am putting aside for a moment Kariv’s political views and his parliamentary work, because the issue is not really the Knesset member. And this cartoon is not merely tasteless or sharp criticism. It is a quiet declaration that Jews who are not Orthodox should be treated with contempt. Yes, the same people who created this video will probably sit on the floor and cry over baseless hatred on Tisha B’Av, but in practice, they are producing total demonization of a Jew who does not behave exactly like them.
 
In recent years, Israelis have been shocked by the plunge in support from American Jewry in particular, and from U.S. citizens in general. That decline does raise serious concerns. True, large parts of it have nothing to do with Israel at all. 
But let us talk about the part that is within our control: Most American Jews are Reform or Conservative. The military equipment that landed in Israel? Most of it was most likely funded by Reform or Conservative money. The solidarity delegations, the FIDF, the donations to buildings, organizations and volunteer initiatives. An enormous amount of kindness and resources invested in Israel comes from enthusiastic Zionist Jews who define themselves as Reform or Conservative. When Smotrich or Rothman march in the Celebrate Israel Parade in New York, many of those marching beside them are non-Orthodox Zionist Jews. How convenient to forget that there, how easy to smear them here.
Put simply, this is ingratitude. It is ingratitude because we expect world Jewry to understand us and support us all the way, while significant parts of Israeli society continue to despise them and deny their Jewish identity. An identity they devote their lives to preserving and work day and night to maintain. Without government support, in a world that is becoming more dangerous by the moment, and with temptations all around that pose an almost impossible challenge.
This is baseless hatred in the simplest sense of the word: Jews who are more occupied with smearing and denying the identity of another Jew than with joining forces against an existential danger. And the existential danger is more serious than is comfortable to think. 
 
Rapid technological progress, an unstable world that is becoming more aggressive by the day and a huge wave of delegitimization on a scale we have not seen before. A decline in the power of American Jews, internal struggles within the communities, the collapse of the relationship between American Jewry and Israel and the collapse of cooperation among Israelis themselves. All these create a real danger to our people’s ability to cope with the challenges that continue to pile up.
And here is the hardest truth: The fate of the Jewish people depends on its two most successful projects: building the Land of Israel and the flourishing of American Jewry. If one of these important projects collapses, the fate of the entire people will be in danger. 
So here is something for you to think about on Tisha B’Av: Do not mourn only theoretical baseless hatred and the destruction of the First or Second Temple. Ask yourselves what you think is leading to the third destruction, and decide to do everything to prevent it.</full-text>
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            <id>s1tv1p0eme</id> 
            <title>Netanyahu-Trump rift leaves Israel in dangerous uncertainty</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Jerusalem is making costly preparations because it cannot determine Trump’s plans for Iran, while Netanyahu’s difficulty reaching the US president leaves Israel with little influence over decisions that could reshape the region</description>
            <author>Ron Ben-Yishai</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/s1tv1p0eme</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 18:26:31 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Israel has stepped up its preparations, but not because it knows that U.S. President Donald Trump has ordered, or is preparing to order, a major strike on Iran. The opposite is true.
Jerusalem does not know what Trump has decided, and that uncertainty is forcing Israel to prepare for several possible scenarios at considerable cost. A decision in Washington could be made quickly, leaving the Israeli Air Force little time to formulate a response that both serves Israel’s operational needs and is coordinated with the United States.
 
The prevailing assessment in Jerusalem is that Trump still wants to return to the understandings outlined in the memorandum of understanding with Iran. At the same time, the White House appears to recognize that compromise proposals advanced by Qatar and Oman would largely serve Iranian interests.
Those proposals call for a 10-day ceasefire during which the U.S. blockade would also be suspended. Iran would be able to export oil and receive goods through the Strait of Hormuz, while the pause in fighting would ease pressure on the regime.
The United States, however, would gain little from such a ceasefire because Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has shown no willingness to abandon its demands regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
The Americans are weighing two poor alternatives. The first is to escalate and strike Iranian national infrastructure in the hope of forcing Tehran back to the negotiating table in a more realistic frame of mind.
The second is to accept compromise proposals offered by Qatar, Oman and Pakistan. A 10-day ceasefire would offer Washington little beyond conserving munitions and temporarily halting attacks on Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain, as well as on U.S. troops stationed there. Those forces are currently under repeated attack.
Once the 10 days are over, however, the United States would likely find itself facing the same strategic problem. For that reason, the assessment in Jerusalem is that Trump may prefer to escalate now, while the U.S. midterm elections are still three months away, rather than risk a major confrontation closer to election day or during the campaign itself.
According to a reliable source, Israel’s central problem is not only the complete uncertainty surrounding Trump’s intentions. The deeper problem is that the Israeli government, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally, currently have little ability to influence those decisions in either direction.
 
Over the past 10 days, Netanyahu has had difficulty establishing direct contact with Trump. During the war, and until recently, the two leaders spoke and consulted by phone almost every day. Netanyahu has also not received a date for a meeting with Trump, despite seeking one as early as last week.
The disconnect appears to stem in part from Netanyahu’s efforts to block the transfer of F-35 fighter jets to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whom Trump favors. It also reflects pressure from antiwar figures in Trump’s inner circle, led by Vice President JD Vance, who have been telling the president that Netanyahu is trying to draw him into a war that would be politically damaging.
Evidence of the growing distance between the two leaders emerged during a meeting of Israel’s smaller security cabinet this week. Participants struggled to assess the White House’s intentions as they prepared for possible scenarios in the conflict with Iran. At one point, Netanyahu left the room to hold a lengthy call with Washington in an effort to obtain more detailed and current information about U.S. plans.
Unlike in the past, however, he did not speak with Trump that evening. Instead, Netanyahu held a long conversation with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is regarded as Israel’s most important supporter within Trump’s inner circle.
That stands in contrast to Vance, who is viewed in Jerusalem as hostile to Israel’s position.
Washington’s decision to finalize a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia also came as a shock to Jerusalem. The surprise was not only that strategically significant, potentially game-changing information reached Israel through the U.S. media rather than directly from the administration.
The Trump administration also dropped its demand that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman normalize relations with Israel as a condition for the nuclear agreement. Under former president Joe Biden, Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords had been the central condition for reaching such an agreement.
That requirement has now disappeared. Israel’s political leadership is trying to obtain information about Washington’s intentions from the IDF, but senior military officials cannot provide the missing answers.
Israeli commanders frequently speak in glowing terms about their close relationship with U.S. Central Command, but CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper and his staff apparently do not yet know what Trump has decided. They may also have been instructed to maintain strict discretion.
These are therefore days of deep uncertainty, reflecting an unhealthy disconnect between the leaderships in Jerusalem and Washington. That disconnect appears to stem from the near-total loss of trust Trump once placed in Netanyahu.</full-text>
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            <id>bjaqgxcnzl</id> 
            <title>A rejected claim isn’t always the end: what new immigrants should know about Israel’s National Insurance Institute</title> 
            <description>Opinion: New immigrants often expect that settling into life in Israel will be their biggest challenge; in reality, navigating the country's social security system can be just as daunting; here is what you need to know to protect your rights</description>
            <author>Adv. Sheri Dvir</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bjaqgxcnzl</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 08:07:07 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Moving to Israel is one of the most significant decisions a person can make. Alongside the excitement of a fresh start come a host of practical challenges, including finding a job, adjusting to a new culture, learning the language and becoming familiar with unfamiliar institutions. What many new immigrants do not realize is that from the moment they arrive, they may already be entitled to a range of benefits through Israel's National Insurance Institute.
Far too often, a lack of familiarity with the system leads to delays, incorrectly filed claims or even the loss of benefits that people are legally entitled to receive. It is important to understand that the National Insurance Institute is far more than a provider of welfare payments. It serves as Israel's social safety net, offering support throughout every stage of life, from starting a family to workplace injuries, illness, disability, unemployment, long-term care and retirement.
 
The first step: make sure your residency status is in order
Before exploring which benefits may be available, it is essential to ensure that your immigration process and residency registration have been properly completed. Eligibility for National Insurance benefits is generally based on recognition as an Israeli resident, making it crucial to verify that your status has been officially established and that all personal information is accurate and up to date.
It is also wise to keep copies of all relevant documents, including your immigrant certificate, proof of residency, identification documents, bank account details and any additional paperwork that may later be required when filing a claim.
Health coverage: do not assume everything happens automatically
Many new immigrants believe that joining a health fund and gaining immediate access to medical services happens automatically upon arrival. In practice, it is important to confirm that your registration has been completed correctly and that you have been assigned to a health fund. A simple check early on can prevent unnecessary delays when medical care is urgently needed.
How do you know what you are entitled to?
This is perhaps the most important question, and there is no universal answer. Eligibility is not determined simply by immigrating to Israel. It depends on your individual circumstances, including your age, family situation, medical condition, employment status, income and length of residency.
 
Rather than trying to memorize every available benefit, ask yourself a simpler question: Has something significant changed in my life recently?
If you have children, you may qualify for child allowances and, where applicable, maternity grants or maternity benefits. If you have started working in Israel, make sure your employer reports your employment properly and pays National Insurance contributions on your behalf. This could have a direct impact on your rights if you experience a workplace accident or work-related illness.
If you lose your job, you may be eligible for unemployment benefits, provided you meet the legal requirements. Individuals living with a medical condition or reduced work capacity may qualify for disability benefits, while older adults who require assistance with daily activities may be entitled to long term care benefits. Upon reaching retirement age, it is also worth checking whether you qualify for an old age pension or additional benefits.
It is important to remember that many benefits are not granted automatically. In many cases, you must submit a formal claim, provide supporting documentation and meet the legal eligibility criteria. Whenever your family, health or employment circumstances change, it is worth reviewing your eligibility again. Many new immigrants only discover years later that they could have received valuable benefits but never knew they had to apply.
If you work, you have rights too
Employment in Israel provides more than financial stability. It also creates important protections under the National Insurance system. If you suffer a workplace injury, develop an occupational illness or lose your ability to work, you may be entitled to financial compensation and additional benefits.
 
For this reason, it is essential to verify that your employer reports your employment as required by law and pays the necessary National Insurance contributions. Failure to do so can create serious difficulties precisely when you need to exercise your rights.
A rejection is not always the final word
One of the most common misconceptions is that a rejected National Insurance claim marks the end of the process. Many decisions can be appealed. Additional documentation, updated medical opinions or information that was not originally considered may significantly change the outcome.
Understanding why a claim was rejected is therefore essential. In more complex cases, seeking professional guidance from the outset, rather than only after a rejection, can make a substantial difference.
Common mistakes to avoid
New immigrants often make the same avoidable mistakes. They assume benefits will be granted automatically, miss filing deadlines, forget to include medical records or employment documentation, or simply give up after receiving an initial rejection.
It is equally important to remember that some claims are subject to statutory filing deadlines. Delaying action may reduce the benefits available or even result in the permanent loss of financial entitlements.
The bottom line
Israel's National Insurance Institute is one of the country's most important social protection systems, especially for those beginning a new life in a new country. The sooner you understand your rights, organize the necessary documentation and take action when needed, the greater your chances of receiving the full range of benefits available under the law.
Perhaps the most important message for every new immigrant is this: Do not assume that if no one contacted you, you are not entitled to anything. In many cases, the benefits exist. The responsibility to find them, apply for them and protect your rights rests with you. A single timely inquiry can prevent unnecessary hardship and unlock benefits worth thousands, or even tens of thousands, of shekels.</full-text>
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            <id>s1cm7otemg</id> 
            <title>What we need is empathy, not agreement</title> 
            <description>Opinion: In the absence of agreed-upon rules for managing disputes, each camp tries to use its power to reshape reality to its advantage; the danger to our future does not stem from the very existence of disagreement among us, but from the way we manage it</description>
            <author>Yedidia Stern</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/s1cm7otemg</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 13:36:02 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>According to a well-known folk tale, Napoleon once passed by a synagogue on Tisha B’Av and was surprised to hear the crying and lamentations. When he understood that the deep mourning was over the destruction of the Temple 2,000 years earlier, he said with reverence that a people that remembers to cry over such an ancient destruction will merit rebuilding what it lost. Memory, according to this legend, is a constructive force for repair.
But this year, on Tisha B’Av 5786, we should fear that perhaps we have forgotten. True, we will fast and observe the customs of the national day of mourning by rote habit, but there is no escaping the conclusion: We have forgotten.
 
Tradition attributes the loss of Jewish independence in the two previous kingdoms to hatred among brothers, which ate away from within at the Jews’ ability to stand against their enemies. The burning of the storehouses - while the enemy was laying siege to Jerusalem - is the clearest symbol of the madness to which hatred among brothers can lead. And here too today, we are in danger of setting fire to the storehouses of sovereignty — undermining the rule of law, losing trust in state institutions, weakening governance — once again while at war with our enemies.
According to a recent JPPI survey, most Israelis, some 55%, believe the greatest threat to our future is not outside the country’s borders — security threats and antisemitism in the world — but within. In their view, the greatest threat is not from Khamenei or Mamdani, but from the preferences and actions of the neighbor in the shared apartment building. This intuition has something to rely on, but it is important to be precise: The danger does not stem from the very existence of disagreement among us, but from the way we manage it.
The public sphere has become an arena in which a “zero-sum game” is being played: Either I win, or I am defeated. Each side in the dispute believes with all its heart that a victory by its rival will make the shared home unfit for it to live in. This is an apocalyptic reading of reality, one to which many have become addicted, and it is fertile ground for fanaticism. And fanaticism, as Jewish history teaches, is the true battering ram for bringing down the walls of sovereignty.
Disagreement is not a problem that needs to be fixed
Disagreement is an inseparable part of a living society. The great question is whether we are capable of disagreeing with one another without denying the legitimacy of the other, without turning him into an enemy who must be defeated. For that, empathy is required — not agreement. Empathy means the ability to understand that even someone who thinks differently from me is acting out of a worldview, values and genuine concern for the future of the state.
Try a painful exercise: If you are voters of the left or the right, are you willing to say that Bezalel Smotrich or Yair Golan may be wrong, but they seek the good no less than you do? Allow me to guess that each side is offended by the very comparison. And that is exactly the problem.
But empathy alone is not enough. A polarized society needs agreed-upon rules of the game for managing disagreement. Israel needs a “lean constitution” — a basic system of governing rules that will establish stable agreements about how public life is managed. Such a system, had it existed, would have thwarted the possibility of carrying out a regime revolution, as the outgoing coalition tried to do, and would also prevent the opposite but parallel fear that if the current opposition wins the coming election, it will lead a counter-regime revolution.
 
In the absence of agreed-upon rules for managing disagreement, each side fears that if it does not defeat the other now, it will be defeated tomorrow. That fear creates a cycle in which each camp tries to use its power to reshape reality unilaterally in its own favor, and in doing so undermines the wall of Jerusalem of our generation. The road to my paradise leads to our shared hell.
The three weeks between the 17th of Tammuz, when the walls of Jerusalem were breached, and Tisha B’Av, when the Temple was destroyed, are called the days of “Bein HaMetzarim,” the period of distress. The expression is taken from the Book of Lamentations: “All her pursuers overtook her between the narrow straits.” How tragic that the pursuers threatening our future, then as now, are us. Will we know how to remember the consequences of fanaticism in previous generations and overcome the curse?
We can begin the repair, after the election, by accepting binding and entrenched rules of the game for managing disagreement.
Yedidia Stern is president of JPPI, the Jewish People Policy Institute.</full-text>
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            <id>hkoffp34mx</id> 
            <title>The truth about Pegasus: How the Morocco-Israel security shield outlasted global media outrage</title> 
            <description>Opinion: While Western headlines amplify sensational leaks, sovereign states continue to rely on intelligence superiority to preserve regional stability</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hkoffp34mx</link>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 14:24:48 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>In the high-stakes arena of Middle Eastern and North African security, public perception and strategic reality often occupy entirely different worlds.
For years, an international consortium of investigative outlets coordinated by Forbidden Stories, together with Amnesty International and major news organizations, has published extensive criticism of regional signals-intelligence operations. Much of that reporting has centered on disclosures involving Israel’s NSO Group and its flagship spyware, Pegasus.
 
These reports have portrayed cooperation between Israeli technology companies and Moroccan security services as an illegitimate breach of international norms. Yet viewed through the lens of strategic realism, that narrative often reduces complex geopolitical realities to a simple morality play.
Media organizations operating within business models driven by subscriptions and outrage can be tempted to replace objective intelligence analysis with moralizing commentary. Sovereign states, however, do not entrust national defense to foreign newsrooms, nor do they dismantle critical counterterrorism capabilities in response to shifting headlines.
A central element of the media campaign rests on accounts from anonymous insiders, most notably a pseudonymous former operative known as Safir, who claimed to have worked inside Morocco’s domestic intelligence service for nearly a decade.
Investigative reports have placed considerable weight on Safir’s description of a 2017 technical demonstration at a secure property known as the FSSYS villa, operated by a local branch of the United Arab Emirates-based intermediary Al-Fahad. The reporting presented the demonstration by NSO Group representatives as evidence of a covert arrangement, emphasizing shared account structures and Emirati financial involvement.
Safir’s account provides granular details that reportedly correspond with technical datasets and leaked records. But critics have arguably drawn conclusions that overinterpret what may have been a conventional defense-procurement process.
Evaluating advanced software through regional intermediaries is standard practice for security agencies confronting complex and rapidly evolving threats. NSO Group operates under export licenses issued by Israel’s Defense Ministry, a system intended to restrict sales to approved governments.
The rapid proliferation of commercial spyware does raise serious international concerns. But it reflects a broader global challenge involving the spread of sophisticated surveillance capabilities, rather than a uniquely Moroccan or Israeli phenomenon.
Critics also emphasize the technological shift within intelligence agencies from traditional collection methods to zero-click remote exploits.
Earlier reporting described how security services once relied on physical surveillance, monitored terminals in internet cafés and intercepted conventional telephone lines. Advocacy groups have presented the adoption of zero-click tools as an unprecedented escalation.
That characterization, however, fails to account for the structural realities of modern communications. The widespread adoption of end-to-end encryption on platforms such as WhatsApp and Signal has rendered many conventional wiretaps and physical-surveillance techniques far less effective.
To maintain operational readiness against violent extremist networks, organized crime and hostile proxies, intelligence services increasingly seek access to data at the device endpoint, before or after encryption is applied. From a security perspective, this shift is less a matter of preference than a response to the evolution of digital communications.
Morocco’s intelligence services have, by many accounts, conducted targeted surveillance against individuals operating in sensitive geopolitical environments. Such operations must nevertheless be considered in the context of Morocco’s national-security priorities, particularly threats to its territorial integrity in Western Sahara and concerns about separatist movements supported by outside actors.
The protection of civil liberties remains essential. But no sovereign state can afford to render its intelligence agencies ineffective when confronting hybrid threats, foreign-backed political activity and encrypted coordination by adversaries.
Moroccan authorities, like their counterparts in Western countries and major Asian powers, maintain that they have both the right and the responsibility to use modern endpoint-collection tools to protect national security. Pegasus and comparable systems are part of that broader technological transformation.
Investigative consortiums devoted particular attention to allegations that Moroccan services used Pegasus to monitor foreign officials. Reports cited leaked datasets containing Spanish telephone numbers and alleged targeting of senior Spanish officials, including Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Defense Minister Margarita Robles and Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska.
The reporting also referred to members of the Guardia Civil involved in counterterrorism operations, particularly during diplomatic tensions over Western Sahara and the 2021 Ceuta border crisis.
Cross-border intelligence collection involving foreign leaders inevitably produces diplomatic backlash. Yet it also reflects a longstanding principle of statecraft: governments do not rely on diplomatic trust alone when evaluating another state’s intentions.
During geopolitical confrontations involving territorial integrity and national sovereignty, intelligence agencies operate under a duty to ensure that political leaders are not caught unprepared by sudden or covert changes in a foreign government’s position.
To support allegations of widespread misuse, media reports have also cited corporate litigation, particularly Meta’s lawsuit in the United States against NSO Group over the exploitation of its messaging platforms.
Legal discovery in that case revealed internal client codenames, including “Subaru” for Saudi Arabia and “Morgan” for Morocco. Media outlets paired those codenames with forensic findings from Amnesty International’s Security Lab, including alleged memory indicators and command-server connections, and presented them as proof of state-directed hacking.
Digital forensics have undoubtedly become more sophisticated. Translating technical findings into legally admissible evidence and formal state responsibility, however, remains difficult.
When some of these claims reached European courts, they did not result in criminal convictions or definitive findings of legal liability. In Spain, judges at the Audiencia Nacional repeatedly suspended or closed investigations into the alleged hacking of senior government officials’ phones.
Those decisions did not necessarily mean that no digital traces existed. Rather, the investigations encountered severe procedural obstacles, including a lack of foreign cooperation, limits imposed by sovereign immunity and national-security classification rules that prevented intelligence material from being tested fully in open court.
The ultimate measure of an intelligence strategy is not the volume of media criticism it attracts, but the durability of the security partnerships built around it.
Had the allegations advanced by investigative consortiums truly destroyed diplomatic confidence, security ties between North Africa and Europe would have deteriorated sharply. Instead, cooperation has continued and, in some areas, deepened.
 
In late 2025, Spanish Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska presided over a ceremony at which Abdellatif Hammouchi, director general of Morocco’s national security apparatus, received the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Spanish Civil Guard, the institution’s highest honor for foreign dignitaries.
Grande-Marlaska praised Hammouchi’s leadership in modernizing Morocco’s intelligence and security infrastructure and described it as an important asset in counterterrorism and cross-border cooperation.
France has also honored Hammouchi with the Officer’s Medal of the Legion of Honor. These recognitions illustrate a basic reality of international relations: states facing immediate security threats tend to prioritize operational effectiveness over media controversy.
Sahel-based terrorist networks, violent proxy expansion, maritime insecurity and organized human trafficking are not abstract concerns. They demand intelligence-sharing arrangements, technical capabilities and sustained cooperation among governments.
The campaign against regional cyber capabilities has therefore proved less transformative than its organizers may have expected. The strategic framework linking Israeli technology, Moroccan national security and European defense partners remains functional, resilient and increasingly relevant as countries prepare jointly for major international events, including the 2030 FIFA World Cup.
In an era defined by hybrid warfare and accelerated digital conflict, information superiority is not a luxury. It is a central component of national sovereignty.
Public-relations campaigns organized by transnational nongovernmental organizations cannot intercept terrorist plots, secure borders or preserve regional stability. The future of global security will ultimately be shaped not by external critics, but by pragmatic states exercising what they regard as their fundamental right to defend themselves.
Amine Ayoub is a fellow at the Middle East Forum and a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X at @amineayoubx.</full-text>
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            <id>skhjfthezg</id> 
            <title>Why the US and Israel have not struck Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Western intelligence has tracked centrifuges moving into the deeply buried site since fall 2025, but an attack would require proof of nuclear activity, renewed US bunker-bomb stocks and precision planning accurate to within meters</description>
            <author>Ron Ben-Yishai</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/skhjfthezg</link>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 14:06:31 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The central concern for nuclear experts, as well as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump, is that Iran could take the uranium it still holds enriched to 60% and raise it to weapons-grade levels using a relatively small number of surviving centrifuges.
If Tehran does so, and there are indications that this is its intention, it could possess enough fissile material for more than one atomic bomb. Once weapons-grade material is available, the path to assembling a nuclear weapon becomes relatively short.
 
Highly enriched fissile material could also be used in a radiological or “dirty” bomb. A missile warhead or aerial bomb carrying such material could scatter radioactive contamination across a wide area when it strikes the ground, or even if it is intercepted, potentially making the area inaccessible.
That is why the new network of underground tunnels and production halls Iran has spent years excavating beneath the site known as Pickaxe Mountain has become a focus for Israeli, American and Western intelligence agencies.
The facility lies about 1.5 kilometers south of the Natanz uranium enrichment and nuclear production complex. Excavation began in 2020, and the site soon drew intelligence and scientific attention because its intended purpose remained unclear.
Iran may plan to turn the tunnel system into an enrichment facility and transfer advanced centrifuge arrays there from the original Natanz site to protect them. Alternatively, the complex could be intended for work related to assembling a nuclear weapon. There is still no definitive answer.
A question of weapons economics
Geologically, Pickaxe Mountain is composed of igneous rock, primarily granite. According to a Wall Street Journal report published Tuesday, its tunnels lie between 100 and 135 meters underground, making them almost completely resistant to conventional aerial bombardment. Both the depth and the hardness of the surrounding rock resemble the characteristics of Iran’s Fordow enrichment plant.
At the end of Israel’s Rising Lion operation last summer, U.S. B-2 bombers and specialized munitions were required to damage Fordow’s underground facilities and bury uranium enriched to 60% that had been stored there.
The name Pickaxe Mountain is itself a translation. Its Persian name, Kuh-e Kolang, refers to a pickaxe or hoe, apparently reflecting the difficulty of excavating the mountain even in ancient times. Despite modern equipment and reported Chinese expertise, tunneling through it remains highly complicated.
 
The underground facility was not attacked in June 2025 because it was empty, or nearly empty, and its intended role had not yet been established. After Operation Rising Lion, however, Iran began moving centrifuges and other equipment from Natanz into the Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, along with machinery recovered from other nuclear sites that had been bombed.
The transfers did not begin immediately. Iran first needed time to clear the entrances to damaged tunnels at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. Only several months later, in fall 2025, did it begin secretly transferring surviving or lightly damaged centrifuges to Pickaxe Mountain.
Iran attempted to conceal the activity from satellite sensors and other intelligence systems operated by Israel and the United States, but apparently with limited success. Even so, the site was not attacked during Israel’s Roaring Lion operation or the American Epic Fury campaign, which began in late February 2026 and continued until the ceasefire in early April.
One likely reason is that the facility was still not being used for actual nuclear activity, such as uranium enrichment or weapons design, and served only as a storage location. Another, equally important reason is that seriously damaging the mountain’s tunnels would require an exceptionally large operation that only the United States could carry out.
Only the U.S. Air Force possesses the roughly 10-ton GBU-57 bunker-busting bomb, which can penetrate approximately 60 meters of hard rock. The United States also operates the stealth B-2 bombers capable of carrying several of the weapons.
During the June 2025 Midnight Hammer operation against Fordow and other underground nuclear facilities, the United States deployed seven B-2 bombers carrying 14 highly precise bunker-busting bombs. Each weapon was dropped into the crater created by the bomb before it, allowing the strikes to reach an estimated depth of 80 to 100 meters.
The shocks created around Fordow damaged its highly sensitive centrifuge systems and rendered them unusable. The attack was one of the largest operations conducted by the U.S. Air Force since World War II. Seismic stations near Fordow recorded tremors equivalent to a magnitude 4.3 earthquake.
The damage affected not only the rapidly spinning centrifuges but also the carefully leveled foundations on which they stood. U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies therefore concluded that Fordow had been taken out of service, even if it was not completely destroyed.
 
The bombers flew directly from a base in Missouri and returned there, spending more than 30 hours in the air. A separate deception operation sent seven other advanced B-2 bombers toward Guam in the Pacific Ocean, apparently to make Iran believe the attack would come from that direction.
No less important, however, was the effect on the American weapons stockpile. The operation used 14 of the roughly 20 heavy bunker-busting bombs the United States reportedly possessed, nearly exhausting the available supply. That suggests an attack on Pickaxe Mountain would be at least as complicated, and perhaps more so.
Before Midnight Hammer, the Israeli Air Force cleared a route for the American bombers by destroying Iranian air defenses on the way to Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Even then, the United States deployed an escort force of 125 aircraft, including F-22 stealth fighters, electronic warfare aircraft and other platforms protecting the B-2s. A strike on Pickaxe Mountain would likely require the same capabilities, including Israeli assistance.
For now, therefore, the main consideration for Israel and the United States remains one of cost versus benefit.
The secret is no longer secret
According to The Wall Street Journal, Pickaxe Mountain is not currently being used for active nuclear work. It is serving only as a storage site for centrifuges and other equipment that has not been installed or maintained in a way that would allow it to be used in the near future.
To reproduce the effect achieved against Fordow last year, four basic conditions would need to be met. First, intelligence agencies would need evidence that Iran had moved its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% into the facility and had installed and activated at least some centrifuges and other equipment, even on a trial basis. Second, they would need sufficiently detailed intelligence on the precise location of the centrifuge production and operating halls to strike them accurately. Third, the U.S. defense industry would need to replenish an adequate stock of GBU-57 heavy bunker-busting bombs. Fourth, the U.S. Air Force would need to complete the planning and logistical preparations for an operation at least as complex as Midnight Hammer. That would take time and cost a great deal of money. 
 
Collecting intelligence on the facility is unlikely to be easy. To achieve meaningful damage, planners would need to know exactly where the centrifuges had been installed and calculate the bombs’ impact points to within one or two meters, perhaps even less.
The weapons would have to strike the same area in succession, penetrate the granite and damage the centrifuge halls and other underground installations, rather than merely shake the mountain. In other words, this would be a one-time operation requiring precise timing.
It would need to take place just before Iran began producing weapons-grade fissile material, but not so early that the strike failed to cause a meaningful delay in the nuclear program. Israeli and American intelligence and military officials had preferred to keep those calculations secret.
Several days ago, however, Trump said during an interview on a popular podcast that the United States was indeed planning to attack Pickaxe Mountain. The pickaxe was out of the bag, and the secret was no longer secret.
There is still no public evidence that Iran has installed the centrifuges stored in the mountain’s tunnels for operation. Satellite images, however, show Iranian work around the tunnel entrances and elsewhere to reinforce and harden them, allowing continued access even if the area is bombed.
At the same time, those entrances would be difficult for ground forces to reach if the United States decided on an operation to destroy the facility’s contents or potentially remove enriched uranium stored there.</full-text>
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            <id>ry2odwnvge</id> 
            <title>Pakistan’s credibility is on the line</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Islamabad need not seek war with Iran, but its response to threats against Saudi Arabia will determine whether allies and rivals view its security guarantees as binding or merely rhetorical</description>
            <author>Prof. Ilan Alon</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/ry2odwnvge</link>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 06:34:13 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>When Pakistan declared that an attack on Saudi Arabia would be treated as an attack on Pakistan, it sent a powerful strategic message. Alliances derive their value not from the ink on treaties, but from the credibility of commitments. Deterrence works only when adversaries believe promises will be kept. Today, that credibility is being tested.
Pakistan’s hesitation is understandable. Iran is a neighbor with whom it shares a long border. Pakistan faces internal security challenges, sectarian sensitivities, economic constraints and an enduring rivalry with India. Entering a direct conflict with Iran would carry significant costs.
 
Yet alliances are meaningful precisely because they require states to bear costs in defense of partners. If commitments are honored only when convenient, they cease to be commitments and become political slogans.
The contrast with Pakistan’s response to India is striking. When India attacked Pakistani territory, Islamabad reacted immediately. There was no prolonged debate over strategic ambiguity or legal interpretation. Pakistan correctly viewed deterrence as requiring a swift response. That same logic applies to alliances. If Pakistan expects its own red lines to be respected, it must demonstrate that Saudi Arabia’s red lines are equally credible.
This does not mean Pakistan should seek war with Iran. Responsible statecraft requires restraint and proportionality. A credible response can take many forms: integrated air defense, intelligence cooperation, military deployments, maritime security, economic measures or, if necessary, calibrated military action. The essential point is not the form of the response, but the unmistakable demonstration that treaty obligations have consequences.
The broader issue extends beyond the Middle East. Around the world, alliances are increasingly being scrutinized. Whether in Europe, Asia or the Gulf, adversaries are asking the same question: will allies actually show up when it matters?
 
Credibility is cumulative. It is built over decades but can be undermined in a single moment of hesitation.
Pakistan has long sought to position itself as a pivotal regional power and a reliable security partner for the Islamic world. That ambition carries responsibilities as well as benefits. If Islamabad wishes to maintain its strategic influence, it must ensure that its security guarantees are perceived as more than diplomatic rhetoric.
History teaches that deterrence depends less on military capability than on political resolve. States rarely challenge commitments they believe will be honored. They frequently test those they suspect will not.
Pakistan’s response in this moment will therefore resonate far beyond its relationship with Saudi Arabia. It will shape how allies, rivals and investors assess the country’s reliability for years to come.
In international politics, credibility is a nation’s most valuable strategic asset. Once questioned, it is remarkably difficult to restore.
Professor Ilan Alon is a professor of Economics and Business at Ariel University (Israel) and the University of Agder (Norway)</full-text>
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            <id>r16cc3onme</id> 
            <title>The Democrats walk a tightrope between protest and power</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Party members voting in today’s primary must choose candidates capable of replacing Israel’s government without turning a future coalition into a permanent street protest</description>
            <author>Nahum Barnea</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/r16cc3onme</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 19:09:02 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Members of Israel’s Democrats party will vote today on their slate for the next Knesset. At first glance, the choice appears straightforward. The party is polling at around 10 seats — effectively nine available places, since party chair Yair Golan does not have to compete for the top position.
The party’s three current lawmakers — MKs Efrat Rayten, Gilad Kariv and Naama Lazimi — have been among the most effective members of the opposition. Together with Golan, they have defined the party’s public identity and helped lift it into double digits in the polls. It would be a major surprise if all three were not elected near the top of the slate. Their greatest danger is the familiar one facing strong primary candidates: voters may assume their election is already guaranteed and cast their ballots elsewhere.
 
Assuming all three win, six places remain. Two are allocated to candidates from Meretz, which merged with Labor to form the Democrats. Golan may appoint two additional candidates to the top 10 and also has the authority to promote candidates within the slate. The final list must then comply with the party’s gender-balancing system, alternating between men and women. It is highly progressive — and exceptionally complicated.
Whether we welcome it or not, this election may mark the final chapter of Israel’s primary system. Among the Democrats, primaries survive only in a heavily restricted form. In Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, they appear to be approaching extinction. Israeli parties increasingly fall into two camps: those in which the leader — or leaders, in the case of former prime minister Naftali Bennett and opposition leader Yair Lapid — choose the candidates, and those in which a small circle of rabbis and politicians settles the matter through private negotiations.
Only a year and a half ago, former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot caused a serious crisis in the National Unity party after its chair, Benny Gantz, refused to hold primaries for either the leadership or the parliamentary slate. Three weeks ago, Eisenkot launched Yashar, the new party he now leads. I attended the event. It was pleasant. Candidates were introduced to applause. Primaries were not mentioned, even in passing.
Should advocates of internal party democracy now sound the alarm? I am not convinced.
Selecting a parliamentary slate is meant to serve two purposes. The first is electoral: choosing candidates who can attract votes. The second is political: assembling a group capable of wielding influence in the next Knesset. The first goal favors popular, polished candidates with impressive military ranks, academic credentials and public résumés. The second favors experienced, combative politicians who understand how to turn parliamentary and government positions into power.
Former defense minister Moshe Dayan once observed that no one remembers the name of ancient Jewish rebel leader Bar Kochba’s deputy. The same is largely true of the order of Likud’s candidates below Netanyahu. Few people other than the candidates and their families will remember who ranked seventh and who ranked 17th. In the end, the party leader — not the primary voter — will decide who becomes a minister and who remains on the Knesset’s back benches.
Individual candidates can bring additional votes when a party represents clearly defined communities. In United Torah Judaism, which represents much of the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox public, every Hasidic court and Lithuanian faction expects representation. The same principle applies to the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox Shas party: without representation, there are no votes. It also matters in Israel’s Arab parties.
For most other parties, however, the names below the leader have limited impact on election results. Their importance becomes clear only after the votes are counted.
Likud offers a useful example. The slate it presented four years ago included, on one side, colorless opportunists who treated the current term as a waiting room before the struggle over Netanyahu’s succession. On the other were disguised Kahanists, habitual provocateurs such as Likud MK Tally Gotliv and inexperienced lawmakers who entered parliament because of the reckless expansion of the Norwegian Law, which allows ministers to resign from the Knesset and be replaced by lower-ranked members of their party slate.
 
Many appeared to have little understanding of their parliamentary role. They served the coalition’s political attack machine, but also damaged the reputation of the governing party. Netanyahu is now seeking to replace some of them with figures who are less inflammatory.
The Democrats’ primary voters face an equally consequential dilemma. Within Israel’s center-left, theirs is the bloc’s most militant party. Removing the current government is, for many of them, not simply an electoral objective but an existential mission. Yet they understand that winning an election would be only the beginning. Any government that includes the Democrats would receive no honeymoon period.
Such a government would be torn between the demand for sweeping change — a reversal of the current coalition’s agenda — and the need for stability and political calm. The Democrats’ representatives in the Knesset and the Cabinet would face contradictory expectations. They would need maturity, restraint and discipline, while also preserving the distinct identity that brought their voters to the party in the first place.
Consider social activist and primary candidate Naor Narkis, who is competing for one of the two places allocated to Meretz. Narkis has built a substantial social media following around a sharply anti-Haredi and secularist agenda. He recruited many new party members and speaks to the anger of voters who believe the government has been shaped by United Torah Judaism leader Moshe Gafni, former housing minister Yitzhak Goldknopf and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.
But would a candidate who built his support through confrontation be able to function within a party seeking a place in government?
That is the Democrats’ central challenge. They want to represent the protesters who filled Kaplan Street without turning a future government — should one be formed and should they join it — into a permanent extension of the protest movement.
They must remain a vehicle for public anger while proving they can also govern. That is the choice behind today’s primary.</full-text>
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            <id>by2edsseml</id> 
            <title>The capitulation of Brussels: Why Europe’s anti-Israel boycotts expose a dying civilizational order</title> 
            <description>Opinion: By banning products from the West Bank, Belgium has chosen to appease domestic Islamist networks and rising street antisemitism; Israel must answer this hostile political warfare with absolute strategic self-reliance, military strength and new global alliances</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/by2edsseml</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:59:48 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The decree enacted by the Belgian government on Saturday, July 18, 2026, to ban imports from Israeli communities across the West Bank represents a critical shift in Western Europe's geopolitical alignment. By formalizing these economic restrictions prior to its summer recess, Brussels has aligned itself with the hostile diplomatic campaigns championed by Spain, Ireland, Norway, and the Netherlands. Wrapped in the sanitized language of diplomacy, European bureaucrats frame this as an enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334. Predictably, Egypt applauded the decision, calling on the global community to adopt identical measures. 
Beneath this veneer of legality lies a darker domestic reality. The decision to single out the Jewish state for economic warfare is a profound act of political capitulation to domestic radicalism. It is a direct consequence of the rise of political Islamism and a terrifying resurgence of antisemitism systematically hijacking the democratic institutions of Western Europe.
 
The demographic engine of European foreign policy
To understand this diplomatic assault, one must examine the demographic and cultural transformations sweeping through Western Europe’s capital cities. Israel has long warned its partners that tolerating unbridled radicalism and systemic hostility against Zionism would erode their own democratic values. 
Today, that prediction is reality. In urban centers like Brussels, Antwerp, Paris and London, the political center of gravity has shifted under the pressure of rapidly growing, highly mobilized immigrant populations. Within these demographics, organized Islamist networks have captured the political narrative, transforming opposition to Israel into a core litmus test for electoral viability. Left-wing coalitions and green parties, desperate to maintain their grip on power, have increasingly found themselves beholden to these voting blocs. 
Terrified of triggering social unrest within their parallel societies, European politicians have chosen the path of least resistance. They appease the radical street by sacrificing their strategic relationship with the only stable democracy in the Middle East. Electoral dynamics in cities like Brussels and Antwerp confirm that left-wing and green coalition partners routinely prioritize anti-Israel resolutions over critical local governance to appeal to concentrated voter bases, illustrating how European foreign policy has been weaponized to satisfy domestic demographic pressures.
The physical peril facing European Jewry
The immediate consequence of this political opportunism is the escalating danger confronting Europe’s Jewish populations. Following the events of October 7, anti-Jewish hatred across the continent has surged to its highest levels in generations, marked by unprecedented spikes in reported hate crimes. Comprehensive reports published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights paint a devastating picture, revealing that 96% of European Jewish respondents have encountered intense antisemitism in their daily lives. Over three-quarters reported being forced to hide their Jewish identity in public out of a justified fear for their safety. 
Data compiled by the Community Security Trust demonstrate that antisemitic hate incidents have shattered historical records, infiltrating schools, campuses, public transit and neighborhoods. When a European government formally declares that products manufactured by Jews in their ancestral homeland are illicit, it provides explicit state validation to the mobs driving this crisis. This institutional delegitimization translates directly into violence on European streets, where synagogues require permanent military protection and kosher businesses face vandalism. 
The strategic fallacy of territorial concessions
The animosity directed toward Israel from capitals like Brussels, Dublin and Madrid is existential, not policy-dependent. To a continent grappling with an identity crisis and yielding its public squares to Islamist influence, Israel serves as a convenient scapegoat. The strategic high ground of the West Bank is not a bargaining chip to satisfy unelected foreign bureaucrats, but rather an indispensable territorial shield against regional radicalism.
If Israel were to succumb to international economic pressure and withdraw from these vital hills, the resulting vacuum would be rapidly occupied by Iranian proxies and terrorist networks. The topography overlooking Ben Gurion Airport and the Tel Aviv metropolitan area would be transformed into a permanent launching pad for rockets, replicating the catastrophic realities witnessed in Gaza and southern Lebanon. European leaders can easily afford to indulge in utopian peace fantasies, but Israeli leaders, who must live with the lethal consequences of security failures, do not have that luxury.
The anatomy of European hypocrisy
The sheer hypocrisy underlying the Belgian decision is as profound as it is transparent. The international arena is filled with genuine military occupations, illegal annexations and state-sponsored atrocities, yet the European Union consistently fails to achieve consensus on punishing the world’s most egregious authoritarian regimes.
 European foreign ministers spent months debating complex customs tariffs and special licensing mechanisms specifically designed to harm Israeli business owners, exposing an obsessive fixation on the Jewish state. Meanwhile, Turkey’s illegal, decades-long occupation of Northern Cyprus, or Russia's military campaigns, never face identical forms of state-mandated economic warfare from Brussels. 
 
This severe double standard perfectly fulfills the globally accepted definition of modern antisemitism. When the international community routinely applies a unique, impossible set of standards to Israel that it applies to no other sovereign nation, its underlying motives are exposed as malicious. Even Egypt’s eager endorsement of this boycott serves as a calculated attempt to appease its own restive domestic public opinion, proving that in the Middle East formal peace agreements are maintained solely through overwhelming deterrence and hard power, not mutual affection.
Economic resilience and the Zionist future
Despite the hostile intentions of certain Western European capitals, Israel's ultimate shield remains its undisputed technological, economic and military superiority. The global economy does not run on the moral grandstanding of Belgian politicians; it runs on the critical, irreplaceable innovations pioneered by the Jewish state. The world relies heavily on Israeli advancements in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, unmanned defense systems and water management technologies. A localized, discriminatory boycott of goods from the West Bank will never succeed in crippling the robust, high-tech economy.
As Western Europe continues to succumb to its demographic and moral crises, Israel must actively pivot its foreign policy away from these unreliable partners. It must deepen its strategic, military and economic alliances with nations across Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia that possess a clear-eyed understanding of the global struggle against radical extremism. 
The capitulation of the Belgian government on July 18, 2026, is an explicit warning sign of a fracturing European moral order, not a measure of Israeli isolation. The State of Israel will continue to fortify its sovereign borders, defend its citizens, and build its future without seeking the permission or validation of foreign institutions. Israel’s national survival has always depended on its internal unity, its military prowess. While Western Europe chooses the path of cultural and political submission, the State of Israel will always choose the path of clarity, self-reliance and ultimate victory.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>bkj3t8sefg</id> 
            <title>The obvious became something we had to fight for | Speech by officer who brought Hadar Goldin home</title> 
            <description>A  society that returns its fallen from an enemy country is a more reformed society, one that closes a circle of justice, identity, memory and national honor; because a society that repairs its relations with its fallen, repairs its relations with itself</description>
            <author>Col. M. The officer who returned the body of Hadar Goldin to Israel</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bkj3t8sefg</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:27:55 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>There are three foundations to the Jewish ethos and the biblical commandment to bring captives home: our forefather Abraham, Moses our teacher and King David. Of Abraham it is said: “When Abram heard that his brother had been taken captive, he mobilized his trained men.” Immediately. Because the road to victory passes through values and is intertwined with them.
Of Moses it is said: “And Moses took the bones of Joseph with him.” Because the road to freedom, too, passes through strict adherence to values. And of King David, the Bible tells of a three-year famine that lasted until Saul and Jonathan were brought to burial. Then it is said: “And God responded to the land after that.” Cause and effect.
 
The ancient lesson learned 3,000 years ago teaches that bringing the fallen to burial in their homeland is a moral and national duty. This is not a matter of symbolism. It is a matter of repairing a moral wound. A society that returns its fallen from enemy territory is a more whole society, one that closes a circle of justice, identity, memory and national dignity. Because a society that repairs its relationship with its fallen repairs its relationship with itself.
It is troubling how something so self-evident has become something that must be fought for so fiercely.
Bringing captives home is not a political issue. Bringing back a soldier left on the battlefield is not a family’s mission. The road to victory passes through adherence to values, their preservation and their fulfillment. There is no contradiction between bringing hostages back from enemy captivity and defeating the enemy.
The range of operations carried out by the IDF and Shin Bet to locate Hadar in the tunnel of Hamas’ Yavneh Battalion in the Rafah Brigade became the Archimedean point that led to its collapse and defeat. We entered the tunnel to bring Hadar back, and the very act of capturing it led to the enemy’s defeat across the entire area. In this way, at the same time, we remained faithful to our values, Hadar returned to his land and the enemy was defeated. No area in the Gaza Strip was defeated as decisively as the Rafah area, and much can be learned from the campaign to return Hadar and its contribution to that unique victory.
Military power, however strong, is meaningless without values and in the absence of spirit. In every successful battle, it is the spirit that allows military power to be expressed. In the many operations to locate Hadar, all the principles of war were applied. But alongside them, it was the IDF’s values that brought Hadar back. 
“Dedication to the mission and striving for victory” were the essence of the actions carried out in the “White Dror” tunnel. And above all, comradeship. Hundreds and thousands of soldiers who took part in the various circles of the operations to locate Hadar are living testimony to the comradeship of fighters and pure mutual responsibility.
No leadership was found to lead the obvious
“Without vision, a people loses restraint,” Proverbs says. I would add: without leadership as well. In the many years before Hadar was returned, no leadership was found to lead the obvious, the basic values. There was no spiritual leadership, no religious leadership, no cultural leadership, no military leadership, no diplomatic leadership and no political leadership.
So what was here? You were here. An “awakening from below” — a few who strive to do good, who adhere to values, who know there is no contradiction between achieving victory over the enemy and bringing the captives home. The awakening from below is what spurred action and created an awakening above.
When we crossed the fence into the Gaza Strip to search for Hadar, the divisive and polarizing discourse did not cross with us. There was brotherhood, comradeship and unity. As one person with one heart.
 
We are in the midst of the days of mourning for the destruction of the Temple, the Three Weeks between the 17th of Tammuz and Tisha B’Av. The sages’ statement is well known: “Because of baseless hatred, Jerusalem was destroyed.” To our sorrow and shame, agents of baseless hatred have embedded themselves and gained a foothold in centers of power, influence and decision-making in the State of Israel. This is a severe moral flaw that could bring us to the threshold of another catastrophe of destruction. And “once permission is given to the destroyer to destroy, it does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked.” Woe to us if we fail to stop this deterioration.
Repairing the destruction and rebuilding will come through baseless love. We would do well to adopt Rabbi Kook’s approach, according to which it is better that we fail through baseless love than, God forbid, fail through baseless hatred.
We must learn to listen to one another more. Those who settle for the basic sense of hearing alone will be taken captive by every passing rumor. But those who rise to the level of listening will also be able to internalize the truth from whoever speaks it, without prejudice and without labeling in advance.
When public discourse fills with baseless hatred and becomes polarized, black and white, us and them, good and evil, one of the things that happens is the loss of the ability to be critical of yourself. The only criticism that remains is criticism of the other. And when there is no self-criticism, there is no ability to improve and move forward. Because you must always be right. But is there any human being who does not make mistakes? Greatness lies in doing, learning from mistakes and moving on as a better person.
The repair
Just as repentance begins with recognition and confession of sin, so too does the beginning of repair. It is the ability to admit a mistake and take responsibility. If there is difficulty doing that, the situation resembles a person who says, “I will sin and repent.” That reflects deep contempt for our basic moral system.
I too made mistakes and erred on the path to bringing Hadar back. Mistakes and errors emerged as the journey dragged on. But I always took responsibility for them, investigated, reflected and tried to correct them. We never despaired, never gave up and never let go of the mission.
For all those years, I avoided coming here for the memorial ceremony or on Memorial Day. The knowledge that the grave was empty was, for me, like a mirror reflecting failure. A systemic failure and a personal failure. Instead, I preferred to initiate another operation or intelligence move, to try another direction we had not yet tried and to do everything so we could succeed in bringing Hadar back.
Tractate Ta’anit teaches us that when the value of mutual responsibility strengthens among the people of Israel, rains of blessing are assured. A short time after Hadar returned to the soil of his homeland, the windows of heaven opened and rains of blessing fell across the western Negev. Those rains broke into the place where Hadar had been held in a Hamas tunnel and brought with them a surge of sand that partially sealed the cursed underground compound. The symbolism was of a tunnel whose purpose had ended and could now collapse into itself, under the force of rains that came because of the mutual responsibility of a large public that did all it could for its sisters and brothers in captivity.
Goldin family, you led a heroic and prolonged struggle to bring Hadar back. And in the spirit of the introduction to “Mesillat Yesharim,” a book Hadar so deeply embraced and turned into a road map for building his life, it seems to me that in the path you proposed for bringing him home, you too sought “not to teach people what they did not know, but to remind them of what they already knew.” You sought to remind us all of the simple things. The actions that are self-evident. Anyone who studies the ideas and plans you proposed over the years will also be able to draw a lesson or two about the way action is required today in the Gaza Strip.
 
In the years before the war of October 7, we carried out a series of operations aimed at locating the place where Hadar was being held, under the code name “Road Signs,” after Naomi Shemer’s song. Anyone who reads the words will understand why: “I am not alone on the road that leads to my home. There is one friend or two walking home with me.”
Thank you to all the soldiers and commanders who worked day and night, without regard for the calendar and with immense spirit and faith. Thank you to the women and men of the intelligence systems in Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet, the people of light who work in darkness, who broke records of creativity, perseverance and determination.
Thank you to everyone who did not give up, who was part of this, who prayed, who held a sign, who argued and tried to persuade others that this was the right thing, who stepped forward, who did not forget, who adhered to values. All of you brought Hadar back. Continue doing good. Hold the moral compass and lead the way, even when it is difficult. In the end, good will prevail.
And in the words of the poet Haim Hefer: “With the faith in my heart, with love without bounds, with the justice within me and with the greatest hopes, and with the morality in my soul, higher than all plots, today I swear. Even if the grueling journey is long and many fall behind, together we will continue walking on the road toward the light.”
I did not know Hadar before I received the mission to be part of the group that would fight to bring him back. But it seems to me, from what I managed to learn about him, that this is the spirit that would have stirred within him had he been present here.</full-text>
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            <id>byqoquingg</id> 
            <title>Don't worry about Gen Z and start learning from them: How Israeli chaos became the world's best school for managers</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Israeli Gen Z grew up amid pandemic disruption, war and national crisis; rather than seeing them as fragile or disloyal, managers should recognize a generation shaped by pressure, driven by purpose and ready to lead in uncertainty today</description>
            <author>Dror Litvak</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/byqoquingg</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 11:12:10 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>For years, we’ve grown accustomed to talking about Gen Z in terms of "snowflakes": the distracted TikTok generation, the one that suffers from phone-call anxiety, switches jobs like socks, and prioritizes self-care over organizational interests. As employers, we observed them with a mix of apprehension and dismissal, wondering how we would manage a workforce that requires positive reinforcement every fifteen minutes.
But then, Israeli reality came kicking down the door and proved that the mistake was entirely ours. Beneath the digital exterior and the quest for purpose, a new "Greatest Generation" is emerging right here—the generation with the highest potential for effectiveness that the modern job market has ever known.
 
The term "The Greatest Generation" was coined for the young Americans who grew up in the shadow of the Great Depression and went on to fight in World War II. They became a symbol of resilience, responsibility, and sacrifice—not because they were born that way, but because circumstances left them no other choice. In the Israel of 2026, we are witnessing a genetic replication of this phenomenon. Our 18-to-25-year-olds are not just "watching" complexity; they live it in their veins. 
From post-COVID adjustments and social upheavals to the wartime reality forced upon us since October 7th—this generation has undergone managerial boot camp inside a pressure cooker that no MBA program could ever replicate.
The apparent paradox is that the very traits we once perceived as weaknesses are turning out to be an organization’s greatest strategic asset. In a world where ManpowerGroup's "Talent Barometer" indicates record-high levels of global burnout and stress, Israeli Gen Z-ers arrive at the workplace already immunized. 
While managers from previous generations struggle to adapt to a world of uncertainty, these young people were born into chaos. For them, change is not a threat; it is a state of matter. They have developed the ability to function under extreme pressure, make rapid decisions in a volatile environment, and, above all, possess a mental resilience forged in the field—in the military reserves, in running civilian command centers, and in coping with profound personal and national loss.
This generation, often accused of challenging authority, is actually the generation searching for authentic leadership rather than empty hierarchy. When they find a worthy cause, they demonstrate total commitment that lasts for long months, far from home and comfort. They aren't just looking for a "job"; they are looking for a mission. 
In the current job market, where organizations struggle with employee retention and brand connection, Gen Z brings a hunger for meaning that can propel companies forward—provided we are wise enough to offer it to them. They know how to work in flat teams where there is no room for ego, only results, because that is exactly what survival looks like in the Israeli reality.
Our biggest mistake as managers would be to continue viewing them through the lens of the previous decade. If we try to "tame" them into outdated management models of rigid attendance and control, we will simply miss out on the most powerful growth engine at our disposal. We must understand that this is a generation rewritten: it is deeper, more complex, and significantly stronger than anything we imagined.
In conclusion, Israeli Gen Z is not a problem to be solved, but an opportunity to be led. They are not spoiled—they are focused. They are not impatient—they simply know that time is too precious to waste on inefficiency. Managers who are wise enough to grant them the autonomy, meaning, and flexibility they demand will find they have gained the highest-quality employees and leaders that Israeli history has ever produced. 
At the end of the day, those who know how to manage a team under fire or set up civilian aid operations overnight will be the ones to safely navigate your company through the economic storms of tomorrow.
The author is the CEO of ManpowerGroup Israel</full-text>
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            <id>h1duoqjnze</id> 
            <title>War of attrition or compromise: Iran faces its 1988 dilemma</title> 
            <description>Analysis: The anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s decision to end the Iran-Iraq War has reignited a dispute between pragmatists urging diplomacy and hard-liners rejecting US demands, while Tehran shows little appetite for another painful compromise</description>
            <author>Raz Zimmt</author>
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            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/h1duoqjnze</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 07:55:33 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The 38th anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 598, which ended the Iran-Iraq War, has sparked a lively public debate in Iran. Many see similarities between the circumstances in which the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, decided to accept a ceasefire with Iraq on July 18, 1988, and the current confrontation with the United States. 
This debate also reflects the internal dispute in Iran between pragmatists and radicals amid the renewed escalation between Iran and the United States.
 
A battle over the future of the region
The pragmatic camp views the acceptance of the resolution as an expression of responsible leadership that placed long-term national interests above adherence to ideals and slogans. According to this view, Khomeini understood that continuing the war would lead to military, economic and social deterioration, given the international support for Iraq, the weakening of the Iranian home front and the risk of direct American intervention.
This is also the lesson for the present: Diplomacy should be used as an instrument of power, it must be understood that not all objectives can be achieved, and it is sometimes better to settle for partial gains than to be dragged into a war of attrition.
Reformist journalist and political activist Ahmad Zeidabadi argued that when Khomeini concluded that continuing the eight-year war no longer served the country’s interests, he took sole responsibility and agreed to “drink the poisoned chalice,” as he put it, despite his previous insistence that the war continue until Saddam Hussein was overthrown.
The radical camp, by contrast, rejects any analogy between 1988 and the present. Its members argue that Resolution 598 was accepted because Iran was incapable of confronting the United States after the war expanded into the Persian Gulf, while today the reality is the opposite: Iran has the ability to fight across the region, strike American forces and challenge freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Therefore, they argue, there is no place for “drinking the poisoned chalice” again, and calls for political compromise even serve the enemy.
Political activist and media figure Vahid Yaminpour, for example, maintained that the Islamic Republic agreed to the ceasefire in 1988 because it was unable to confront the United States in the Persian Gulf. Today, the United States possesses far more advanced military technology than it did at the time, but it is incapable of opening a 30-kilometer-wide strait and moving even a single ship through it, while Iran has its hand around its throat in the strait in a battle over its own future and that of the region.
In any event, in light of the intensified American strikes in Iran and the disappointment over the collapse of the memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington, the Iranian leadership, despite internal disagreements, currently appears unwilling to make difficult and painful decisions similar to the one Khomeini made 38 years ago.
This approach reflects not only a sense of confidence and complete distrust of the American administration, but also recognition of the vital need to translate the gains Iran accumulated during the war, foremost among them its takeover of the Strait of Hormuz, into long-term security and economic guarantees. This is the case even at the cost of the risks involved in continuing the current escalation.
Military power alongside negotiations
Moreover, in the Iranian leadership’s view, there is not necessarily a contradiction between a fundamental willingness to negotiate an end to the war and firmly defending Iran’s essential rights and interests.
This perception was expressed in an article published by an Iranian news agency associated with figures in the Supreme National Security Council. The article stated that the anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 598 serves as a reminder of the birth of a strategic approach combining a willingness to use military power with diplomacy.
According to the site, the gravest strategic mistake is to view “war” and “peace” as two opposing and contradictory concepts, as though anyone who speaks of negotiations has distanced himself from resistance, and anyone who emphasizes military power has closed the door to dialogue.
A political system is measured not only by its ability to fight, but also by its ability to identify the right time to shift the arena of struggle. The decision to accept the ceasefire with Iraq was not the end of resistance, but its transfer from the military arena to the political and legal arenas. In the Iranian leadership’s view, there is not necessarily a contradiction between a fundamental willingness to negotiate an end to the war and firmly defending Iran’s essential rights and interests.
This historical experience is more relevant today than ever. In recent months, Iran has gone through a difficult war against the United States and the “Zionist regime,” which proved that the Islamic Republic does not hesitate to defend its sovereignty, security and independence, and that if war is imposed upon it, it will respond appropriately and decisively.
However, that same war also demonstrated that even the most successful military operations do not end the competition. After the weapons fall silent, the battle begins in other arenas: diplomacy, international law, economics, the media and public opinion.
Therefore, if during the war Iran’s missile power, defensive capabilities and national cohesion were its main assets, then in the postwar era, wise diplomacy, focused negotiations and political management will complement that power.
 
The most important message of the anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 598 for Iran today, the article concluded, is that courage is expressed not only in launching missiles or maintaining a presence on the battlefield, but also in a nation’s ability to know when it must fight and when it must negotiate, while in both situations refusing to retreat from one principle: preserving Iran, defending its independence and securing its national interests.
Dr. Raz Zimmt is director of the Iran and Shiite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies</full-text>
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            <id>b1nyidcege</id> 
            <title>Saudi nuclear deal tests Trump as Graham’s regional vision unravels</title> 
            <description>Analysis: A US-Saudi deal allowing domestic uranium enrichment is awaiting Trump’s signature, but bipartisan resistance in Congress, Lindsey Graham’s death and Israel’s exclusion from a broader regional framework could jeopardize its approval</description>
            <author>Kobby Barda</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/b1nyidcege</link>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 18:39:34 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>CNN reported that the Trump administration has already finalized a draft agreement allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium on its own territory for civilian nuclear energy, with negotiations on the deal effectively completed last October.
According to documents and sources cited by the network, the draft does not require Saudi Arabia to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would limit the agency's ability to conduct short-notice inspections in the kingdom. The completed agreement is now awaiting President Donald Trump's final signature before being submitted to Congress for approval.
 
The report came immediately after the sudden death of Sen. Lindsey Graham, who has not yet been buried, but it appears that large parts of his broader regional vision are being buried with him.
Graham, who was the chief architect and driving force behind regional mediation efforts dating back to the period when he led a bipartisan initiative alongside Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal, firmly believed that expanding the Abraham Accords and bringing Saudi Arabia into a U.S.-backed defense alliance with a civilian nuclear program represented Tehran's greatest strategic nightmare and the only path to ending the conflict.
But under current circumstances, that ambitious framework has begun to unravel, even as it has become increasingly clear that the initiative's real potential lay in being part of a much broader regional agreement rather than a standalone move.
Just last weekend, Nadav Eyal, a senior columnist for ynet’s parent newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, reported what he described as Israel's major political missed opportunity.
According to the report, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was prepared during the war to pursue a dramatic framework that included full normalization with Israel, a ceasefire, the return of all hostages and the deployment of Saudi troops to help administer the Gaza Strip, in exchange for an Israeli commitment to a credible pathway toward a Palestinian state within five to seven years. 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, rejected the proposal, missing what the report characterized as a historic opportunity for an agreement.
 
The cost of that missed opportunity, according to Eyal, extends beyond diplomacy to broader strategic and economic interests. He reported that while Israel has been left behind, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) — an ambitious initiative designed to connect Asia, the Persian Gulf and India with Europe — continues to move forward without Israeli participation.
IMEC's significance is considerable. Beyond a planned rail network that was expected to extend to the Port of Haifa, the project has expanded into a broader regional infrastructure initiative that includes fiber-optic networks for digital connectivity and cybersecurity, green hydrogen infrastructure, automation, artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies. 
According to the report, that network is now being developed quietly through meetings in Washington, while Israel is no longer on the route of the envisioned "peace corridor" and is being excluded from the region's emerging economic and technological architecture.
A profound shift in thinking at the White House
Alongside that missed opportunity, CNN's report that the nuclear agreement has already been finalized and is awaiting only a signature points to a profound shift in thinking at the White House, one that also stems from earlier concessions.
In practice, the U.S. retreat from its key demands began last year, when the Trump administration made a dramatic policy change by dropping a condition that the Biden administration had insisted upon: making a civilian nuclear agreement and a defense pact contingent on normalization with and formal recognition of Israel.
That decision, which left Israel outside the immediate framework, paved the way for the current draft agreement, tailored to Riyadh's needs. It would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium domestically without signing the IAEA Additional Protocol, thereby avoiding the agency's more intrusive inspection regime.
 
Saudi Arabia now finds itself at a strategic crossroads. Although the technical negotiations have concluded, Trump's signature has reportedly been delayed amid the ongoing war with Iran and concerns over congressional opposition. Graham's sudden death has left the administration without the chief advocate who was capable of securing the votes on Capitol Hill needed to pass such a controversial agreement.
There is now deep bipartisan skepticism in Congress over granting Saudi Arabia civilian nuclear capabilities, particularly if they are not tied to a much broader regional diplomatic initiative. That broader framework was precisely what the Biden administration and Graham sought to advance, with the late senator pledging to work personally to assemble the constitutionally required supermajority of 67 senators — two-thirds of the Senate — needed to ratify a historic defense treaty and civilian nuclear agreement while also integrating Saudi Arabia into the IMEC economic corridor.
Amid this uncertainty, the article argues that it is of paramount importance for Israel to leverage these developments and prevent its exclusion from the emerging diplomatic and economic framework. For Jerusalem, the goal should not be to oppose Saudi Arabia's growing influence but rather to support its integration as part of a much larger comprehensive package. 
The key to regional stability is to return the nuclear agreement to the broader regional negotiating table and once again link it to initiatives such as the IMEC corridor and normalization with Israel.
 
Only by integrating Israel's security, diplomatic and economic interests into this broader initiative can a strong and effective regional coalition be built that is capable of harnessing Saudi Arabia's influence to contain the Iran-led regional axis.
The White House now faces an all-or-nothing dilemma. Without the agreement's chief architect in the Senate, and with the deal detached from its broader regional context, Trump will have to decide whether to risk a direct political confrontation with a skeptical Congress or freeze the kingdom's nuclear ambitions at the height of the confrontation with Tehran in order to recalculate and pursue the broader agreement that the article argues is needed.
Dr. Kobby Barda is a faculty member at the Holon Institute of Technology (HIT) and a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI).</full-text>
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            <id>r1pmgb9nfg</id> 
            <title>The Kuwaiti delusion: How performance politics invited Iranian missiles</title> 
            <description>Opinion: For decades, Kuwait criminalized peace with Israel to appease regional radicals; Over the weekend, Tehran proved that ideological boycotts cannot intercept explosive drones;  The fires of July 18 have vividly shown the true cost of illusion</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/r1pmgb9nfg</link>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 12:07:37 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>In the quiet twilight of Saturday, July 18, 2026, the sky over Kuwait City fractured into a chaotic canopy of air defense fire and sudden, violent detonations. The wealthy Gulf emirate's long-cherished assumption that its vast fiscal reserves and diplomatic neutrality could shield it from the raw volatility of the Middle East vanished in a matter of minutes. A highly coordinated barrage of Iranian ballistic missiles and explosive drone swarms penetrated key sectors of the state's defensive network, striking directly at the vital organs of the nation's civil infrastructure. 
Two major power generation and water desalination plants suffered severe kinetic hits, triggering immediate rolling blackouts across key municipal districts and threatening the domestic water supply of an entirely arid nation. Simultaneously, a critical oil refining and storage facility belonging to the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation erupted into towering walls of flame, leaving multiple facility workers and emergency firefighters injured in the line of duty. 
 
The sheer scale of this unprovoked cross-border aggression forced the civil aviation authority to implement an immediate, total freeze on all commercial flights, plunging Kuwait International Airport into silence and locking the entire country into an unprecedented state of national emergency. 
The profound strategic irony of this security failure lies in the massive political energy Kuwait has spent fighting an imaginary enemy while ignoring the heavily armed predator directly across the Persian Gulf. 
 
For generations, the Kuwaiti political establishment, driven by an alliance of pan-Arab nationalists and radical Islamist factions within its National Assembly, has maintained the most aggressively hostile stance toward Israel of any country in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Rather than adapting to modern realities, Kuwaiti lawmakers have spent decades expanding draconian domestic boycott legislation, turning anti-Zionism into a mandatory state policy. 
Under the foundational 1964 Uniform Boycott Law, any form of normalization or expression of sympathy toward the Jewish state is a severe criminal offense. Citizens and foreign residents face lengthy prison sentences and ruinous financial penalties for merely communicating with an Israeli, participating in online forums, or advocating for peace. The state strictly enforces an absolute ban on any consumer goods containing components manufactured in Israel, subjecting local merchants to aggressive audits, while border control denies entry to anyone carrying an Israeli passport. This domestic theater created a massive institutionalized blind spot. 
This self-imposed strategic vulnerability stands in sharp contrast to the geopolitical maturity and foresight demonstrated by the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. By signing the historic Abraham Accords, these forward-thinking Gulf nations discarded obsolete ideological dogmas in favor of a tangible, forward-looking security architecture. 
Normalization with Jerusalem was never merely about securing lucrative trade deals; it was fundamentally designed to construct a sophisticated, integrated regional defense network capable of neutralizing shared existential threats. Through the synchronization of early-warning radar systems, real-time intelligence sharing, and joint missile defense planning, the Accords states established a formidable deterrent shield against Iranian hegemony. They recognized that the regional threat landscape had permanently evolved and that Israel represents an indispensable superpower partner in resisting the expansionist ambitions of the clerical regime. 
Tehran’s decision to unleash its missile and drone arsenals against Kuwait highlights the complete futility of attempting to appease regional revisionists through anti-Israel rhetoric. The planners within the Iranian regime do not formulate target lists based on which Arab capitals are the loudest in their condemnation of Israel. Instead, they operate on cold, calculated geopolitical metrics and strategic leverage. 
 
Kuwait functions as a critical logistical hub for the United States military, hosting expansive installations such as Camp Arifjan and the Ali Al Salem Air Base. These bases serve as vital staging grounds for American power projection across the region, placing the host nation on the front lines of any wider regional confrontation. Following the recent collapse of diplomatic engagements, Tehran has shifted its doctrine from relying exclusively on deniable regional proxies to executing direct, state-on-state kinetic aggression. 
By striking Kuwaiti infrastructure, the clerical regime sends a bloody message to Washington: any nation hosting American forces will be held as a geopolitical hostage, its economy and infrastructure subject to immediate destruction if the United States continues to launch defensive strikes against Iranian assets. 
The missiles that tore through the Kuwaiti power grids did not pause to consider whether the local population supported the Palestinian cause; they were launched to project raw terror and exploit a perceived weak link in the American security umbrella.
The fundamental lesson of the July 18 attacks is that in the unforgiving calculus of Middle Eastern national security, ideological purity, is ultimately a suicidal luxury. Kuwait tried for decades to buy domestic political stability and regional immunity by leading the anti-Israel chorus, yet this strategy has yielded absolutely zero strategic dividends. It did not purchase a single ounce of goodwill from the Supreme Leader in Tehran, nor did it delay the launch of a single explosive drone. 
 
In fact, by maintaining its fierce hostility toward Israel, Kuwait signaled its own strategic isolation and vulnerability to its enemies. It demonstrated to the Iranian regime that it was fundamentally unwilling to participate in the unified regional front necessary to check the activities of the regional octopus. The legislative obsession with isolating Israel succeeded only in isolating Kuwait itself, leaving its most vital economic engines and civilian lifelines completely exposed to the predatory designs of a neighboring theological dictatorship that respects only strength and collective deterrence.
The time for performance politics has expired under the rubble of the damaged power plants. While the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs scrambles to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and issue frantic international appeals, the hard truth remains that international law cannot intercept a ballistic missile.
 
To preserve national sovereignty and protect its populace from future waves of aggression, the leadership of Kuwait must execute an urgent paradigm shift. The ruling establishment must dismantle its obsolete boycott laws and abandon the performative hostility that has compromised its true security interests for generations. The real threat to the future of the Gulf monarchies has never been located in Israel; it has always been rooted firmly in Tehran. 
Kuwait must embrace reality, look toward its pragmatically minded neighbors in the region, and actively seek integration into the emerging regional defense cooperation that links the Abraham Accords states with the State of Israel. By integrating its defense capabilities, sharing vital radar data, and participating in a unified regional shield, Kuwait can transform itself from a highly vulnerable target into a resilient and secure partner. 
Survival in the modern Middle East requires hard alliances and real defensive capabilities, not historical grievances and legislative grandstanding. The fires of July 18 have vividly shown the true cost of illusion; the only logical path forward for Kuwait is the absolute pursuit of genuine regional strength through normalization and collective security.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>sklyzypezg</id> 
            <title>Iran’s calculated gamble: Keep Israel out, turn Hormuz into the battlefield</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Tehran is seeking to keep Israel and the nuclear issue out of the current crisis, focusing instead on Hormuz while avoiding direct confrontation with Jerusalem; Trump, meanwhile, remains focused on Iran’s nuclear program and the secret Pickaxe Mountain facility</description>
            <author>Dr. Michael Milshtein</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/sklyzypezg</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 13:53:29 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The military confrontation that unfolded in the region over the past week appeared to have been taken straight out of the “Roaring Lion” campaign, as if no memorandum of understanding had ever been signed that was supposed to put the sides on the path toward an agreement.
Alongside the similarities, there is one striking difference: Israel is not involved in the current episode. Iran, which is striking countries across the region, is making sure not to hit Israel, while the Americans, who are striking back at Tehran, are emphasizing that, at least for now, the matter does not involve Netanyahu, even though he very much wants to join the fighting.
 
At the center of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran, it appears, is deliberately maintaining tensions around the issue by disrupting and restricting the movement of ships and has even attacked several vessels, a move that led Trump to announce about a week ago that he was renewing the fighting.
This appears to be Iran’s way of turning the Hormuz issue, a card that did not exist before the war, into the focus of the conflict while pushing the nuclear issue to the sidelines. “Hormuz is more important than dozens of atomic bombs and we will defend it,” declared Mohsen Rezaei, the military adviser to Iran’s leader, this week, adding: “After the recent attacks, it is impossible to speak about friendship with America.”
“The confrontation provides an interesting glimpse into the decision-making process in the regime’s new-old structure, in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps plays a dominant role and the supreme leader is not the final authority,” Danny Citrinowicz, an expert on Iran and the axis of resistance, explained in a conversation. “The leadership in Tehran does view Washington as the ‘great Satan’ that must be avenged for the killing of Khamenei the elder, and it is more willing than in the past to use force. At the same time, it attaches great importance to negotiations, which serve its interests well. Tehran is demonstrating rigidity and is willing to take the heavy risk of escalation and a prolonged confrontation, but its goal is to return to negotiations under improved conditions from its perspective.”
The ever-volatile Trump broke new records this week. He is frustrated by the Iranians’ rigidity, claiming they are “dying for a deal,” and by the renewed surge in oil prices, which reached about $80 per barrel compared with less than $70 before the crisis and is affecting the lives of American citizens.
This week he announced that he would impose heavy fees on vessels passing through Hormuz, but reversed course a day later following, according to him, an offer by Gulf leaders to invest the amount he demanded in the U.S. economy. Along the way, Trump declared that Mojtaba Khamenei was “90% dead,” that he was checking whether the Iranians had stationed missiles and drones in Cuba and would “deal with it,” and that he had left precise instructions on how to strike Tehran hard if he himself were killed in an assassination.
At least at this stage, it appears that Trump has not taken his eyes off the nuclear issue. In this context, attention this week focused on “Pickaxe Mountain,” a secret facility carved 100 meters deep into a granite mountain near the Natanz enrichment site. Unlike Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow, this facility was not hit during the 2025-2026 campaigns and international inspectors have never visited it. In recent weeks, unusual activity has been detected there, possibly related to uranium enrichment. Trump, for his part, declared: “ But Pickaxe is a possible target for a nice, big, fat shot right in the front door. We’re going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to get ready. Tell them we’re coming, and there’s nothing they can do about it.”
Citrinowicz highlights the risk posed by the nuclear issue under the current circumstances: “Unlike the elder Khamenei, who demonstrated great caution on this issue, the current leadership may take greater risks and explore progress toward nuclear weapons. The statements recently made by senior officials in Tehran in this context could indicate a dramatic shift taking place in the thinking of the new leadership.”
Meanwhile, a dramatic revelation emerged this week regarding contacts between the Mossad and former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was known for his repeated declarations about the need to destroy Israel. The contacts were reportedly part of a plan to topple the Iranian regime and establish a new, supposedly “moderate” government. The information reinforces suspicions regarding the unfounded assumptions, bordering on fantasies, that underpinned the goals of the “Roaring Lion” campaign. It joins reports about plans to activate Kurdish militias against the Iranian regime and reflects an extreme misunderstanding of the nature of the “other,” a fundamental problem exposed on October 7 that appears not to have been addressed and may even have worsened.
The Iranian-American tensions also spilled over this week into Yemen. In this context, an unusual Saudi strike against Sana’a airport stood out, in an attempt to prevent the landing of an Iranian aircraft that Riyadh claimed had violated the airspace of Yemen’s official government, which is engaged in conflict with the Houthis. The Houthis, as expected, did not remain silent and responded by attacking an airport in southern Saudi Arabia with missiles and drones.
 
“The attack represents a certain deviation from the cautious line Riyadh has pursued in recent months. It may stem from concerns over deeper Iranian involvement in Yemen in a way that threatens Saudi interests and required signaling and the drawing of red lines, without risking a slide into broad escalation,” explains Dr. Michal Yaari, an expert on the Gulf, in a conversation.
The Saudi attack is an exception that does not represent the broader trend, namely the overall Arab and Muslim effort to prevent further escalation in the current crisis. The Qataris and Pakistanis, the sponsors of the memorandum of understanding, along with the Omanis, are working intensively to persuade the United States and Iran to halt the fighting and resume negotiations.
The Gulf states, as well as Jordan, absorbed painful blows from the Iranians this week, as usual in response to American strikes, but they still appear committed to the view that a status quo and calm with a revenge-driven and self-confident regime is preferable to a prolonged confrontation that would destabilize them politically and economically and could, among other things, provide Israel with a renewed opportunity to try to establish regional hegemony.
Indeed, Iran’s decision not to strike Israel appears highly calculated and based on the understanding that bringing Israel into the campaign could increase the damage to Iran itself, would not necessarily mobilize popular support in the Muslim world and could turn the current confrontation, which appears “controlled” for now, into a far more complicated conflict, even leading to the complete collapse of the memorandum of understanding signed a month ago.
 
Such a scenario could also, from Tehran’s perspective, rescue Netanyahu from the strategic predicament he has recently found himself in, after being forced to accept Trump’s terms for ending the war against Iran through an agreement viewed in Jerusalem as deeply problematic and a fragile arrangement in Lebanon.
The current escalation demonstrates that the agreement between Iran and the United States still rests on shaky foundations and deep mistrust between the sides. Nevertheless, it appears that neither side wants to return to a broad and intense campaign, and both view the current confrontation as part of, or a continuation of, diplomatic discussions, which they will likely return to after the current round, which may be the first in a series.
Israel is required to maintain close monitoring and, in the event of a dramatic deterioration, may be able to pursue deeper strikes against the nuclear program, which has not been destroyed. However, it would be preferable that this opportunity not again be accompanied by harmful fantasies about toppling the regime, a goal that would consume resources and divert efforts away from focusing on the nuclear issue. Until then, Israel would be advised not to surprise the Americans with an offensive move, a step that, as Israel has learned several times since October 7, ends with enforcement and causes more harm than benefit.
Dr. Milshtein is a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University.</full-text>
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            <id>sykn00w8ezx</id> 
            <title>Why Israel cannot afford to bet against JD Vance</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Israel is too quick to take offense and abandon important relationships; that is no way to conduct foreign policy, especially after Netanyahu governments spent 20 years neglecting ties with the Democratic Party</description>
            <author>Kobby Barda</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/sykn00w8ezx</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 18:42:59 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>U.S. Vice President JD Vance said in an interview Wednesday with Joe Rogan, the influential host of one of the world’s most watched podcasts, that while foreign countries often try to influence the American political system, what particularly troubled him in the current situation was that people inside the system were actively working to persuade others against him.
Vance pointed to the involvement of figures in the Israeli government who, he said, were conducting an influence campaign against him while using the services of Brad Parscale, who previously worked on Donald Trump’s campaign. According to the vice president, this was a coordinated influence operation intended to turn parts of the Republican Party against him. What angered him most, he said, was that the effort had succeeded in spreading a negative narrative among Republican voters.
 
Vance’s personal story is that of a man who built himself with his own hands. He came from Appalachia, grew up as the son of a single mother who struggled with alcohol addiction and was raised by his grandparents. He wrote about them in his bestselling memoir “Hillbilly Elegy,” which was later adapted into a popular Netflix film of the same name.
Despite his difficult background, Vance managed to attend Yale Law School. He later worked in the shadow of multibillionaire Peter Thiel and managed an investment fund for him.
It is worth remembering that before Donald Trump Jr., the president’s son and Vance’s close personal friend, chose him over the other candidates, Vance had spoken harshly against Trump and even described him as a bad and unfit candidate.
 
Although Vance was a young, first-term senator, he was ultimately chosen because he was seen as the clearest representative of the America First worldview.
The vice president promotes a policy of limited, or almost nonexistent, involvement in international affairs. His aim is to focus on what is happening inside the United States and redirect resources toward struggling regions such as Appalachia, enabling their residents to advance.
A leading voice for compromise with Iran
As part of that worldview, Vance was among the leading figures who favored compromise with Iran in order to avoid war.
Trump placed him in charge of managing relations with Iran. On the eve of the war in February, Vance tried to advance a framework that did not succeed. Later, during the second stage of the war, he managed relations with the Iranians, a process that led to the signing of a memorandum of understanding that was supposed to end the conflict.
 
Vance is a convert to Catholicism. The combination of his religious commitment and his lack of interest in foreign involvement led him to head the faction in the administration that opposes the embrace Israel receives from Christian Zionists, an important bloc in the Republican Party.
Vance does not hold any exceptional emotional attachment to Israel based on religious considerations. Instead, he sanctifies nationalism and national interest. It is also important to note that the son of Tucker Carlson, an influential media figure who has become openly antisemitic over the past two years, previously worked for Vance.
During that period, Vance was frequently exposed to messages portraying Israel as a country that persecutes Christianity. This led him to view Israeli actions in terms that are deeply troubling to the Christian faith.
Christianity as a persecuted religion
When examining the situation, Israelis tend to forget that protecting Christianity as a persecuted religion is a supreme value for many people.
For the first time in the republic’s 250-year history, Trump acts from an almost messianic perception of himself as a defender of Christians around the world. He has even said that he ordered strikes against the Islamist terrorist organization Boko Haram because it persecuted Christians. At the same time, Israel keeps scoring spectacular own goals.
On one hand, there is talk of aspirations to expand into Lebanon, part of which is driven by messianic movements that want to settle on the Lebanese side of the border. On the other, there are serious incidents involving ultra-Orthodox Jews who spit at and harass Christian tourists in Jerusalem on a daily basis, as well as the recent physical assault of a nun by an ultra-Orthodox youth.
All of this makes it difficult for Christian Zionists to justify Israel when they see images of an IDF soldier smashing a statue of Jesus, a soldier climbing with military equipment on a statue of the Virgin Mary or a soldier carrying a map of the promised Land of Israel that includes Lebanon, while trying to explain that there is no intention to expel Christians.
Despite this, it is important to note that JD Vance was personally involved in the release of the hostages. The hostage families whom he received warmly, particularly the family of Edan Alexander, have testified to his personal commitment to securing their release.
Broadly speaking, Israelis have a tendency to throw out the baby with the bathwater and take offense at everything. That is not how international policy is managed, and it is not how a ship is navigated, particularly after Netanyahu governments gave up on the Democratic side over the past 20 years.
Israel must not reach a situation in which both the Republican candidate and the Democratic candidate want it to fail. It has a duty to find a path to JD Vance.
A friend who is a political science professor at an evangelical university estimated that as the election approaches, Vance will move away from the nationalist wing and toward the center, understanding that without the evangelical bloc he will not win the nomination.
 
Betting everything on one basket called Marco Rubio, while dismissing in advance the possibility that Vance may play a role or even replace the president under circumstances required by the Constitution, would be foolish and could critically damage Israel’s ability to function in the diplomatic arena.
The recommendation to the next government is to make every effort to repair relations both with the Democratic Party and with the vice president.
A good beginning would be to work with the hostage families, including the family of Edan Alexander, and focus on the points of agreement with Vance rather than on the dispute.
Dr. Kobby Barda is affiliated with the Multidisciplinary School at HIT and the Jewish People Policy Institute</full-text>
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            <id>h1pjewg4mg</id> 
            <title>The Left vs. The Establishment: Why the anti-Israel backlash is just a symptom</title> 
            <description>Analysis: New York’s pro-Palestinian surge reflects more than hostility toward Israel: it is part of a broader revolt against political elites, wealthy donors and institutions that long shielded Israel in US public life</description>
            <author>Amir Bogen</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/h1pjewg4mg</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 16:24:01 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>"We occupied Times Square!" Miri Regev shouted from the stage during the 70th Independence Day celebrations she orchestrated in New York back in the summer of 2018. This particular "occupation" required no military force. All it took was funneling a few million shekels to the city and the operators of the giant billboards projecting Israeli landscapes into the heart of Manhattan.
But for whom, exactly, was this ostentatious street party intended?
Those permitted inside the heavily secured, barricaded enclave included Jewish community VIPs, members of Congress, senior city officials, Zionist organization representatives, consulate staff, journalists, and a handful of Israeli expats or tourists who had registered in advance. After two hours of dancing on stage and taking selfies (including with the writer of this column), the then-Minister of Culture ended the event, reassuring the supporting crowd that Times Square was "in our hands." Well, eight years later, it’s clear New York has been liberated - or at least, that is how its residents feel after voting the pro-Palestinian Zohran Mamdani into the mayor's office.
 
The frequent flyer Regev loves New York, but she is hardly alone. Israeli politicians routinely visit the city on official state missions or simply because they fancy a vacation. Typically, they blend fabricated meetings with Jewish community leaders and Shabbat receptions with wealthy donors, punctuated by shopping sprees in Manhattan’s luxury boutiques.
But their New York is not the real New York.
Whose New York is it?
It is impossible to truly connect with a massive metropolis of 8.5 million residents when your visit is confined to high-rise corporate offices downtown, lavish kosher cocktail galas, quick stops at Bloomingdale's and Macy's, and performative candlelighting at the Lubavitcher Rebbe's grave in Queens. 
When you rub shoulders exclusively with city hall operatives and VIPs who claim to represent its million Jewish residents, it is easy to develop a detached sense of mastery over the city. Yet New York’s natural, incredibly diverse population is the very epitome of global cosmopolitanism, and today Mamdani and his loyalists represent that reality far more accurately than Netanyahu's high-ranking friends. And the latest polls show they are more popular than any of them - including with Jewish voters.
 
Many Israelis dream of taking a bite out of the Big Apple for a vacation or relocation. Many successfully integrate, chasing the American dream across real estate, tech and academia. But New York is the center of the modern world not just because of Wall Street, Carnegie Hall and Trump Tower. It is a city of refuge for displaced people from conflict zones such as Ecuador, Congo and Iran (whose flags flew throughout the city during the World Cup). It also serves as a sanctuary for LGBTQ+ Americans fleeing conservative strongholds in Texas, Idaho, and Missouri.
It is a rare territory where Hasidic Jews in shtreimels, Muslim women in burqas, trans individuals with pink hair and keffiyehs, bald Buddhists in saris, and naked Scientologists can coexist. Alongside the bankers and institutional investors, progressive left-wing activists have an equal right to exist. This includes a brand of socialism that is rapidly gaining momentum across New York and the United States.
Symptom of a deeper fracture
In New York, almost anything goes. That includes the "Free Palestine" and "Stop the Genocide" graffiti on street corners that, since October 7, have blended into the daily landscape. It represents everything Israel has never been, and has no desire to be. Pluralistic. From this perspective, it is understandable why so many lovers of Zion feel their deeply Jewish city has been hijacked and taken from them by the pro-Palestine movement.
 
The immediate, reflex explanation is antisemitism. It is true that current American public sentiment tilts sharply against Israel, and Zionist Jews (as well as non-Zionists) frequently pay the price, perceived as proxies for their home state. However, the vocal protests against Israel are not the root cause; they are a symptom of a deeper, more fundamental phenomenon in American public life: a fierce rebellion against the establishment and the existing political order.
The recent wave of so-called socialist victories in New York’s Democratic primaries is, first and foremost, a defiance of the status quo. It is a backlash against the legacy of the Trump administration, as well as against Biden and Kamala Harris that preceded it. While old-guard commentators view these factions as traditional political rivals, the younger generation sees little difference between them. To them, both sides have surrendered to corporations and powerful corporate donors, perpetuating a political system that never served the ordinary citizen, and fight to keep things the same as they have always been for the benefit of the few in power.
This is the core of the current fracture: the rebellion of everyday citizens against the institutional stagnation of Washington politicians, consultants, and lobbyists. The vast majority of the old guard look and sound identical — lawyers, businessmen and retired generals who choose to pivot into public service. Fed up with this elite class of politicians, right-wing voters propelled Trump to power on a promise to "drain the swamp." Now, the left wants its own combative, revolutionary force to dismantle the existing order.
The crumbling armor for Israel
The burning debate over U.S. support for Israel fits squarely into this rift. For decades, Israel enjoyed steadfast, ironclad backing from American presidents, senators, representatives and bureaucrats. These were the very individuals Israeli prime ministers, ambassadors and emissaries met with for strategic briefings and lavish receptions during every visit to Washington, New York or Miami.
 
This closed circle of high-level influence, fueled by the financial muscle of extraordinarily wealthy donors and organizations like AIPAC, has been breached. The armor granted to Israel under the auspices of veteran, long-serving politicians is crumbling. In the past, congressional and Senate candidates relied entirely on big-donor money to fund exorbitant television ads and campaign apparatus. Today, social media provides direct, cheap and unmediated access to the masses, allowing anti-establishment candidates to bypass traditional gatekeepers entirely.
Recent New York election cycles clearly signal this shifting balance of power. Despite massive funding poured in by the city's business elite to block the election of Mamdani, who openly threatened to "tax the rich," and despite AIPAC declaring war on him and his progressive allies, the establishment failed time and again. 
Today, an AIPAC endorsement is increasingly viewed as a political liability for progressive candidates on the eve of elections. Look at the current campaign of Abdul El-Sayed in the Democratic primaries in Michigan, which thrives on the narrative that AIPAC is pouring millions into his opponent, Haley Stevens. These internet-driven dynamics are rewriting the rulebook of American politics. Fundraising totals used to be the definitive predictor of ballot-box success. We are now in a new era where young, outsider, resource-poor candidates can seize center stage, much to the terror of institutional lobbyists who have lost control of the narrative.
The shift we cannot stop
While these developments extend far beyond Israel, they undeniably impact it - and it should worry every one of us. Contrary to the optics coming out of the White House and Capitol Hill, Israel was never a top-tier priority on the agenda of America's silent majority. However, since October 7, large swaths of that majority have developed an acute awareness of Middle Eastern geopolitics and, more importantly, of how much it costs them as taxpayers as they struggle to make ends meet.
With the Israeli brand diminishing across the board into an international low, the political elites in New York and Washington remain Israel's only real safety belt. But as their influence fizzles out in the face of charismatic, anti-establishment candidates dominating Instagram and TikTok, it is difficult to see how this drift can be halted.
 
Mamdani and his allies - figures like Claire Valdez, Darializa Avila Chevalier, Brad Lander (the progressive Jewish and Zionist running for the House of Representatives), and 29-year-old Melat Kiros in Colorado, likely heading to Congress, as well as El-Sayed - are championing ideas once dismissed as radical fringe positions. To the average citizen, however, policies like taxing high earners, universal healthcare, abolishing ICE and tackling the cost of living make a lot of sense, and so does the prospect of halting military aid to Israel.
They bring an authentic, grassroots anti-establishment energy that veteran leadership simply cannot contain. Like it or not, they give voice to ordinary New Yorkers, like the thousands of passers-by who stood behind the barricades of Miri Regev’s street party. Made to feel like outsiders in their own city as they watched high-ranking guests celebrating the 'occupation of Times Square' with waving Israeli flags.
Today, the fence of that sterile, exclusive territory has been breached. The defensive shield of the old world's dignitaries is no longer functional. This reality will hold, at least until Mamdani and his peers become their own establishment, causing the pendulum to swing against them from the other side as their disappointed voters push back. That shift may happen sooner than expected, but for Israel, it might already be too late.</full-text>
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            <id>r1wtangi4gx</id> 
            <title>Abraham Accords strike again: Morocco just signed historic deal with Israel to secure Gaza</title> 
            <description>Analysis: First major Arab power commits troops to post-Hamas Gaza under Trump’s peace framework, shattering Islamist narratives and redefining Middle East security</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/r1wtangi4gx</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 11:39:53 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>On Wednesday, July 15, 2026, Rabat hosted a historic diplomatic milestone that promises to profoundly reshape the security landscape of the Middle East. Under direct instructions from King Mohammed VI, Morocco signed the legal framework to participate in the International Stabilization Force in Gaza. 
This agreement, signed by Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, National Defense Minister Abdellatif Loudiyi and Nickolay Mladenov, the high representative of the Gaza Board of Peace, represents a calculated step forward. 
 
For the first time, a major Arab military power with deep regional credibility is committing personnel to secure the peace, protect civic life and lay the foundations for sustainable governance in post-conflict Gaza.
The strategic gravity of this development is signaled by the presence of Morocco’s supreme defense establishment during the ceremony, including the inspector general of the Royal Armed Forces and the commander of the Royal Gendarmerie. Their direct involvement underscores that this is a highly sophisticated, meticulously planned security operation. 
By formalizing this comprehensive legal framework, Morocco has established a binding operational protocol that addresses all technical and logistical parameters, setting a new global standard for regional stabilization. While initial planning elements are already on the ground in Israel to coordinate logistics, this agreement provides the concrete legal architecture necessary for the eventual implementation of the mission.
The absolute prerequisite: total victory first
For Israel, the strategic implications of this Moroccan deployment are profound and positive, representing a structural shift in the region's defense paradigm. However, the Israeli defense establishment must remain unyielding on one absolute truth: there is no outsourcing of Israeli national security. 
 
No international force, regardless of its composition or diplomatic prestige, can replace the absolute necessity of Israel achieving total military victory over Hamas. The stabilization force is not designed, nor is it equipped, to fight Israel’s war. Its mandate is stabilization, not active combat against a deeply entrenched terrorist army.
To ensure the long-term success of this joint mission, the operational sequencing must be clear: the systematic dismantling of Hamas remains an absolute security prerequisite. The Israel Defense Forces continue their uncompromising mission to neutralize terrorist infrastructure, ensuring that the incoming stabilization force enters a highly controlled environment. 
By decisively breaking the backbone of Hamas’ military capabilities, Israel creates the secure foundation upon which Moroccan and other forces can successfully operate. This coordinated approach ensures that foreign stabilization teams are positioned as active agents of order rather than being drawn into active combat, making the final neutralization of Hamas’ political and military machine the ultimate security guarantee for this historic partnership.
Eradicating the Islamist plague
This mission is not just a physical security challenge; it is an ideological war against the toxic plague of political Islamism. Hamas is not merely a local militant group, but a genocidal franchise of the Muslim Brotherhood, funded and directed by the Iranian regime to sow perpetual chaos and block regional integration.
 
For too long, the international community coddled this extremist ideology, allowing it to poison the minds of generations in Gaza. This systemic indoctrination must be forcefully dismantled if any long-term stability is to be achieved.
Morocco's entry into the security equation is highly significant precisely because Rabat represents an explicit, structural rejection of this Islamist model. The Moroccan monarchy, through its historic spiritual legitimacy and domestic security policies, has spent decades actively suppressing extremist religious movements within its own borders. 
By committing to the stabilization of Gaza, Morocco joins Israel and the United States in a direct, institutional stand against political Islamism. This deployment must be viewed as an ideological offensive designed to purge the remnants of Hamas’ radical governance and replace it with a moderate, pragmatic administrative model that respects sovereignty and rejects jihadist expansionism.
The strategic reality of a demanding mission
Let there be no illusions about the sheer, grueling difficulty of the task that awaits these forces. Gaza is a highly radicalized, booby-trapped ruin. The environment is inherently hostile, and the civilian population has been fed a steady diet of antisemitism and jihadist propaganda for two decades. 
 
The Moroccan forces, slated to help secure a pilot humanitarian zone in the devastated southern area of Rafah, are stepping into a complex strategic arena. They will face asymmetrical threats, lingering sleeper cells and subterranean dangers left behind by a defeated enemy. This is a highly demanding and serious endeavor.
Fortunately, Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces and Royal Gendarmerie are uniquely equipped to meet these formidable challenges. Over several decades, Moroccan forces have accumulated vast experience in complex, high-risk peacekeeping environments across the globe, from the Balkans to sub-Saharan Africa.
Renowned for their iron discipline, tactical versatility and operational efficiency, they possess the precise skill set required for this sensitive mission. They are not passive observers; they are elite, highly trained professionals capable of maintaining absolute order while projecting a reassuring, stabilizing presence.
With the unyielding backing of Israeli intelligence and American logistical support, these forces possess the capabilities, the training and the strategic resolve to master this challenging terrain and protect the peace.
The axis of Washington, Rabat and Jerusalem
The success of this stabilization architecture rests upon a powerful foundation of trilateral cooperation between three long-standing allies. This diplomatic breakthrough is a direct product of the Gaza Board of Peace, launched in Washington under the leadership of U.S. President Donald Trump. 
 
For American foreign policy, this deployment represents a masterful realization of the regional burden-sharing model, where reliable, moderate partners take responsibility for maintaining order, reducing the need for endless Western interventions. 
By facilitating this agreement, the Trump administration demonstrates that the Abraham Accords are an active, security-focused alliance capable of solving complex challenges. This trilateral alignment serves as an enduring template for future cooperation, enhancing Israeli security while elevating Morocco’s standing as a vital anchor of stability.
A visionary legacy
The signing of this historic and comprehensive agreement in Rabat signals a profound, generational turning point for the region. This milestone deployment stands as a lasting monument to the visionary statesmanship of King Mohammed VI and President Donald Trump, who rejected past failed dogmas to construct a practical, enduring framework for cooperative regional security. 
By translating the promise of the Abraham Accords into active stabilization, they have initiated a powerful paradigm shift elevating moderation above conflict.
As Morocco’s dedicated personnel take their positions on the ground, they carry the promise of a stable future where security and dignity are daily realities. Through this historic deployment, Rabat, Jerusalem and Washington have forged an unbreakable alliance of moderate nations, united in purpose and resolute in strength, paving the way for a new era of stability and cooperation that will actively shape the future of the entire Middle East for generations to come.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>bkoe4wleml</id> 
            <title>What the UK is doing now to counter the Iranian threat</title> 
            <description>Designating the IRGC and IMCR, £250 million in new funding to protect the UK Jewish community and defending our Middle East allies militarily are just some of the expanded actions the UK is taking to counter Iran’s malign activity</description>
            <author>Simon Walters</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bkoe4wleml</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 10:59:18 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The United Kingdom has consistently condemned and acted in the strongest possible terms against the Iranian regime. This includes against its horrendous killing of Iranian protesters, its attempts to advance its nuclear program and its malign global activity.
This week, the UK went two steps further. Firstly, we are using new powers under the UK’s new National Security (State Threats) Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right (IMCR). This comes after the IMCR have publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities, almost certainly directed by the IRGC. 
 
Secondly, in response to recent attacks against the UK Jewish community, we have announced £250 million in new funding to provide a sustained, national response to protect British Jews. This funding will recruit more police officers, deliver a nationwide investigations hub and antisemitism training, and support the security services in thwarting terrorist attacks against the UK Jewish community.
But these new actions form only part of the ongoing UK response to the Iranian threat.
Militarily, we have acted in defense of our partners in the face of Iranian aggression. In April 2024, British Royal Air Force jets were in the air shooting down Iranian drones during Iran’s attack on Israel. In coordination with the U.S., between January 2024 and May 2025, the UK acted militarily against the Houthis in Yemen to thwart their unlawful armed attacks on shipping in an attempt to constrict freedom of navigation through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. During the recent war, the UK deployed air operations personnel to provide expertise to regional partners in managing complex airspace and UK forces shot down over 100 Iranian drones unlawfully targeting regional allies.
The UK also granted the U.S. permission to use British bases for the specific and limited defensive purpose of removing Iranian missile capabilities being used to kill innocent civilians, put British lives at risk, and strike at regional allies. Finally, along with France, the UK is leading preparations for a defensive multinational military mission to support safe, predictable and unimpeded transit for commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz once a sustained ceasefire is in place.
 
Diplomatically, on February 2, 2026, the United Kingdom implemented yet another sanctions package against the Iranian regime, bringing the total number of UK sanctions on Iranian individuals and organizations to over 550. These include sanctions on the IRGC in its entirety and key members of the Iranian regime. These sanctions follow on from our imposition (working with France and Germany) of UN snapback sanctions on Iran in September 2025, which saw the reinstatement of six previously terminated UN sanctions resolutions on Iran for its failure to comply with its JCPOA commitments. The economic toll of these sanctions on the Iranian regime has been enormous and has restricted its ability to finance its malign activity overseas.
The UK will always act to protect our citizens and our allies against the threat posed by the Iranian regime. We are clear: the Iranian regime must not obtain nuclear weapons. It must cease its military attacks on its neighbors. And it must allow freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. We will continue to call out the regime’s brutal repression, and to take the necessary steps, including with partners, to protect our shared interests. 
The writer is the British ambassador to Israel.</full-text>
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            <id>r19v7mb4fe</id> 
            <title>A betrayal of soldiers, Zionism and the soul of Israel</title> 
            <description>Opinion: By backing privileges for ultra-Orthodox draft dodgers and rejecting meaningful sanctions, coalition lawmakers betrayed the solidarity and shared sacrifice on which Israel was built</description>
            <author>Oz Ben Nun</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/r19v7mb4fe</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 17:07:55 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>What happened last night was a betrayal. A betrayal of those who serve, a betrayal of Zionism, a betrayal of the Torah of Israel.
That vote, in favor of privileges for draft dodgers, against sanctions and in support of a law that disgraces the Torah, was a betrayal.
 
I do not use that word lightly. But you have heard all of this before. We cried out about it. We warned about it. We spoke about it again and again.
Israel’s elected representatives voted yesterday against the State of Israel, not because they failed to understand that this was a betrayal, but despite understanding it perfectly well.
The secret of Israeli society, the secret of the Zionist miracle, has always rested on the defining story we tell ourselves: a story of solidarity and sacrifice.
There has always been corruption here. Politicians have always pursued power. But no one ever dared stand in public and declare that, in the name of power and corruption alone, they were prepared to sacrifice the most sacred principle of all: the Jewish responsibility for the lives of our brothers and sisters, the covenant among those who serve and the solidarity owed to those who gave their lives.
What this coalition did yesterday was an attempt to dismantle the most basic DNA of the Zionist miracle.
It was an attempt to turn us into a nation of scoundrels, a nation in which everyone chases power, money and honor while trying to escape responsibility.
What they did yesterday was turn those who serve into slaves. They took sacred sacrifice, the blood, sweat, fear and bereavement, and transformed it into cynical exploitation.
They will tell themselves stories. They will try to sell those stories to us as well. But it is all vanity and deception.
Will there be a price for this betrayal?
The honest answer is that I do not know.
I do not know because, since the beginning of time, there have been wicked people who prosper.
But I do know that this was a betrayal by those who sent us to the battlefield and then stripped us of our dignity, our sacrifice and our most fundamental values.
As far as I am concerned, from this moment onward, every lawmaker who raised a hand in favor of this law bears the mark of Cain on his forehead, a mark of eternal disgrace.
I will do everything in my power, and I believe many Israelis will do the same, to ensure that at least in the public and political arena, this knife in the back does not pass in silence.
The people of Israel are a people who choose life. In the long run, they will not accept this kind of national suicide.
We will not forget.
We will not forgive.</full-text>
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            <id>skkyzn4vze</id> 
            <title>Under Hezbollah’s nose, an ISIS emir in Beirut shatters Lebanon’s security illusion</title> 
            <description>Analysis: While Hezbollah beats the drums of war against Israel, its systematic dismantling of the Lebanese state has turned Beirut into a safe haven for the world's most brutal Sunni jihadists; here is how Lebanon's collapse validated Israel’s uncompromising iron-wall defense doctrine</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/skkyzn4vze</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:38:41 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>On June 30, 2026, the Intelligence Branch of Lebanon's Internal Security Forces executed a highly sensitive raid in the heart of Beirut. The target was a 32-year-old Syrian national, identified in judicial records as H.R., born in 1994. 
Far from a low-level operative or a desperate refugee, H.R. was subsequently exposed as a premier regional commander of the Islamic State. He served as the general security emir overseeing the group's critical southern and central provinces in Syria.
 
While the tactical precision of the arrest earned praise from regional observers, the subsequent judicial investigation revealed a much more alarming reality. This high-ranking commander was not passing through; he had established a semi-permanent residency in the Lebanese capital. From a quiet apartment in Beirut, an ISIS emir was actively coordinating communication networks, managing regional logistics and planning complex insurgent operations inside Syria.
This dramatic arrest shatters the carefully cultivated myth of Lebanese national security. For years, authorities in Beirut have pointed to isolated counter-terrorism operations as proof of a functional state security apparatus. However, the presence of a top-tier ISIS commander living comfortably in the capital exposes a deep structural paradox. A state may possess the tactical intelligence to execute a single arrest, yet remain strategically hollowed out and unable to police its own territory. 
The Damascus plot planned from a Beirut apartment
The operational details of H.R.’s residency highlight how easily transnational terror networks can exploit Lebanon’s institutional paralysis. According to judicial files, H.R. was not operating in isolation. 
Upon his arrest, security forces confiscated personal computers and advanced communication devices that revealed deep ties to active cells in southern Syria. Analysis of these devices showed that he was actively planning a massive, coordinated assault on a Syrian military facility in the Daraa governorate, alongside several other operations in the heart of the country.
The fact that an operative of this caliber could reside semi-permanently in Beirut points to a systemic collapse in basic administrative oversight. In a functional nation, border control, municipal registries and local intelligence networks act as a multi-layered shield. In Lebanon, this shield has been completely degraded. The economic collapse that began in 2019 has starved the public sector of resources, leaving security personnel underpaid and border crossings highly vulnerable to bribery and corruption. 
In this environment, high-level terrorists do not need to hide in rugged border caves; they can simply buy their way into the relative safety of Beirut's dense urban neighborhoods, blending into the background of a failing metropolis.
Hezbollah’s double game: hollowing the state, welcoming the enemy
This security failure becomes even more damning when viewed alongside the rhetoric of Lebanon’s dominant political and military force. Hezbollah has long justified its independent, Iranian-funded army by presenting itself as the ultimate bulwark against Sunni extremism. 
 
 
During the height of the Syrian civil war, the group deployed thousands of fighters across the border, claiming that if they did not fight ISIS in Damascus, they would be forced to fight them in Beirut. Yet, the arrest of H.R. demonstrates that Hezbollah's dominance has produced the exact opposite effect.
While Hezbollah and ISIS are fierce ideological and military adversaries, they exist in a state of structural symbiosis. By maintaining a parallel military state, Hezbollah has systematically neutralized the official Lebanese state. When a sectarian militia controls independent ports of entry, runs illicit financial systems and dictates foreign policy, the formal government loses the capacity to govern. 
This hollowing out of public institutions is precisely what allows Sunni jihadists to operate. ISIS does not need Hezbollah's permission to set up a safe haven in Beirut; it merely requires the chaos and lawlessness that Hezbollah’s parallel state creates. 
The Islamist pincer: from Sharia ideology to Syria's new chaos
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the transitional government in Damascus, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, continues to struggle with severe instability. While al-Sharaa has attempted to project an image of pragmatic, centralized governance, the transitional administration remains fragile, and southern provinces like Daraa remain highly volatile. This governance vacuum in Syria has rejuvenated remnants of the Islamic State, which are eager to re-establish territorial influence.
This regional instability is fueled by the same underlying ideological pathogen: the desire to replace secular civil law with religious, Sharia-based governance. Whether manifested through the Shia Islamist framework of Iran's Wilayat al-Faqih, which dictates Hezbollah’s actions, or the Sunni fundamentalism of ISIS, the core premise of political Islam is fundamentally hostile to the modern nation-state. 
Both models prioritize transnational religious struggles over the security, stability and welfare of the domestic population. Caught between the Shia Islamist hegemony of Hezbollah within its borders and a highly volatile Sunni Islamist landscape to its east, Lebanon is trapped in an ideological pincer that prevents the development of a professional, rule-of-law democracy.
Israel’s sovereign shield in a volatile neighborhood
The structural failures of the Lebanese state stand in sharp, undeniable contrast to the national security architecture of the State of Israel. Operating in the exact same volatile environment, Israel faces constant threats from both Shia proxies and Sunni extremist networks. However, while Lebanon relies on ad hoc operations and tolerates parallel authorities, Israel maintains a defense doctrine anchored in absolute, centralized sovereign control.
 
Israel's security model relies on several core pillars that Lebanon has abandoned. First, Israel enforces a strict sovereign monopolization of force, ensuring that all military and intelligence operations answer to a single, democratic civil authority. Second, its integrated intelligence architecture coordinates efforts between military intelligence, internal security and external operations, eliminating the blind spots that allow terrorists to hide. Third, Israel protects its territory through relentless technological and physical border integrity. Finally, Israel utilizes a policy of proactive preemption, neutralizing threats at their source before they can infiltrate civilian areas. 
This uncompromising commitment to sovereign strength is the only reason Israel remains a stable, thriving democracy in a region defined by institutional collapse.
No security without absolute sovereignty
The arrest of H.R. in Beirut is a stark warning that cannot be ignored. It proves that tactical security successes are meaningless without strategic sovereign integrity. A country that allows a parallel militia to dictate its defense policy will inevitably become a breeding ground for regional instability and terror.
For Lebanon to break free from this cycle of vulnerability, it must implement radical structural changes. This requires the systematic disarmament of Hezbollah, the re-assertion of a total state monopoly on violence and the absolute rejection of Islamist political models. Only by reclaiming its national sovereignty and securing its own borders can Lebanon hope to protect its people. 
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>sye42znnzg</id> 
            <title>Israel should put antisemites on trial — wherever they are</title> 
            <description>Opinion: After centuries of failed advocacy, a sovereign Jewish state should pursue international jurisdiction over antisemitic offenses, distinguish hatred from legitimate criticism and criminalize denial of the October 7 massacre</description>
            <author>Ze'ev Welner</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/sye42znnzg</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:46:59 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The fight against antisemitism has, throughout history, proved frustrating and antiquated. The only effective tool available to a people that has suffered so profoundly over thousands of years is the law — specifically, the legal system of the sovereign state established by the Jewish people. The Knesset should enact legislation authorizing a special court to summon defendants and prosecute them, similar to the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, which grants Israeli courts universal jurisdiction over such crimes, regardless of whether other countries recognize that authority.
Israel is now home to about 40% of the world's Jewish population and can reasonably argue that its citizens are among the primary victims of antisemitism. It therefore has grounds to exercise such jurisdiction.
 
Why should cases be heard in Israel? A historical example can be found in the landmark 1979 libel lawsuit filed by two British nationals, Michael Adams and Christopher Mayhew, against the Israeli newspaper Maariv after it described them and their book as antisemitic. 
As noted by legal scholar Dr. Shuki Balas in a Dec. 8, 2025 article, "The 1979 Mayhew v. Maariv case has since been recognized as a legal milestone in defining the boundaries of antisemitism. An Israeli court ruled that extreme anti-Zionism rooted in false stereotypes and fabricated conspiracies may constitute antisemitism."
The two Britons — a journalist and a member of Parliament — were deeply offended by being labeled antisemites and believed only a court in Jerusalem had the authority to clear their names. Judge Jacob Bazak ultimately upheld Maariv's characterization, ruling that they were, in fact, antisemitic.
It is worth considering the psychological dimension of antisemitism: those who engage in it often do not want to carry the label "antisemite" for the rest of their lives. Beyond the reputational consequences, offenders could face additional penalties, including fines and imprisonment, depending on the severity of their actions and statements.
Defendants appearing before such a court should be granted full due process, including the right to participate remotely through widely available video conferencing technology and to be represented by legal counsel of their choosing. There would be no organizational obstacle to establishing a dedicated investigative unit and a specialized team of prosecutors to handle such cases.
The individual antisemite should therefore be confronted through legal means, alongside any lawful measures available to every Jew as a free individual with personal and national dignity.
Over the years, several organizations dedicated to combating antisemitism have been established, achieving varying degrees of success, though largely on a local scale. These include the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), founded in 1913 and likely the best-known organization of its kind; LICRA (the International League Against Racism and Antisemitism), founded in France in 1927; the 43 Group in Britain, whose members physically confronted antisemites; and the Jewish Defense League in the United States, which was later outlawed.
It should be emphasized that the major organizations established before World War II failed to eradicate antisemitism. The Holocaust that followed demonstrated the destructive power of antisemitism and the extent of the effort still required to defeat it. 
Antisemitism as an ideology not only survived the Holocaust but has continued to grow. Today, it has reached monstrous levels that rival those seen on the eve of World War II, with some warning of the possibility of another catastrophe for the Jewish people.
Some thinkers view antisemitism as an inherent feature of human social behavior. As one article discussing the ideas of French philosopher René Girard explains: "People believe their desires originate within themselves, but Girard argued that they arise through a different process — one that also explains rivalry, scapegoating and antisemitism."
The article continues: "Why are Jews the scapegoat of global society? Not every victim can successfully serve as a scapegoat. The victim must be close enough for society to recognize them, yet distant enough to portray them as outsiders. They must simultaneously belong and not belong. If they are completely foreign, it is difficult to blame them for what happens within society. If they are too fully integrated, sacrificing them threatens the social order itself. The ideal victim occupies the space in between: familiar yet suspect, present yet distinct, weak enough to be harmed but imagined to be powerful enough to deserve blame."
In that sense, Jews have historically served, in the eyes of persecuting societies, as an almost ideal scapegoat — not because they truly fit that role, but because their historical position made them a convenient vessel onto which societies could project their fears.
***
One situation that warrants closer examination is the following: A Muslim generally does not fear for his safety when walking through a Jewish neighborhood and may even provoke local Jewish residents. A Jew, by contrast, may fear for his safety when walking through a Muslim neighborhood. How can this be explained? If Jews are accused of committing genocide and portrayed as murderers of Arabs, one might expect them to be feared. Muslims, meanwhile, are often portrayed as victims — oppressed, defenseless and vulnerable.
This seemingly paradoxical reality supports René Girard's theory of scapegoating. According to this view, the antisemite seeks to brand the Jew a perpetrator of genocide in order to demonize him as an object of hatred, while simultaneously believing the Jew poses little physical threat and can therefore be attacked with relative impunity. The result is "the unbearable ease of falsely accusing and punishing Jews without fear of retaliation."
If one seeks a thinker who explored the close relationship between antisemitism and hostility toward Jews, French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre is perhaps the best known.
 
In his 1946 essay Anti-Semite and Jew (Réflexions sur la question juive), Sartre analyzed the psychology of the antisemite. He argued that an antisemite is not simply someone who harbors prejudice, but someone who defines his worldview and identity through hostility toward Jews. Sartre famously wrote, "If the Jew did not exist, the antisemite would invent him."
The term "antisemite" itself also warrants clarification, particularly because some people of Semitic origin who are not Jewish argue that they cannot be "anti-Semitic" because they themselves are Semites.
Before the modern term was coined, European languages used more direct descriptions. In German, for example, common expressions included Judenhass ("hatred of Jews") and Judenfeind ("enemy of the Jews").
The modern term "antisemitism" was introduced in 1879 by German journalist and political writer Wilhelm Marr. Seeking to detach anti-Jewish hostility from its traditional Christian religious roots, Marr sought to recast it in racial, political and pseudo-scientific terms. He founded the League of Antisemites and helped popularize the term "antisemitism."
Many Israeli-born Jews, or those raised in Israel from childhood, did not fully understand antisemitism until they moved abroad and experienced it firsthand. In recent years, and particularly since the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel, many Israelis and Jews have come to feel increasingly targeted.
The anti-Israel demonstrations that erupted on October 8, before Israel had launched its military campaign in Gaza, came as a shock to many Israelis. The violence surrounding a soccer match involving Israeli fans in Amsterdam in November 2024 reinforced the persistence of antisemitism.
The fact that demonstrations occurred immediately after the October 7 attack, before Israel's military response had begun, left many Israelis stunned. We were massacred, and people were protesting against us? This was an eruption of hatred that had accumulated over time. Regardless of the role played by Qatari funding in supporting anti-Israel activism, such a global phenomenon involving millions of demonstrators cannot be explained without acknowledging the existence of deep-rooted antisemitism.
History shows that even major legal and public victories against antisemitic accusations have failed to eliminate antisemitism.
The Dreyfus Affair in France, which ultimately ended with the exoneration of Alfred Dreyfus after years of legal proceedings, did not diminish hostility toward Jews. Likewise, the Beilis trial in the Russian Empire, in which Mendel Beilis was acquitted of ritual murder allegations after extensive expert testimony and judicial proceedings, failed to stem antisemitism. Instead, the years that followed led to World War I, World War II and the Holocaust.
Although the Beilis trial discredited one of history's most notorious blood libels through evidence and judicial findings, it did not improve attitudes toward Jews. Antisemitism became even more active and dangerous.
Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Jews could respond to antisemitism only through journalism, public advocacy, literature or legal defense in the courts.
Today, a large portion of the Jewish people lives in Israel, making the country itself a visible target of antisemitism.
Israel is now a militarily and economically strong state, and Jews no longer need to justify themselves in response to antisemitic accusations. Antisemitism will not disappear and repeated attempts to rebut antisemitic stereotypes — whether by denying conspiracy theories, rejecting blood libels or explaining Israel's conduct in war — often fail to persuade committed antisemites and instead risk portraying Jews as defensive and therefore more vulnerable.
At the same time, not everyone who criticizes Israel or its policies is antisemitic. Given the current climate, any proposed tribunal dealing with antisemitism must make that distinction clear.
Israel is widely regarded as a militarily and economically strong, resourceful country. Jews no longer need to apologize for or defend themselves against antisemitic accusations. Moreover, antisemitism is unlikely to disappear and the more Jews apologize, explain themselves or try to prove they do not fit antisemitic stereotypes — that their noses are not "long," that not all Jews are wealthy, that they do not murder babies, that Hamas uses civilians as human shields or that Jews were themselves the victims of the October 7 massacre — the more they risk appearing weak, evasive or defensive, making them, in his view, easier targets for attacks, violence and pogroms.
At the same time, not everyone who criticizes Israel or its actions is antisemitic, despite the current climate. Any proposed tribunal on antisemitism should make that distinction explicit.
In conclusion, Israel must draft a law criminalizing denial of the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack and consider extending international jurisdiction to both Israel's law banning Holocaust denial and any future law prohibiting denial of the October 7 massacre.
The moment for justice for the Jewish people has arrived. We must be prepared to stand against anyone who seeks to deny our rights after everything we have endured and continue to endure.
Attorney Ze'ev Welner, founder of the legal website PsakDin, has published articles advocating Israel's right to bring genocide proceedings against Iran and its proxies before the International Court of Justice. He has also filed petitions that influenced legal precedents involving women's rights and the constitutional role of Israel's Supreme Court. This article is published courtesy of PsakDin. ynet is a partner of the website.</full-text>
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            <id>hj9nl0g4mx</id> 
            <title>Money, power and victory: Trump’s Hormuz tax is about more than Iran</title> 
            <description>Commentary: The 20% fee on cargo passing under US protection aims to squeeze Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and punish those who shunned Washington, but the fighting masks a deeper battle for Hormuz and the victory narrative Tehran seeks</description>
            <author>Ron Ben-Yishai</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hj9nl0g4mx</link>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 02:42:59 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>U.S. President Donald Trump has apparently had enough of the strange game being played with him by the two factions inside Iran’s regime: the militant faction, led by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and also using the authority of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei; and the moderate faction, headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, which apparently wants to continue the ceasefire under the memorandum of understanding signed by the sides several weeks ago.
Trump has evidently realized that the faction actually running things on the ground is the extremist camp led by the IRGC. Evidence of this can be seen in the repeated Iranian attacks on oil tankers and cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz, the counterstrikes carried out by U.S. Central Command in response and then the renewed Iranian attacks on American bases in the Gulf states.
 
This ritual, it seems, has worn out the American president. That is clear not only from what he writes on his social media platform, but also from the interview he gave to Fox News. Trump therefore decided to kill two birds with one stone: he is hitting the IRGC, and Iran in general, by renewing the blockade on Iranian ports, not only those inside the Persian Gulf, but also the Iranian ports on the Indian Ocean coast.
The second goal Trump is trying to achieve is to hit NATO countries and China, which refused to help him pressure Iran to open the strait. In effect, Trump is imposing a kind of 20% transit tax on every cargo shipment that moves through the strait under the air and naval cover provided by U.S. forces, in order to allow ships to pass safely.
 
This transit fee is certainly expected to raise oil prices in China, other Asian countries and Europe. That is supposed to be the penalty for these countries shunning the United States. Beyond that, imposing the tax on cargo ships and oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz will help the U.S. cover the considerable costs it will likely incur as a result of the need to provide increased escort and protection for commercial shipping along the southern route, near the coast of Oman.
The U.S. is capable of providing such cover with the naval and air power it has in the region, but the costs are beginning to weigh on the American administration. That is why it is asking to roll those costs onto the oil consumers who, as noted, are not willing to come to America’s aid, pressure Iran and take part in securing the Strait of Hormuz as an international shipping route.
As far as is known, the Iranians sent representatives on behalf of the IRGC, and the Americans sent officers and diplomats who apparently discussed the transit arrangements until Sunday evening. According to Trump’s account, the sides almost reached an agreement, but then the Iranians demanded changes and the negotiations collapsed. As a result, the sides have been trading blows in the Gulf.
It is possible that the IRGC representatives, who are now negotiating directly with the U.S., will return to the negotiating table following Trump’s move, and then we will experience another change. In principle, what we are seeing now is a war of attrition in which Israel is not involved for the time being, but one that is developing in a pattern that actually serves Israeli interests and prevents the removal of sanctions and the end of American military and diplomatic pressure on Iran.
 
The only problem is that recently the Iranians have been acting in a way that looks like an attempt to restore the nuclear facilities that were damaged, while refusing to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor what is happening inside them. 
According to published satellite images, it appears that the Iranians are not, for now, renewing uranium enrichment or other activity in the field of nuclear weapons production, but only fortifying the nuclear facilities and “hardening” them, in order to prevent another hit or minimize the damage of another strike if the Americans or Israel attack them when the fighting resumes.
This war of attrition is, in effect, a war over two things: control of the Strait of Hormuz and the PR win that senior IRGC officials want.
On the one hand, the militant faction in the Iranian regime wants to hold the Strait of Hormuz as an economic asset for Iran and as a strategic lever for applying pressure, not only on the Gulf oil-producing states, but on the entire global economy.
On the other hand, the U.S. is not prepared to allow senior IRGC officials to claim, and from their point of view rightly so, that they won the war: not only because they did not lose it, but because they acquired for themselves a profitable economic asset and a global strategic lever as a result of the strike that, according to President Trump, was meant to subdue them.</full-text>
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            <id>hyvyxqmeml</id> 
            <title>Trump is using bombs to force Iran back to the negotiating table</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Frustrated by Tehran’s slow, rigid bargaining and pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, the US president is using limited strikes to hasten a deal, project strength before the midterms and avoid a wider war</description>
            <author>Itamar Eichner</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hyvyxqmeml</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 19:26:52 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The strikes and exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf are continuing, but as far as Donald Trump’s thinking can be understood, an ambitious task at the best of times, the U.S. president does not appear to want a return to full-scale war with Iran.
What is happening instead is a form of negotiation conducted through military pressure.
 
Trump does not understand the way the other side is operating. Accustomed to the direct and results-driven culture of American business, he has grown frustrated with the slow pace and rigidity of Iranian negotiations.
He is also angry that Tehran still holds a significant bargaining chip in the Strait of Hormuz and is using it to stretch out the process and violate the memorandum of understanding reached with Washington.
The situation also risks making Trump appear weak to his political base at home ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. The result is an increasingly frustrated president whose rhetoric has grown harsher, including descriptions of the Iranians as “scum” and “sick.”
For all those reasons, Trump has ordered a series of limited military strikes in recent days.
The objective is not necessarily to restart the war. It is to deter Iran, push Tehran toward more focused negotiations, punish repeated interference with freedom of navigation through Hormuz and allow Trump to project strength to the American public.
Trump has also announced the restoration of a blockade targeting Iranian ports and proposed a 20% charge on cargo passing through the strategic waterway.
War as bargaining
The latest U.S. strikes on Iran and Iranian attacks on neighboring countries should be viewed as part of the negotiations themselves.
Both sides are trying to improve the terms under which the war will end.
The problem is that time is limited.
The sides signed a memorandum of understanding and a temporary 60-day ceasefire on June 21, but three weeks have already passed.
Washington appears to have concluded that Tehran is trying to run down the clock, assuming that by September or October, Trump will be preoccupied with entirely different political pressures.
If Trump wants the Nobel Peace Prize, the last thing he needs is a renewed war in the fall.
The Nobel Committee generally decides on the winners in September and announces them publicly around October 10.
At the same time, Trump must prepare for the midterm elections under difficult conditions, particularly if oil prices continue to rise.
He is therefore trying to use military force to push Iran back onto the negotiating track.
Iran’s double game
The Iranians are also playing a double game.
On one side, they are issuing belligerent statements, making personal threats against Trump and declaring that the memorandum of understanding is null and void.
 
On the other, they also understand that the alternative is a return to suffocating economic sanctions.
The use of the Strait of Hormuz has proved to be a double-edged sword for both sides.
Iran believed it could choke the global economy, force an end to the war and dictate terms to Trump.
But the Americans found a partial alternative through a route close to the Omani coast and by providing targeted assistance to ships.
Both sides know this arrangement cannot continue indefinitely. Yet before negotiations can resume, a short military chapter may be required.
Gulf allies lose patience
There is another motive behind the military escalation: the growing frustration of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which have been among the biggest losers in the war with Iran.
These countries are clearly identified with the anti-Iranian camp, yet they have been left to absorb missile attacks with limited ability to defend themselves.
Trump may understand this and be trying to repair the impression among his Gulf allies by applying direct military pressure on Iran.
What will Israel do?
The developments in the Persian Gulf do not appear directly connected to Israel.
Had Iran wanted to renew the war against Israel, a single missile launch would have been enough to signal that intention. Tehran has not done so, and that is not accidental.
At the same time, Washington has not given Israel freedom to act.
That is another indication that the current confrontation remains limited and is taking place within the broader framework of U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
 
Inside Israel, there is disagreement over the correct course of action.
The prevailing assessment is that there is little chance of reaching a permanent agreement with Iran that Israel would regard as satisfactory.
That leaves two broad strategic options.
The first is to support the restoration of a full economic blockade on Iran, which could weaken the rule of the ayatollahs.
The second is a large-scale attack on infrastructure that would darken the country and neutralize the regime’s ability to generate oil revenue, potentially bringing protesters back into the streets.
Either way, the next major window for military action may not open until after the U.S. midterms, and much will depend on the result.
If Trump loses and Republicans lose control of Congress, he may find it difficult to order a renewed war.
If he emerges politically strengthened, he may feel free to act as he chooses.
Could he still renew the fighting before the midterms?
The assessment in Israel is that the likelihood remains low.
But the situation could always spiral out of control, particularly if an Iranian attack kills U.S. troops and forces Trump into a much harsher response.
In that scenario, every option would return to the table.</full-text>
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        <item>
            <id>bjk4odm4mg</id> 
            <title>Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision takes shape across Africa</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Ankara is combining military bases, arms exports and ‘drone diplomacy’ with embassies, air routes and religious influence to build regional power, forcing Israel to develop a broader strategy with its Abraham Accords partners</description>
            <author>Roy Binyamini</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bjk4odm4mg</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 19:16:44 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>While public and media attention remains focused on the Middle East, Ankara is quietly and systematically building a strategic axis of influence across Africa.
Through defense agreements, infrastructure projects, military bases and expanding religious and cultural influence, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision is taking shape across the continent. This emerging geopolitical reality, in which Turkey is steadily widening its presence, requires Israel to rethink its approach and adopt more creative solutions.
 
The NATO summit hosted by Erdoğan last week can be counted as another public-relations success in Turkey’s effort to position itself as a leading regional and international power.
Erdoğan adopted a conciliatory posture toward the other members of the alliance, presented Turkey as a valuable strategic asset to Western interests and received praise from his close ally, U.S. President Donald Trump, as well as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.
As expected, the Turkish president also used the summit to criticize Israel, arguing that Israeli and Greek opposition to Turkey’s acquisition of F-35 fighter jets had “no place.”
He again presented the two-state solution as the only path to peace and called on the parties to reduce tensions in Gaza and Lebanon.
Days before the summit, Turkey’s foreign minister issued an especially inflammatory statement, declaring that “Israel has become a burden humanity can no longer bear.”
That rhetoric drew little meaningful criticism from NATO leaders, who preferred to avoid confrontation with the summit’s host.
At a time when diplomatic criticism of Jerusalem is growing, Western governments are increasingly choosing accommodation with Turkey for strategic reasons. Put plainly, Israel’s actions and its deteriorating relations with the international community are playing directly into Ankara’s hands.
Turkish messaging is now treated with tolerance even by Israel’s friends, as governments prioritize hard interests. This is also visible in Trump’s approach. He treats Erdoğan with considerable respect and sees him as a stabilizing regional actor, including in mediation efforts involving Iran, Syria and Lebanon.
Turkey’s double game
For these reasons, it is unsurprising that Erdoğan continues largely unhindered to play a double game designed to advance Turkey toward global leadership.
Those ambitions do not end in the Middle East. His neo-Ottoman vision is also taking root in Africa in ways that pose a growing challenge to Israel.
For the past two decades, Africa has served as fertile ground for Erdoğan’s ambitions, particularly in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, including Libya, and the Sahel.
Ankara’s courtship of the continent began in earnest in 2005, which the Turkish government declared the “Year of Africa.”
Since then, the relationship has passed several important milestones, including the African Union’s recognition of Turkey as a “strategic partner,” a series of joint summits and an extraordinary number of presidential visits that made Erdoğan one of the most frequent foreign leaders to travel across the continent.
The real turning point came in 2011, when Erdoğan visited Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.
That visit laid the foundations for massive Turkish involvement that has since expanded across the humanitarian, economic and military spheres.
Turkey sees Somalia as a vital strategic asset. It serves as an anchor for projecting power, expanding economic influence and establishing a military presence in the Horn of Africa near the crucial shipping routes of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Turkish economic and infrastructure assistance has deepened Somalia’s dependence on Ankara and allowed the country to become a testing ground for Turkish ambitions.
Turkey now operates its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, while the Turkish military provides direct aerial and military assistance in the local fight against growing terrorism.
This involvement is accompanied by major investment in natural resources, including special agreements for oil and gas exploration off Somalia’s coast.
Reports have also said Turkey is advancing plans for a space base and ballistic missile testing facility near the Indian Ocean coast in the Somali town of Warsheikh, at an estimated cost of about $350 million.
Hard power and soft power
Seen more broadly, expansion in Africa is a strategic objective for Erdoğan as he seeks to position Turkey as a regional power.
The strategy combines hard power, including military presence and extensive defense exports, with what has become known as “drone diplomacy.”
At the same time, Ankara is deploying soft power through an unprecedented network of embassies and air routes, while deepening cultural and religious influence.
This presence is growing as traditional powers such as France and the United States retreat from parts of the continent.
The vacuum allows Turkey to establish a diplomatic foothold that could increasingly challenge Israel, particularly given bloc politics within Africa and Ankara’s prominent standing in the African Union.
Israel still maintains productive relations with numerous African countries, but it currently lacks the presence, tools and resources required to counter Turkey’s strategic encirclement.
The Horn of Africa
The clearest current point of friction between Israel and Turkey in Africa lies in the Horn of Africa, amid Israel’s strengthening ties with Somaliland.
Ankara views this development as an attempt to undermine Turkish interests in what it considers its own strategic backyard, and it has responded angrily.
Turkey quickly worked to assemble a diplomatic front with Egypt, Djibouti and Somalia and further expanded its presence in Somalia.
Some have attempted to portray Israel’s engagement with Somaliland as a marginal diplomatic move. In reality, it is a decision of major geostrategic significance.
It is essential for improving Israel’s position in the Red Sea arena, particularly against the direct security threats posed by the Houthis and other Islamist terrorist organizations.
To realize the diplomatic, security and economic potential of the Horn of Africa and the wider continent, Israel should formulate a comprehensive strategic doctrine.
 
Such a plan must serve as a counterweight to the Turkish axis of influence, which operates in the ideological spirit of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Israel should emphasize its role as a stabilizing force and do so in close coordination with its Abraham Accords partners, above all the United Arab Emirates and Morocco, which already possess significant influence across Africa.
Historically, many African states have viewed Israel as a positive partner that engages them on equal terms and offers valuable experience in technology, water, agriculture and health.
Turning this human and technological advantage into an effective strategic foothold will require a national-level government decision and the allocation of resources capable of producing genuine change on the ground.
Strengthening bilateral ties with key African countries, while developing joint projects with Israel’s Gulf and Moroccan partners, would advance a shared strategic interest: establishing a moderate and stabilizing presence across the continent while showcasing Israel’s capabilities and initiatives.
Africa faces terrorism, poverty, climate stress and political instability. Israeli innovation and national power can and should offer a serious, competitive alternative to Turkey’s expanding influence.

The writer is a former department head at Israel’s National Security Council and an expert on the Middle East and Africa</full-text>
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            <id>ryvzeof4mg</id> 
            <title>Tucker Carlson to the dustbin of history</title> 
            <description>Opinion: The conservative commentator has gone from questioning policy to amplifying narratives that serve America's adversaries, undermine Israel's legitimacy and erode the moral foundations of the West</description>
            <author>Rami Simani</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/ryvzeof4mg</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 17:43:49 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>In the end, you will meet the same fate as so many of the Jewish people's worst enemies, men far greater and more powerful than you ever were. You will end up in the dustbin of history. And not just any dustbin, the one with the industrial shredder, so that even there you won't take up much space.
Israel is fighting a war for its very existence. We stood on the brink of annihilation. Yet never in modern history has a nation fought for its survival with such extraordinary restraint and moral discipline against an enemy that deliberately embedded its military forces within a civilian population. At the very same time, a relentless campaign of lies and demonization has been waged to ensure Israel loses, and you have become one of its leading voices.
 
We remember how the Western Allies confronted an enemy that hid among civilians during World War II. Germany's cities were subjected to massive carpet bombing, soldiers and civilians alike. That war ended in Allied victory. The same principle still defines Russia's conduct in Ukraine and in numerous conflicts throughout the Muslim world—wars that Tucker Carlson has shown remarkably little interest in discussing.
Israel, however—the nation of the Bible—has defeated enemies even more barbaric than the Nazis while adhering to the moral principles rooted in Jewish tradition. No carpet bombing. No indiscriminate destruction.
In doing so, Israel is also defending Western civilization itself against an axis of tyranny determined to destroy it. As German Chancellor Friedrich Merz put it: "Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us."
Yet Tucker Carlson, echoing a narrative promoted and financed by members of that very axis, Iran, Qatar and Erdoğan's Turkey, declared almost immediately after the war began that Israel was bombing innocent Muslim civilians. In an apparent effort to fracture Christian support for Israel, he went further, claiming that "the Israeli government is persecuting and bombing Christians in the Holy Land."
His patrons in Doha could hardly have been more pleased.
From there, his attacks on the Jewish wellspring from which his own Christian civilization emerged only intensified. "Washington and London are not sovereign," he declared. "They are run from Tel Aviv."
He became one of the first prominent figures to advance the now-familiar narrative that Benjamin Netanyahu somehow manipulated Donald Trump into war, even though Israel is the only country consistently defending American strategic interests across the Eastern Hemisphere.
"Trump did this against his will," Carlson told his audience. "He was a hostage of Benjamin Netanyahu and his many supporters in the United States."
 
In an interview with Israeli television, Carlson accused Trump of surrendering to political and financial pressure, arguing that "the Israeli prime minister pushed the U.S. president, who turned out to be much weaker than I had believed, into a war that harms America."
He did not stop there.
His moral decline seemed to lose all restraint.
Like so many of Israel's greatest enemies before him, figures eventually swallowed by history's grinder, Carlson continued descending into increasingly extreme claims.
He argued that Tehran's threat to humanity is merely "an Israeli invention"; that Iran is "a legitimate regional power with reasonable interests"; that Hamas is not America's problem and that he does not care who governs Gaza.
And if the Jewish people's return to their ancestral homeland is one of history's greatest acts of national restoration, Carlson dismisses it by claiming that Jews have "no genetic connection to Israel" and are merely foreign invaders without historical legitimacy.
Congratulations, Tucker.
Thanks to the algorithms that govern today's social media platforms, the falsehoods you spread reach hundreds of millions of viewers and are endlessly recycled. You have become a danger not only to the Jewish people but to America itself.
According to the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, Israel is America's forward outpost across the entire Eastern Hemisphere—the only nation with the proven capabilities and unwavering reliability to defend vital American interests day after day. Every blow dealt to Israel is a blow to America's national security. Weakening Israel is a direct threat to the security and survival of the United States.
That is the story. There is no other.
Yet Carlson's obsession remains fixed on Israel. Day after day, he rails against the Jewish state, as though every other crisis confronting the world has already been solved. Recently, he declared that he no longer considers himself a Republican because of the party's support for Israel—perhaps revealing, despite his repeated denials, far more about who truly stands behind him than he ever intended.
Being antisemitic would be bad enough.
But Carlson has elevated it into something even more dangerous: a relentless stream of poisonous falsehoods designed to delegitimize and destroy Israel.
Like Hitler before him, he portrays Israel as the source of much of the world's suffering and perpetual conflict. He claims Israel wages wars in order to build a Third Temple. He accuses Chabad of sowing chaos around the globe. He has even claimed that Israel assassinated Charlie Kirk, one of Israel's strongest supporters—and when confronted with recordings of his own statements, simply denies ever having made them, despite video evidence proving otherwise.
Note carefully how Carlson conducts interviews: His method often begins by attributing a statement to his guest that the guest never actually made. Before the interviewee has time to correct him, Carlson immediately asks a question built upon that false premise. If the guest corrects him, Carlson simply repeats the assumption as though it were established fact. Many interviewees eventually become trapped into debating the premise itself instead of rejecting it outright.
Through feigned innocence, carefully rehearsed skepticism and manipulative questioning, few escape the technique. Even Ambassador Mike Huckabee, a man known for his integrity, intellect and decades of media experience, fell into this trap during their widely discussed interview.
Nor have we forgotten Carlson's fabricated story that he was "aggressively interrogated" at Ben-Gurion Airport before that interview. Official footage released by Israel's Airports Authority showed precisely the opposite: cordial treatment, smiling officials and routine procedures.
Once again, he lied. Once again, in service of a broader campaign aimed at damaging the relationship between Israel and the United States.
Ironically, during that very interview Huckabee reminded Carlson of a truth obscured by his own arrogance: Without the land of the Bible, there would have been no America.
Carlson now sits before the camera swollen with self-importance, dressed in his trademark faded striped shirts that seem to flout every standard of respectable American public life—a fitting reflection of the contempt he now shows not only for Israel, but for the very values and institutions of his own civilization.
He projects innocence while delivering contradiction after contradiction, fabrication after fabrication. Once regarded as a stable conservative commentator, he has become someone in whom arrogance, ignorance and hubris appear locked in perpetual competition.
In many ways, whether knowingly or not, Carlson has become one of the most sophisticated threats facing Israel in the digital age.
Most disturbing of all, however, is his effort to erode evangelical Christian support for Israel by reviving the ancient "Replacement Theology"—the doctrine that claimed Christianity had replaced the Jewish people in God's covenant.
For nearly two thousand years this theology served as one of the principal religious justifications for the persecution, forced conversion and massacre of Jews throughout Christian Europe.
It took two millennia for much of the Christian world to repudiate it.
In 2015, the Vatican formally reaffirmed that God's covenant with the Jewish people has never been revoked, referred to the Jews as Christianity's "elder brothers," and declared antisemitism fundamentally incompatible with Christian teaching.
The tragedy is that Carlson portrays himself as a fearless defender of free speech and truth.
In reality, he has become perhaps America's most contemporary example of what Lenin once called a "useful idiot", serving, whether intentionally or not, the strategic interests of Qatar and the broader axis aligned against the West.
Carlson has become a perfect instrument of demoralization.
When he repeatedly gives a platform to extreme anti-Israel voices or depicts America's only dependable Middle Eastern ally as a liability, he is no longer engaging in journalism. He is amplifying the psychological warfare waged by Qatar, Iran and Erdoğan's Turkey under the comforting slogan of "America First."
Today, his programs are enthusiastically distributed by figures associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose stated objective is to transform—and ultimately undermine—American society from within. Tucker, you have found yourself standing alongside those openly committed to America's decline.
Have you ever seen Muslim communities praying for the prosperity of the nations that welcomed them?
The Jewish people have done precisely that for centuries. Every Sabbath, in every Jewish community across the world, Jews pause to pray for the peace and welfare of the country in which they live. 
Blatant antisemitism never ends with the Jews.
It targets the Jews first because they stand at the gates of Western civilization. But once they are gone, the attack expands to the civilization itself, to liberal democracy, free markets and America.
Israel's enemies are America's enemies.
Successful statesmanship means recognizing tomorrow's dangers today. If you wait until tomorrow arrives, it is already too late. When the United States struck Iran, it was not acting on impulse. It was making a strategic decision based on the future. That strategic reality is precisely what Tucker Carlson seeks to obscure with fantasies of isolationism.
As Senator John Kennedy of Louisiana succinctly put it: "America First, but not alone."
And since we are speaking of prayers, let there be no misunderstanding. Unlike the fate you wish upon us, every Sabbath we shall pray for your well-being, even there, deep inside history's dustbin where humanity ultimately places those who dedicate themselves to falsehood.
We wish you a long, healthy and vigorous life, not out of malice, but so that you may live to witness, day after day, the continued flourishing of Israel, one of the most remarkable nations on earth. May you watch as the Jewish spirit, the cradle of Western civilization—prevails once again and, as in generations past, helps safeguard the future of humanity.</full-text>
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            <id>rje3olfeze</id> 
            <title>Middle East Christians should see Israel as a partner, not a threat</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Christians facing Islamist pressure across the Middle East should see Israel as a natural partner that offers religious freedom, security and protection for their communities and holy sites</description>
            <author>Elias Zarina</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rje3olfeze</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 16:56:32 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Christians in Jerusalem and across the Middle East are facing a difficult reality today. They are threatened not only by terrorism and violence, but also by a gradual encroachment driven by the political power, money and ideological influence of radical Islamist actors. This reality is eroding the independence of Christian communities and undermining their ability to preserve their identity.
The situation in Jerusalem illustrates this clearly.
 
Millions of dollars in Qatari funding have been invested this year in the Christian St. Joseph Hospital, with Qatar’s influence also visible on the ground through prominent signage acknowledging its support. The Turkish Consulate continues to operate from a property belonging to the Syriac-Aramean Patriarchate—a community that carries the memory of the massacres committed against its people under the Ottoman Empire. Over the years, a sign has also been displayed in the area of the Mosque of Omar, above the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, expressing the claim that Jesus was a Muslim—a message that many Christians view as an affront to their identity and faith.
When speaking with Christians in Jerusalem, one encounters a growing sense that these are not isolated incidents, but part of a broader pattern in which the vulnerability of Christian communities is exploited, while various actors fail to provide genuine protection for their status and independence.
In the face of this reality, the truth must be stated clearly: Israel is the only country in the Middle East where Christians enjoy religious freedom, personal security, legal protection and freedom of worship. While Christian communities in many countries across the region have declined as a result of persecution, war and emigration, in Israel they continue to exist, develop, and participate in every sphere of society.
The future of Christians, therefore, does not lie in continued dependence on regional actors who exploit their vulnerability, but in building a courageous partnership with the State of Israel. This is a shared interest of both sides: protecting the holy sites, safeguarding religious freedom and strengthening stability throughout the region.
 
In Lebanon, too, a growing number of voices are calling for liberation from the influence of the radical axis and for consideration of a future based on sovereignty, stability and normalization. This direction could offer hope to other Christian communities across the Middle East as well.
The message must be clear: if Christians in the Middle East seek to secure the future of their children, protect their freedom of faith and ensure their safety, they should view Israel not as a threat, but as a natural partner.
In a turbulent Middle East, Israel is not merely a safe haven for Christians; it is their best hope for the future.
Elias Zarina is a Jerusalem Christian, founder of the Jerusalem Initiative for the Integration of Christians into Israeli Society, and a Research Fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Applied Policy (JCAP).</full-text>
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            <id>hjuudxzezl</id> 
            <title>The 2033 autocratic blueprint: inside Erdogan’s coming constitutional maneuver</title> 
            <description>Analysis: How Ankara plans to weaponize a constitutional loophole for another decade of absolute rule, and the rising cost of Western complacency</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hjuudxzezl</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 14:07:12 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>More than two decades into his dominance of Turkish politics, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to demonstrate how a constitutional republic can be systematically remodeled from within. Rather than relying on unconventional mechanisms like an outright military coup, the current administration fuses majoritarian elections with the gradual institutional capture of independent state bodies.
This phenomenon, frequently analyzed by political scientists as competitive authoritarianism, allows the executive to maintain institutional continuity while structurally tilting the political playing field. Although international observers previously anticipated that the constitutional two-term limit would mandate retirement, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has initiated a precise legal path to circumvent this boundary. By coordinating an early parliamentary renewal, the governing coalition intends to extend Erdogan’s executive tenure until 2033.
 
The mechanics of Article 116
The strategic framework for this survival mechanism was made public by Mehmet Uçum, Chief Legal Advisor to the Presidency. In an analytical column published by the state-run Anadolu Agency to mark the eighth anniversary of the executive presidential system, Uçum detailed the utility of Article 116 of the Turkish Constitution. The core argument relies on a specific provision: if the Grand National Assembly votes to renew elections during a president’s second term, an act requiring a three-fifths majority of 360 out of 600 seats, the incumbent is permitted an exceptional third candidacy without a formal constitutional amendment.
The administration has identified April 16, 2028, as the target date for this vote, falling roughly one month before the scheduled expiration of the current mandate. By dissolving parliament just weeks ahead of schedule, Erdogan would technically serve an unfulfilled term. This maneuver resets the constitutional counter and clears the path for an additional five-year tenure.
Systemic Islamization of the state
This institutional adjustment is designed to secure a deep ideological and systemic transformation within the state architecture. Over the past decade, the traditional separation of powers has been replaced by a centralized executive structure that has recalibrated Turkey's secular foundation. The Directorate of Religious Affairs, known as the Diyanet, has experienced unprecedented budgetary growth. Under the 2026 central government budget allocations, the Diyanet was granted 174.3 billion liras. This immense figure exceeds the combined budgets allocated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, providing the directorate with massive resources to act as a primary tool for social engineering.
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Education has institutionalized the Century of Turkey Education Model. This sweeping curriculum overhaul replaces core secular pillars with state-sanctioned theological programs across public schools. In foreign policy, this ideological consolidation manifests in the formal protection and hosting of Hamas political bureaus in Istanbul and the systematic cultivation of regional Muslim Brotherhood networks.
Judicial warfare and opposition disarray
Executing the Article 116 strategy requires the containment of municipal opposition strongholds, a task increasingly delegated to the judiciary. A notable instance occurred during the July 2026 security operations in Ankara’s Çankaya district, a historic base for the secular opposition. The intervention resulted in the detention of twenty-seven municipal officials. It specifically targeted the administration of the newly elected mayor, Hüseyin Can Güner, on contested allegations of fiscal mismanagement and tender rigging. Such judicial interventions freeze municipal resources, disrupt local administration, and complicate governance for opposition leaders who secured unexpected victories during recent regional elections.
Concurrently, the ruling coalition benefits from persistent internal fragmentation within the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). Following the election of a reformist faction under Özgür Özel, subsequent appellate court decisions challenged the party's congress outcomes, creating leadership disputes with the former chairman, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. This internal paralysis unfolds against a complex economic backdrop. The Turkish Statistical Institute reported official annual inflation at 32.11 percent for June 2026, though independent research bodies like the Inflation Research Group estimate the true consumer price index expansion closer to 51.49 percent.
Data from the June 2026 MetroPOLL Turkey's Pulse survey highlights the volatility of this environment, indicating that in a hypothetical scenario where an independent reformist faction breaks away, it could capture 24.9 percent of national support. By contrast, the ruling party retains a baseline of 19.9 percent and the legacy opposition collapses to 3.6 percent. This projection confirms that a cohesive secular coalition presents an existential challenge to the administration's long-term retention of power.
Reevaluating the architecture of executive stability
Proponents of the current executive system defend these constitutional adjustments as essential mechanisms for political stability, asserting that a consolidated presidency insulates the nation from the fragile parliamentary coalitions of the late twentieth century. However, an objective assessment suggests this centralized stability remains precarious. Genuine constitutional governance requires a level playing field. Leveraging structural loopholes to extend an executive's tenure while placing judicial pressure on municipal leaders shifts the state configuration away from a balanced democracy toward a consolidated electoral autocracy.
This evolutionary trajectory occurred in distinct institutional phases. An early era of economic liberalization and pro-Western messaging gradually transitioned after the 2016 attempted coup into an extensive reorganization of the secular judiciary. This shift centralized administrative authority and provided the groundwork for the current 2028 legislative stratagem.
Strategic implications for regional security
A prolonged, uninterrupted executive presidency lasting into the next decade creates substantial strategic complications for both Western capitals and regional partners, including Israel. Under the maritime framework known as the Blue Homeland doctrine, Ankara has asserted extensive jurisdictional claims across the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. This posture directly challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime boundaries. It also introduces friction into European energy exploration and presents a structural barrier to alternative natural gas pipelines intended to link Levant basin reserves to European markets.
Furthermore, the central government retains the capacity to manage migration flows into the European Union. By utilizing its control over millions of refugees, Ankara can effectively secure fiscal and political agreements from Brussels. Within NATO, Turkey acts as a transactional partner, frequently using its institutional veto power over alliance expansion and defense integration to extract unilateral concessions. Simultaneously, the state expands its strategic defense procurement and alternative financial networks with non-Western revisionist powers.
Parameters for a recalibrated Western strategy
Western planners must adopt strict conditionality rather than passive accommodation. Diplomatic engagement should target secular metropolitan hubs, effectively bypassing central state ministries to empower local democratic Turkish civil society groups directly. Furthermore, international security cooperation must tie future defense technology transfers to verifiable regional commitments. Washington and Brussels must utilize economic levers, customs union negotiations, and intelligence sharing mechanisms to signal that institutional regression carries severe consequences. Ultimately, the path outlined for April 2028 represents a structural project to lock in an assertive, revisionist framework. Allowing this political maneuvering to go unchallenged risks abandoning Turkey's remaining democratic factions while permanently destabilizing the Mediterranean basin. The alliance cannot afford to treat these profound geopolitical shifts as immaterial domestic constitutional debates within a volatile region.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>rk11kfgmvfx</id> 
            <title>A historic Israel-Lebanon deal is closer than it appears</title> 
            <description>Opinion: As President Joseph Aoun prepares for a rare White House visit, quiet diplomacy, growing public support in Lebanon and new US proposals point to a potential breakthrough — though Hezbollah remains the biggest obstacle</description>
            <author>Smadar Perry</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rk11kfgmvfx</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 11:28:08 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Lebanese President Joseph Aoun faces a complicated predicament: Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, has been declared persona non grata. For four months, he has not been permitted to present his credentials, and if he leaves the embassy building where he has barricaded himself, he is expected to be deported to Iran. Yet that did not stop Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa from passing in person in Tehran before the coffin of the country’s former ruler, Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a joint US-Israeli strike. President Aoun even declared that “relations are normal.”
On July 21, the Lebanese president is scheduled to meet Trump at the White House. The meeting has been postponed several times, while Lebanon’s impressive ambassador, Nada Hamadeh Awwad, has been shuttling between the White House and the State Department to ensure there will be no “unpleasant surprise” and that Netanyahu does not also happen to show up. From the Lebanese perspective, at least, there is no doubt that this is a historic meeting: The last Lebanese president invited to the White House was Michel Suleiman in 2009.
 
At the same time, members of the Lebanese delegation expressed frustration over the decision to hold the meeting with the Israeli delegation in Rome. They pressed for the talks to continue at the US State Department building in Washington. “Why Rome, of all places?” In the end, they agreed with a strained smile.
Trump also pressured Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to send a military force into Lebanon to eliminate Hezbollah and collect its weapons. But al-Sharaa made it unequivocally clear — apparently after consultations with his patron, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan — that he would not send troops, saying there were first other issues that had to be resolved, including weapons and drug smuggling along the countries’ unmarked border. Lebanon’s top four officials — the president, prime minister and the foreign and interior ministers — welcomed the announcement from Damascus. The Syrian president appears stronger than his Lebanese counterpart. He is also far more favored by Trump and, of course, by Erdogan.
Were it not for the threat posed by Hezbollah, which has suffered a series of blows but is still managing to recruit young people and strengthen the Shiite presence in the Lebanese army, the talks would be moving much faster. After all, there is an understanding between Jerusalem and Beirut. Lebanese citizens want a permanent agreement with Israel. Dozens have already said on camera that they want to undergo professional training in Israel and even study at the Technion, while Israel quickly announced that “we would be happy to welcome tourists.”
In northern Israel, preparations are also underway to receive Lebanese workers under a model similar to the Jordanian arrangement at the Aqaba crossing: They arrive in the morning and return home in the evening. Anyone who has not seen Jordanian waiters communicating with Ukrainian colleagues using hand gestures has not seen what this new kind of normalization looks like.
 
Particular attention should be paid to the special role of the Lebanese ambassador in Washington. On the one hand, she continues to head the diplomatic negotiating team opposite her Israeli counterpart, Yechiel Leiter, who has discreetly developed a special relationship with her and speaks of her in glowing terms. Yet at the end of every round of talks, the two stand together for the group photograph without exchanging a word or shaking hands.
Ambassador Awwad has also received a grave warning not to travel to Lebanon. Hezbollah, acting under Iranian inspiration, may attempt to assassinate her in order to derail the talks.
A new idea is now beginning to take shape in Washington: replacing UNIFIL forces with American troops. Should it be implemented, it would be the ultimate solution. Together with the Lebanese army, they could then “deal with” Hezbollah, clear the southern communities adjacent to the Israeli border and deepen relations.</full-text>
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            <id>hyc8tcwvgg</id> 
            <title>Lebanon’s dilemma: A door to Israel opens as Hezbollah pushes back</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Lebanon and Israel appear closer to an understanding, but Hezbollah remains the main obstacle; Despite suffering blows, the group is strengthening its influence in the Lebanese army and could derail talks</description>
            <author>Smadar Peri</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/hyc8tcwvgg</link>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 02:19:54 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The predicament facing Lebanese President Joseph Aoun: Iran’s ambassador to Beirut, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, has been declared a “persona non grata.” For four months, he has not been allowed to submit his credentials and if he leaves the embassy building where he has been holed up, he is expected to be deported to Iran. But that did not stop Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa from physically passing by the coffin of Iran’s former ruler Ali Khamenei in Tehran, after he was killed in a U.S.-Israeli strike. President Aoun even declared that “relations are normal.”
On July 21, the Lebanese president will arrive for a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House. The meeting has been postponed several times, while Lebanon’s impressive ambassador to Washington, Nada Hamadeh Moawad, has been shuttling between the White House and the State Department to ensure there will be no “bad surprise” and that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not also show up “by chance.” There is no doubt that from the Lebanese perspective, this is a historic meeting: The last Lebanese president invited to the White House was Michel Suleiman, in 2009.
 
At the same time, members of the Lebanese delegation expressed frustration over the decision to hold the meeting with the Israeli delegation in Rome. They pressed to continue the talks at the U.S. State Department building in Washington. “Why Rome?” they asked. In the end, they agreed with a forced smile.
Trump also pressured Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to send military forces to Lebanon to eliminate Hezbollah and collect its weapons. But al-Sharaa made it unequivocally clear, apparently after consultations with his patron, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that he would not send forces and that there are issues that must first be resolved, including weapons and drug smuggling along the unmarked border between the countries. Lebanon’s top leadership — the president, prime minister and foreign and interior ministers — welcomed the announcement from Damascus. The Syrian president appears stronger than his Lebanese counterpart. He is also much more favored by Trump and, of course, by Erdoğan.
If not for the threat posed by Hezbollah, which has suffered a series of blows but has managed to recruit young people and strengthen the Shiite presence in the Lebanese army, the talks would be moving at a faster pace.
After all, there is an understanding between Jerusalem and Beirut. Lebanese citizens want a permanent arrangement with Israel. Dozens have already announced on camera that they want to undergo professional training in Israel and even study at the Technion. Israel, for its part, quickly announced that “we would be happy to host tourists.”
 
In the north, preparations are also underway to bring in Lebanese workers, following the Jordanian model at the Aqaba terminal: They arrive in the morning and return in the evening. Anyone who has not seen Jordanian waiters communicating with Ukrainian colleagues through gestures has not seen what the new kind of normalization looks like.
It is worth noting the special role of Lebanon’s ambassador to Washington. On one hand, she continues to head the political negotiating team opposite her Israeli counterpart, Yechiel Leiter, who has discreetly developed a special relationship with her and is full of praise for her. Yet after each round of talks, the two appear together for the group photo but do not exchange a word and avoid shaking hands. Ambassador Moawad has also received a severe warning not to travel to Lebanon. Hezbollah, with Iranian backing, could attempt an assassination to derail the talks.
In Washington, a new idea is now beginning to take shape: replacing UNIFIL forces with American troops. If implemented, it would be the ultimate solution. This would allow the United States, together with the Lebanese army, to “deal with” Hezbollah, clear the southern communities bordering Israel and strengthen relations.</full-text>
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            <id>h1vpkpw4gl</id> 
            <title>Iran’s crisis is only beginning. Where does the regime go from here?</title> 
            <description>Opinion: Iran’s leadership faces three main scenarios that could determine the regime’s future: restoration of the monarchy, military rule or tactical reform</description>
            <author>Dana Sameah</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/h1vpkpw4gl</link>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 22:18:12 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The day after the end of Ali Khamenei’s funeral procession finds the Islamic Republic at its most critical crossroads since its founding in 1979. The death of the leader who shaped the system for nearly four decades is not merely a routine change of personnel. It is a test of the resilience of the entire governing structure.
Behind the scenes, the regime must now maneuver between preserving the revolution’s religious legitimacy and confronting realities on the ground: a plunging economy, crumbling infrastructure, mounting public pressure, an increasingly fraught international arena and a memorandum of understanding hanging by a thread and subject to the whims of Donald Trump.
 
What will the day after look like? The government in Tehran now faces three main scenarios that could determine how the regime is run and shape its future.
The religious dynasty scenario: A myth of distance and sanctity
Those pulling the strings behind the scenes wanted to show both the Iranian public and the world that the regime remained strong and stable. That pressure led them to install Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, in an unprecedented, expedited process.
But the appointment immediately raises a question: How long can it last when it runs counter to the regime’s ideological foundations, particularly while the newly appointed successor has yet to appear in public?
For now, the governing strategy rests on a myth of distance and sanctity. The regime is trying to use Mojtaba’s physical absence from public view to build an aura around him as a supreme leader who stands above everyday politics.
The message to the public is clear: The leader is working for you from the shadows and managing the global struggle against the West, while the technocratic government must answer for the country’s economic and social problems.
But the risk is profound. Succession from father to son is widely seen in Iran as a complete betrayal of the principles of the 1979 revolution, which was launched to overthrow the shah and reject hereditary monarchy.
Such a move could ignite widespread public protests challenging the regime’s very legitimacy and require especially violent and aggressive repression to preserve it.
The military option: An IRGC junta
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has long been more than a military force. It is an economic, political and technological power center that controls broad sections of the country and wields considerable influence beyond Iran’s borders.
The second scenario would mark the completion of an IRGC takeover of state institutions.
Under this scenario, the Guard could leave a cleric in the supreme leader’s office as a largely ceremonial figure. Alternatively, it could push through constitutional changes abolishing or reducing the institution of velayat-e faqih, or rule by the Islamic jurist, in favor of national security leadership.
In practice, Iran would become a semireligious military junta, replacing global Shiite ideology with militaristic Iranian nationalism and focusing almost exclusively on domestic stability, regime survival and management of the centralized economy.
Compromise and tactical reform: The pressure-valve model
President Masoud Pezeshkian and more pragmatic figures within the temporary succession council could try to promote a more moderate course to prevent a social explosion.
The strategy would involve a degree of tactical openness abroad, including attempts to renew diplomatic channels with the West in hopes of easing sanctions, while loosening some social restrictions at home, such as reducing enforcement of dress codes and internet controls.
The constraint is clear. The Islamic Republic’s history shows that its conservative and security establishment views any compromise as a sign of weakness.
Such openness could therefore trigger bloody internal power struggles between pragmatists and the ultraconservative camp. Rising international tensions and the latest exchanges of fire have also done little to ease domestic suspicions about Western intentions regarding Iran’s future.
A gamble over the regime’s survival
The government in Tehran is now gambling with its survival, but the ambiguity surrounding Mojtaba is only a temporary bandage over an existential wound.
 
A renewed external attack, which I believe is unavoidable, would leave the regime little room to maneuver. It would force the government to drop its masks and decide whether Iran is moving toward an overt military dictatorship that would destroy what remains of its religious legitimacy, or toward a direct, violent and unavoidable confrontation with an Iranian public waiting for the moment when the new king is exposed.
In my view, the answer will become clear once the final whistle blows at the World Cup.
Dana Sameah is an independent researcher, commentator and lecturer specializing in Iranian society and civil protest movements from the revolution to the present day.</full-text>
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            <id>s1gthtlezg</id> 
            <title>Lindsey Graham was more than Israel’s friend; he was its iron shield in Washington</title> 
            <description>Opinion: the South Carolina senator rose from personal tragedy to become a dominant Republican voice on Israel, Iran, Ukraine and US foreign policy, leaving behind a political legacy few will be able to match</description>
            <author>Kobby Barda</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/s1gthtlezg</link>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 16:46:48 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>With the passing of Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of the most colorful, influential and important voices in American politics has fallen silent. Graham was not merely a standard “friend of Israel” on Capitol Hill. He was an iron defender and a moral shield who never hesitated to stand before the cameras and proclaim the justice of Jerusalem’s cause.
Behind the lilting Southern accent, biting humor and emphatic hand gestures stood a brilliant politician who wielded considerable influence over American policy.
Israel has lost not only a powerful ally in Washington, but a true friend who devoted a significant part of his political career to strengthening the strategic relationship between the two countries.
 
The tragedy that shaped the sheriff
To understand Graham’s toughness, one must return to the small town of Central, South Carolina, where he was born in the summer of 1955. He grew up in a working-class family that operated a business combining a restaurant, bar and pool hall.
When he was a young college student of about 21, his world collapsed. Both of his parents died within roughly 15 months of one another. Graham did not break. With the help of relatives, he took responsibility for his younger sister, legally adopted her and continued on to law school.
He carried the toughness he had acquired into military service as a legal officer in the U.S. Air Force, where he was stationed in West Germany. He continued serving for decades through active duty, the National Guard and the reserves, including short deployments as a military lawyer in Iraq and Afghanistan during congressional recesses, before retiring in 2015 with the rank of colonel.
He never married and had no children.
From the Clinton trial to the Senate
Graham’s political career began in the South Carolina House of Representatives, where he served from 1993 to 1995, but his breakthrough onto the national stage came with the Republican Revolution of 1994.
At the end of 1998, he was appointed as one of the House impeachment managers, and in early 1999 he presented the case against President Bill Clinton in the Senate trial.
In 2003, he stepped into the enormous shoes of Strom Thurmond in the Senate and became a distinctly conservative voice. He led an effort to impose a federal ban on most abortions after the 15th week of pregnancy and promoted bipartisan cooperation on red-flag laws aimed at restricting access to firearms by dangerous individuals.
From a live on-air feud to a close alliance
Graham reached the peak of his political influence during the Trump era, though the road there was filled with obstacles.
Anyone who remembers the 2015 Republican primaries will find it difficult to forget their public confrontation. After Graham called Trump a “jackass,” Trump retaliated by reading Graham’s personal cellphone number aloud before millions of viewers.
Despite that, Graham showed pragmatism, became one of Trump’s closest allies in the Senate and used his direct access to the president to advance a hawkish foreign policy supportive of Israel.
The bitter enemy of the ayatollahs’ regime
When it came to the Middle East, Graham must be remembered as one of Iran’s fiercest enemies. He consistently pushed for crippling sanctions and refused to accept any compromise over Tehran’s nuclear program or its terrorist proxies.
Only recently, while addressing tensions in the region, he warned that the Iranians had badly misjudged Trump.
A global hawk: the Russia-Ukraine war
His hawkish and uncompromising worldview was not limited to the Middle East. After the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine, Graham became one of the loudest and most determined voices in support of Kyiv and a leading advocate for supplying weapons to the Ukrainians.
He did not hesitate to cross diplomatic lines when he publicly suggested that the only way to end the war was for someone close to Vladimir Putin to “take this guy out.”
He also provoked Moscow’s fury during a visit to Kyiv when he declared that American aid to Ukraine was “the best money we’ve ever spent.”
Republican backing for a trilateral agreement
Graham understood the potential of regional initiatives such as IMEC, the multinational project designed to strengthen connectivity, infrastructure and economic integration between India, the Middle East and Europe.
Under the Biden administration, Graham became one of the leading Republican supporters of efforts to forge a trilateral agreement among the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
He met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and worked to rally Republican support in the Senate for a defense treaty. That effort was critical because ratification of a treaty requires the backing of two-thirds of senators, a threshold a Democratic administration would have struggled to reach on its own.
The negotiations were led by the Biden administration and the Saudi and Israeli leaderships and, alongside normalization, included security arrangements, a civilian nuclear program and the Palestinian issue.
The day after: the battle over his Senate seat
Beyond the personal loss, Graham’s sudden death is also shaking the political system in South Carolina. Only last month, in June, he won the Republican primary and secured the party’s nomination for the November 2026 general election.
The state’s governor will now have to appoint a temporary replacement to preserve the Republican seat until the end of the term. At the same time, the party will be required to select a replacement candidate to represent it at the ballot box in the fall, in accordance with state party rules.
 
Whoever replaces him will have to try to fill the shoes of a figure whose voice was so prominent and influential.
Graham’s support for Israel was consistent, public and unmistakable throughout his years in the Senate. Israel has lost not only a powerful ally in Washington, but a true friend who devoted a significant part of his political career to strengthening the strategic relationship between the two countries.
Dr. Kobby Barda is a faculty member at the Holon Institute of Technology’s multidisciplinary school and a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute</full-text>
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            <id>rygpxygegx</id> 
            <title>The American squeeze: inside Iraq’s cash purge starving Iran’s proxies</title> 
            <description>How an American currency freeze forced Baghdad to choose between Western dollars and Iranian loyalty</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rygpxygegx</link>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 06:17:55 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>In early July 2026, an investigating judge from Iraq’s Central Anti-Corruption Criminal Court monitored an asset recovery operation in Tikrit that exposed the financial plumbing of regional instability. Security forces extracted bundles of mud-stained canvas bags from a local storm drain, uncovering ten point seven million dollars in physical American currency. This discovery followed a raid that uncovered twenty million dollars packed into plastic water bottles alongside five kilograms of gold jewelry. Iraqi state television has broadcast these striking images of confiscated currency, small arms, and provincial property deeds, transforming a judicial investigation into a highly publicized political event. State prosecutors have tied these assets directly to Adnan al-Jumaili, a former deputy oil minister arrested for receiving illicit kickbacks from state contracts.
While Baghdad frames these moves as an independent crusade for internal accountability, the situation reflects a complicated intersection of domestic political survival, regional national security, and international financial pressure applied by Washington to disrupt the funding pipelines of Tehran's regional proxies across the Middle East region today explicitly.
 
The Green Zone domino effect
The investigation centered on Jumaili quickly transformed into a broader institutional purge that rippled through the upper echelons of the Iraqi bureaucracy. Security forces executed a series of synchronized raids across Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone and adjacent commercial districts, arresting dozens of senior bureaucrats, municipal lawmakers, and prominent private contractors. Among those currently held in custody is Ali Maarij, another deputy oil minister whose administrative control over Iraq’s vital hydrocarbon infrastructure was previously considered insulated from political interference. The Supreme Judicial Council recently announced that total asset recoveries from this specific network have surpassed one hundred and twenty million dollars in physical cash, alongside significant quantities of gold bullion, small arms, and approximately forty separate luxury properties distributed across prime real estate sectors in Baghdad, Salah al-Din, and Erbil. While the government has touted these seizures as a historic breakthrough, independent analysts note the importance of contextualizing the scale of this operation within Iraq's broader history of endemic graft. While a one hundred and twenty-million-dollar cash recovery is substantial for a single enforcement action, it represents a modest fraction of the billions in capital flight the country has suffered over the past two decades from systemic political theft by entrenched elites operating across multiple successive governing administrations in the capital city of Baghdad.
Domestic cleavages and political skepticism
Skeptics point out that this purge pales in comparison to massive systemic scandals such as the infamous corruption case widely known as the Heist of the Century, where an estimated two point five billion dollars was siphoned directly from the General Commission for Taxes through fraudulent check schemes. Consequently, the current campaign is viewed by some critics not as an absolute dismantling of corruption, but as a targeted strike against a specific economic network closely tied to non-state actors. At the center of this dangerous political maneuvering is Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. Taking office as an independent compromise candidate, the forty-one-year-old businessman entered the premiership with a critical political asset, specifically that he lacks direct, historic ties to the established paramilitary factions that restricted the policy options of his predecessors. Zaidi has sought to capitalize on this independence by introducing a comprehensive whistleblower reward system and granting broader operational latitude to anti-graft investigators. However, this aggressive approach has drawn sharp criticism from Iranian-aligned political blocks within the Coordination Framework. These factions argue that the Prime Minister's anti-corruption campaign is not an objective defense of state resources, but rather a weaponized, politically motivated purge designed to marginalize specific groups and weaken their economic influence ahead of future electoral contests. They claim the judiciary is being selectively deployed to fulfill external mandates rather than serving domestic judicial equity, maintaining that Zaidi’s administration is bending to Western demands at the expense of Iraqi national cohesion today explicitly.
The mechanics of the dollar freeze
To understand the sudden velocity of the current campaign, the domestic momentum in Baghdad must be linked to financial decisions enacted thousands of miles away in Washington and New York. The enforcement drive intensified significantly following a sharp uptick in regional security friction earlier this year. After the major escalation involving Israel, the United States, and Iran, certain local militias in Iraq launched a series of rocket and drone strikes targeting Western installations and regional transit corridors, threatening to draw Iraq directly into a broader multi-front conflict. In response, the United States chose to leverage Iraq’s unique financial dependencies rather than relying solely on conventional military deterrence. Under a bilateral regulatory framework established after the 2003 invasion, Iraq’s international oil revenues are deposited into a secure account held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Central Bank of Iraq regularly draws down these reserves by requesting physical shipments of hundred-dollar bills, flying millions in cash to Baghdad to maintain liquidity within its cash-reliant domestic marketplace. Citing intelligence that these physical funds were leaking into the hands of sanctioned Iranian entities and hostile regional armed groups, Washington enacted a four-month suspension of approximately five hundred million dollars in scheduled currency deliveries. This financial intervention created immediate structural anxieties within the political elite, as the sudden dollar shortage threatened to depress the value of the dinar and widen the parallel exchange market spread. American policymakers conditioned resumption on rigorous, transparent central bank financial audits.
Paramilitary patronage and institutional durability
The physical currency shipments were restored shortly after Baghdad executed its high-profile arrests and offered comprehensive transparency guarantees to international monitoring agencies. Washington’s restrictions acted as an irresistible accelerant, forcing the Iraqi judiciary to target systemic graft that historically functioned as the primary economic engine for non-state armed groups linked directly to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Factional banking entities routinely used the Central Bank's foreign currency sale window, submitting highly fraudulent import documents to purchase heavily discounted government dollars, which were then smuggled across regional borders to fund militant activities. While Western policymakers view the disruption of this pipeline as a crucial victory for regional stability, pro-Iran political entities contest this narrative, labeling the audits as imperial overreach designed to force Baghdad into alignment with a pro-Western geopolitical agenda that suppresses the axis of resistance. Prime Minister Zaidi has actively attempted to leverage this momentum by issuing a strict disarmament ultimatum to irregular militias, establishing a strict late September cut-off date that aligns with the planned scale-back of international military personnel. The ultimate test will occur when acute temporary currency crises fade and these institutional systems must operate independently. Achieving sustainable success will require moving permanently beyond selective enforcement toward objective oversight, ensuring that transparent institutional governance can shield the domestic economy from parallel administrative networks and withstand shifting regional realignments over this decade as Iraq seeks independence.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>sjcge0yemg</id> 
            <title>Beyond thoughts and prayers: Why Jews and Christians must stand as one</title> 
            <description>At CUFI’s Washington summit, thousands of Christians and Jews showed that support for Israel is not a feeling but a duty, built through action, friendship and a refusal to let hatred go unanswered</description>
            <author>Yuval David, Washington</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/sjcge0yemg</link>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 17:31:48 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The ballroom at the Gaylord National Resort was still filling in when I felt it — that particular hum of a room that knows why it showed up. Thousands of people, most of them Christians from all fifty states, some of them Jews like me, converging for three days on the banks of the Potomac. Not for a concert. Not for a rally in the disposable sense of the word. For a summit. For work.
I left the Christians United for Israel Washington Summit this week changed. Not because the sessions were polished, though they were. Not because the programming was ambitious, though it was that too. I left changed because for three days I was surrounded by people who have decided that loving Israel and the Jewish people is not a feeling you have — it is a job you do.
 
The feeling was real, and it was specific
There is a spiritual unity in that room that is hard to describe to someone who has not stood inside it. It is not generic goodwill. It is not the soft, safe solidarity of a hashtag. It is Christians and Jews, side by side, naming the same enemies and reciting — in different languages of faith — the same conviction: that the Jewish people have a right to exist, to defend themselves, and to live in their ancestral homeland without apology.
What struck me most was how little of it stayed in the realm of sentiment. This was not a room content with thoughts and prayers. CUFI's more than ten million members do not just believe something about Israel — they act on it. By the end of the week, delegations had walked the halls of nearly every congressional office in Washington, armed with the year's policy priorities and the knowledge that their numbers, back home, are real and countable. That is not a metaphor for support. That is support with a shoe-leather cost attached to it.
And then there was the schmoozing — because that is the Jewish word for it, and I will not pretend otherwise. The hallway conversations. The meals shared with pastors from Texas and rabbis from New York. The unplanned moments where people turned their brief conversations into soulful conversations, in the lobby, the lobby bar, the restaurant, and every hallway in between, where two strangers from entirely different worlds settle in over coffee or a late dinner and discover they are, in fact, standing in the same fight. That is where alliances are actually built. Not from the stage. From the conversations that happen once people finally sit down together.
 
I have spent years in rooms like this one. As a journalist and news commentator, I represent these stories in broadcast and print, unpacking difficult global topics and making them approachable from a values based understanding. As a political advocate and, at times, a strategic communications advisor to organizations and leaders trying to say the right thing in the wrong moment, I have worked the policy and the language of it from the inside. And as a Jewish representative invited to speak in rooms that are not always Jewish rooms, I have learned something particular: that the space between two communities is rarely closed by a speech. 
It is closed by people willing to do the slower work of being a bridge — showing up in the room, listening as much as speaking, reminding both sides that shared values and common cause are the foundation, not the exception. I do not say any of that to claim particular authority. I say it because it is the lens I bring into a room like this one, and it is why I could recognize the difference between a room performing unity and a room building it. 
This was the latter. And it clarified something I have come to believe deeply in that work: that being an ally is not the finish line. Allies coordinate. Friends show up. What I saw at CUFI, again and again, was people trying — imperfectly, earnestly — to move from the first category into the second.
The part that should disturb every American
Here is what widened my chest with something other than inspiration, and I want to be precise about it rather than gesture at it. I face death threats. Specific, targeted, ongoing death threats. I am not speaking in the abstract or in generalities. 
I receive them because I am a Jewish advocate who refuses to go quiet — because I speak openly and honestly about Israel, because I claim the word "Zionist" not only as a matter of my own identity as a Jew, but because I understand clearly what Zionism actually means: the Jewish people's right to self-determination in our ancestral homeland, and a movement that also helps other peoples learn to represent themselves, too. And I receive them because I insist on human rights for every human being without ever diminishing or hiding who I am, as a Jew, to make that stance more comfortable for someone else. That is the price attached to refusing to shrink. I have made my peace with paying it. I will not pretend it is small.
What I was not prepared for, at CUFI, was how many people already knew that about me — knew my work, knew the threats that come with it — before I ever said a word about it myself. And what genuinely stopped me was how many of them, unprompted, told me they live with the same thing. Christian pastors. College students. Lay leaders who had never stood on a stage in their lives. 
People who are not Jewish, who are not Israeli, who simply said in public that they stand with the Jewish people and the State of Israel — and who are now receiving death threats for exactly that. Not because they are Zionists in the sense I am. Because they are Christians who chose, openly, to support Israel and the Jewish people, and someone decided that support was worth threatening to kill them over. Specifically, personally, by name.
 
That should stop every American cold. It should not take being Jewish to be terrified of a death threat for supporting Jews. It should not take being a Zionist to be threatened for being one. When a Christian college student is receiving the same kind of threat I receive, for the same reason, that is not my problem to carry alone anymore, and it never should have been theirs to carry alone either. That is an American problem. It is a moral one. And it is proof of exactly how high the stakes of this alliance actually are.  When Jews are targeted, and those who support Jews are targeted, the problem is our society is a cancer of hate that is normalized and spreading.
Common enemies are not the whole story
It would be easy — and it would not be wrong — to say Jews and Christians must unite because we share common enemies. We do. The Islamist terror networks that murder Jews for being Jews do not stop to ask whether the aid worker, the journalist, or the pastor standing beside us is Jewish too. Their hateful ideology has no room for either of us. That is a real and sufficient reason to stand together, and I do not discount it.
But if shared enemies were the whole of it, this alliance would be thin, reactive, defensive — a bunker, not a movement. What I felt in that ballroom was something sturdier. Christians and Jews in that room share a text, a moral vocabulary, a belief that human beings are made in the image of God and that the world is meant to be repaired, not merely survived. We share a conviction that justice, dignity, and freedom are not Jewish values or Christian values — they are the shared inheritance we are both responsible for protecting.
That is the alliance worth building. Not one that exists only in opposition to what threatens us, but one that exists in pursuit of what we are both, separately and together, called to build: a world where no one is threatened for their faith, their nationality, or their support for a besieged ally; a world repaired, not merely defended.
The call to action
Some of the most meaningful conversations I had that week happened in the spaces between the programming — moments where Christians and Jews sat down together to talk about what we actually share, not just what we're both against. That is the work I keep returning to, because I believe it is the actual work: building the bridge, not just standing on either side of the canyon shouting encouragement across it. And every time I do it, I come back to the same conviction. Being allies is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Allies can drift the moment the crisis passes. Friends do not.
 
So here is what I am asking of every Jew and every Christian reading this. Do not wait for the next atrocity to remember that you have allies. Build the relationships now — the pastor in your town, the synagogue two miles from the church, the campus group that could use a friend from the other tradition. Show up for each other's vulnerable moments before they become emergencies. Move past alliance and into friendship, because friendship is what survives the moment the headlines move on.
And do not let the reason you show up be limited to the enemy at the gate. Show up because you believe, as I do, that the world gets better when Jews and Christians insist — together, in public, without apology — that human dignity is not negotiable, that hatred dressed as politics is still hatred, and that the work of repairing the world was never meant to be done by one faith alone.
Thoughts and prayers were never going to be enough. This week in Washington, thousands of people proved they know that. Now it's on the rest of us to prove it too.

Yuval David is an Emmy Award–winning journalist, filmmaker, actor, news commentator, and internationally recognized advocate focused on combating antisemitism, extremism, and disinformation while advancing democratic values, human rights, and the U.S.-Israel relationship. He advises governmental leaders, diplomatic missions, NGOs, and policy organizations and appears regularly across major American, Israeli, and international news networks.
Website: yuvaldavid.com | Instagram: @Yuval_David_ | X: @YuvalDavid | Facebook: YuvalDavid | YouTube: YuvalDavid| TikTok: @yuval.david</full-text>
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            <id>bjy034a7fx</id> 
            <title>Spain’s NATO humiliation began the day it turned on Israel</title> 
            <description>Analysis: How Madrid’s appeasement of the Axis of Resistance transformed a European ally into Washington’s greatest strategic liability</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bjy034a7fx</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 12:49:06 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>Within the gilded, cavernous expanse of the Beştepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, the atmosphere this week possessed a suffocating stillness. U.S. President Donald Trump sat framed by an oversized leather chair, the American flag and blue NATO star behind him. Beside him, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte maintained a rigid posture, his face a mask of diplomatic neutrality as the president spoke. Trump spoke of Spain with caustic clarity, treating its prime minister not as the leader of a sovereign European democracy, but as a delinquent contractor who had simply stopped showing up to work.
Every outlet covering the summit instantly framed the encounter around an impatient president losing his temper over defense budgets and publicly degrading an ally. That narrative is accurate, but superficial. Spain's true disintegration began two and a half years earlier in Madrid, when Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez decided that punishing Israel mattered more to his domestic coalition than honoring the Western alliance. Wednesday's outburst was a strategic invoice, and Spain has been running up the bill since October 2023.
 
Turning toward Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Trump issued a blunt directive to sever commercial ties, stating Washington does not want to do trade business with Spain anymore because they do not participate and they do not pay. He concluded with a simple verdict: Spain is a wasted cause.
The timeline of abdication
NATO leaders endorsed a benchmark requiring member states to allocate five percent of GDP to defense. Spain, alone among all thirty-two allies, refused to commit, negotiating a unique carve-out instead. Yet, Spain's profound quarrel with Western security originates not in Brussels, but in Jerusalem.
The deliberate path to isolation began in October 2023, when Madrid implemented a quiet bilateral arms ban, halting all weapons transactions with Israel within days of the October 7 attacks. This initial fracture deepened in May 2024, when Sánchez aligned Spain with Ireland and Norway to formally recognize a unilateral Palestinian state, a move that fractured Western unity and effectively rewarded Hamas diplomacy.
By September 2025, the Sánchez administration unrolled nine distinct punitive measures against Israel, systematically attempting to isolate the Jewish state within Europe. This hostile trajectory reached its legislative peak in October 2025, when the Spanish parliament officially enacted the comprehensive arms embargo into national law through a razor-thin vote of 178 to 169. The final transformation from a diplomatic dissenter to an active operational liability was completed in February 2026, when Madrid denied U.S. forces access to critical airbases and closed its airspace during the opening hours of the allied campaign against Iran.
The strategic spillover
This isolationist instinct did not remain confined to the Levant for long. When Washington and Jerusalem launched Operation Epic Fury in late February 2026, a decisive joint campaign against the Iranian regime that eliminated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in its opening salvos, Spain rapidly positioned itself as the most vehement objector in Europe, targeting the United States directly. Madrid denied American forces the operational use of the jointly managed naval and air bases at Rota and Morón, prompting Trump to threaten an immediate trade cutoff during a tense encounter that March, telling Sánchez directly that his government’s behavior was terrible.
Sánchez responded by actively reviving the historical slogan "No a la guerra," the anti-war rallying cry that had flooded Spanish streets during the Iraq War two decades earlier. Weeks later, Madrid went further, completely closing Spanish airspace to American military aircraft and forcing fifteen U.S. transit planes to execute complex, long-range rerouting maneuvers. Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles defended the obstruction by declaring the allied operation against Iran to be profoundly illegal and profoundly unjust. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar’s final counter-verdict was unsparing, noting that Spain had chosen to stand openly with tyrants.
The Illusion of Ethical Sovereignty
The Moncloa Palace has consistently attempted to frame this pattern of defiance as an exercise in ethical foreign policy. The official narrative from Madrid suggests that by implementing arms embargos and restricting superpower military actions, Spain is acting as a principled custodian of international law, protecting its citizens from being dragged into foreign escalations. This posture is tailored meticulously for domestic political consumption, serving to unite a fractured, left-wing governing coalition around a shared adversarial stance toward Washington and Jerusalem.
This self-styled humanitarianism, however, is a strategic delusion. True geopolitical principle requires uniformity, yet Madrid’s application of international law is glaringly selective. The Sánchez administration routinely weaponizes the vocabulary of human rights to undermine a fellow democracy fighting an existential multi-front war, while simultaneously offering passive indulgence to the revisionist regimes and terrorist proxies destabilizing the Mediterranean basin.
 
By denying operational access to Rota and Morón during a critical Western confrontation with the Iranian regime, Spain did not preserve its neutrality; it actively compromised the collective defense capabilities of the entire alliance. Morality in statecraft cannot be decoupled from its strategic consequences, and Madrid’s ethical posture is ultimately a luxury item subsidized by the very security architecture it seeks to dismantle. Spain is engaged in an unsustainable form of geopolitical free-riding, operating under the naive assumption that the Western umbrella will continue to shelter the Iberian peninsula even as Madrid aggressively cuts away at its spokes.
Regional luxury versus frontline realism
This systemic unreliability is what the Ankara summit made visible. Every time an ally requested cooperation, Madrid manufactured a moral pretext to refuse, proving that conscience is remarkably easy to afford when other nations' soldiers pay the blood currency to maintain global order. This dynamic illustrates a widening chasm within NATO. Trump’s grievances extended beyond Spain; he renewed demands regarding Greenland from Denmark, noting that few answered the call against Iran except highly exposed frontline states. For states in the Middle East or Eastern Europe, proximity to threat leaves no room for theater. Spain has abused its geographic comfort, a stark contrast to the realistic foundation of the Abraham Accords.
The verdict
Sánchez’s office responded to the humiliation with standard bureaucratic platitudes about excellent relations and business as usual. Madrid will likely weather this immediate diplomatic storm, since European Union trade policy cannot be unilaterally severed by executive order. Yet the rhetorical escalation continues precisely because the underlying strategic deficit remains unaddressed.
The biting irony cannot be overstated. In Ankara, Spain managed to position itself as more toxic to Washington than Turkey, a volatile, revisionist NATO member that has spent years undermining Western interests and playing a duplicitous double game. For a Western European democracy to be structurally demoted beneath even an unreliable authoritarian partner like Turkey reveals the true depth of Madrid’s self-inflicted isolation.
Spain wished to be remembered as the moral conscience of the West, the government bold enough to draw a line its allies refused to see. Instead, Ankara delivered a stark preview of its actual legacy once the primary guarantor of Western security stopped pretending to believe the illusion. A wasted cause is not a mood. It is a structural verdict, and Spain drafted the first lines of it long ago in Madrid.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>skruietqzl</id> 
            <title>Turkey and Egypt’s military embrace is a strategic nightmare for Israel</title> 
            <description>Analysis: Joint air force and commando drills point to a fast-deepening military partnership between Cairo and Ankara, raising concerns in Jerusalem over Turkey’s regional ambitions, Egypt’s trajectory and the future balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean</description>
            <author>Amine Ayoub</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/skruietqzl</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 20:39:37 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The combat training images emerging from Egyptian military facilities this month should trigger immediate alarm within Israel's defense and intelligence communities.
While global attention remains fractured by ongoing conflicts elsewhere, Cairo and Ankara have quietly launched a massive joint military exercise codenamed Golden Eagle. This is no routine training deployment in some remote, abstract landscape. Elite paratroopers, special forces and thunderbolt commando units from both nations are actively practicing synchronized operations on Egyptian soil.
 
For anyone who understands the intricate chessboard of Middle Eastern geopolitics, this sudden military intimacy is nothing short of a profound alarm bell. It represents the formalization of a relationship that was considered completely impossible just a few short years ago.
This shift follows a major defense framework agreement signed in Cairo during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's high-profile visit to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Although official military spokesmen frame these maneuvers as routine cooperation with friendly nations, the timing and composition reveal a deeper reality.
This is a cold, cynical strategic alliance between two authoritarian heavyweights, and its long-term consequences could permanently destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean while breathing dangerous new life into regional Islamism.
To understand why Golden Eagle is so alarming, one must look at what preceded it just weeks ago. This special forces drill is actually the second major escalation in bilateral military cooperation this summer.
In late June 2026, the two nations concluded a massive, multi-day joint air force exercise hosted across several strategic air bases inside Egypt. That aerial summit featured advanced multi-role fighter aircraft, specifically American-made F-16 jets, which form the backbone of both the Turkish and Egyptian air fleets.
Immediately following those maneuvers, Egypt deployed its assets to participate in the Anatolian Eagle 2026 trilateral air exercise hosted in Turkey alongside Azerbaijan and NATO assets. During those intense aerial sorties, pilots practiced advanced command and control procedures, coordinated strikes and complex electronic warfare tactics.
The rapid transition from complex air force exercises to face-to-face commando drills proves that this is not a temporary diplomatic flirtation. It is a highly coordinated, multi-domain integration of two of the largest militaries in the region, systematically building interoperability from the skies down to urban warfare trenches.
The speed of this military convergence suggests that technical and operational barriers are being systematically dismantled, fundamentally altering the traditional balance of power.
 
To fully grasp the magnitude of this threat, observers must look past polished diplomatic press releases and examine the raw power dynamics uniting Sisi and Erdogan.
For a decade, these two men were the most bitter rivals in the region. Sisi was the secular general who saved Egypt from the brink of total Islamist collapse, while Erdogan acted as the self-appointed global champion of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Today, they are burying the hatchet, but they are not doing it for the sake of regional peace. They are doing it because their respective paths to domestic survival and geopolitical projection have converged.
Their newfound military cooperation sends a dark, unmistakable message to Israel and the Western world that ideological principles mean absolutely nothing when authoritarian survival is on the line.
By inviting Turkish commandos onto Egyptian soil, Sisi is validating a foreign leader who has spent his entire career attempting to subvert the traditional Arab state structure. Erdogan, facing severe economic isolation and shifting global alliances, sees Egypt as the perfect vehicle to legitimize his regional ambitions.
It is a transactional marriage of convenience where the currency of exchange is military hardware, shared tactical doctrine and an eventual realignment of regional dominance.
Israel cannot afford to remain blind to the ideological undercurrents driving Turkish foreign policy.
Under Erdogan's long rule, Ankara has transformed from a vital secular ally into a primary state sponsor of political Islam. Turkey has sheltered senior Hamas operatives, provided diplomatic cover to extremist networks and funded Muslim Brotherhood assets across Europe and the Middle East.
Erdogan openly dreams of restoring historical Ottoman influence over former provincial territories, with North Africa sitting at the very top of his geopolitical agenda. Turkey's aggressive military interventions in Libya, its deep footprint in Syria and its recent geopolitical push into the Horn of Africa all point to a singular goal of projecting Islamist nationalist soft and hard power across the Mediterranean basin.
The Golden Eagle drills provide Ankara with the ultimate cover. By integrating its elite units with the Egyptian military, Turkey secures a permanent foothold closer to Israeli waters and critical international sea lanes.
This is not just a tactical exchange. It is a mechanism for Turkey to project its shadow directly onto Israel's southern borders under the guise of an accepted Arab partnership.
For years, Jerusalem and Washington viewed Sisi's Egypt as an immovable bulwark against religious radicalism, built on the systematic dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood.
However, Sisi's Egypt is currently drowning in profound economic misery and systemic domestic repression, creating a perfect breeding ground for covert radicalization. By opening the door to intense military cooperation with Erdogan, Sisi is importing Turkish-style Islamist soft power into a highly sensitive society.
This normalization inadvertently grants the ideology the mainstream legitimacy it needs to fester beneath the surface.
This domestic shift directly intersects with geopolitical realignments in the Eastern Mediterranean, a highly contested arena characterized by vast natural gas discoveries and disputed maritime boundaries.
 
A deepening military nexus between Cairo and Ankara completely upends the delicate balance of power. Beyond joint maneuvers, Egypt has explored participation in Turkey's KAAN stealth fighter program and signed agreements with Turkish defense firms for the domestic production of advanced drones.
This level of defense integration builds shared technical and operational capabilities that alter the traditional strategic assumptions of the region.
Israel's historic peace treaty with Egypt has always been a cold, transactional calculation born out of military reality, not shared values. Israel can no longer rely on passive monitoring.
Israel must explicitly warn its Western allies, particularly the U.S., that unconditional financial and military aid to Cairo must be re-evaluated if Egypt continues to build a strategic axis with an adversarial, Hamas-backing Turkish regime.
Israel must respond with aggressive, clear-eyed diplomacy, leveraging security ties to demand strict oversight on how American-supplied technology, including the F-16 fleets used in recent exercises, is shared or integrated during joint maneuvers.
Intelligence agencies must track the specific tactical doctrines and hardware shared between Ankara and Cairo.
If Israel remains complacent, it will soon face a heavily armed, highly synchronized axis on its southern border, led by an erratic Islamist in Ankara and an economically desperate strongman in Cairo.
The lines between secular autocracy and political Islam are blurring into a dangerous regional challenge that threatens historical security buffers. Jerusalem must proactively dismantle this evolving configuration before these integrated forces redirect their shared tactical capabilities, ensuring that deterrence remains absolute across all frontiers.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx</full-text>
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            <id>rkfpyha7gg</id> 
            <title>Today's hitman did not emerge by chance</title> 
            <description>Opinion: As organized crime grows more sophisticated through global finance and technology, Israel's reactive approach is leaving a growing national threat unchecked</description>
            <author>Liran Segal</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rkfpyha7gg</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 18:54:06 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The wave of targeted killings that Israel has witnessed in recent years is not the result of a single incident or the actions of one particular crime organization. It is the outcome of several deep, interconnected processes that have evolved over more than two decades — economic, technological, social and cultural.
To understand today's reality, we must go back to the early 2000s. 
 
That period marked a turning point for organized crime in Israel. The Trade Bank affair was one of the most significant events illustrating how unprecedented amounts of money could flow into the criminal underworld and reshape the balance of power. At the same time, a much broader process was unfolding: the globalization of organized crime.
Israeli crime organizations expanded their operations into Europe, the Americas, and other international markets. Drug trafficking, money laundering and other transnational criminal activities transformed local organizations into international networks. This was the stage in which organized crime became scalable, rapidly expanding its financial resources, influence, operational capabilities and global reach.
Today, we are witnessing the next phase of that evolution. While the first wave was driven primarily by globalization and the movement of illicit capital, the current phase is fueled by digital finance, encrypted communications, advanced technologies and increasingly sophisticated criminal infrastructures that enable organizations to operate faster, more efficiently and across multiple jurisdictions.
Yet money alone does not explain what we are seeing.
 
Alongside these economic changes, a profound cultural transformation has taken place. Social media no longer merely reflects reality — it shapes it. It promotes images of power, wealth, status and instant success, making organized crime appear attractive to some young people searching for identity, recognition and rapid social mobility. In this sense, culture has become just as influential as money itself.
This phenomenon is not unique to Israel. Similar patterns can be observed in Southern Italy, parts of France, South America and other regions where organized crime recruits a new generation of hitmen by offering money, influence and a sense of belonging.
At the same time, the unwritten rules that once imposed at least some limits on violence have steadily eroded. Attacks in public spaces, explosive devices and the killing of innocent bystanders—including women and children—have become increasingly common. The violence itself has evolved.
Taken together—the Trade Bank affair as a historical milestone, the globalization of organized crime, its growing scalability, digital finance, cultural transformation and the erosion of traditional criminal codes—these developments present a far broader picture than any single assassination or criminal incident.
 
Yet the state's response has not evolved at the same pace. While organized crime continuously adapts to economic, technological and social change, Israel's approach remains focused largely on individual incidents and specific criminal organizations rather than on the long-term evolution of the threat itself.
The fight against organized crime, important as it is, has not received the national attention it deserves-particularly in light of these developments. Israel's unique security reality naturally places terrorism, war and external threats at the center of national priorities, absorbing much of the country's strategic attention and resources.
In many other countries, where external security threats are far less dominant, organized crime is recognized as a major threat to national resilience, governance and economic stability. As a result, it often receives greater strategic attention, dedicated resources and long-term policy development.
It is time to broaden the way we think about organized crime.
 
The fight must shift from a reactive approach to a strategic one, focusing on long-term trends rather than isolated events.
Greater integration of intelligence capabilities, financial tools, advanced technologies and interagency cooperation should become a central component of the national response.
Israel also needs an updated national framework that recognizes organized crime not merely as a criminal phenomenon, but as a growing threat to governance, the economy, homeland security and national resilience.
Finally, the traditional distinction between national security and internal security deserves renewed examination. Organized crime increasingly employs methods, technologies and operational capabilities that closely resemble those associated with national security threats.
Organized crime has already adapted to the realities of the twenty-first century.
It is now time for our strategy to do the same.
The author is a consultant and lecturer specializing in intelligence, homeland security, organized crime, personal security and privacy protection.</full-text>
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            <id>h1csocnmmg</id> 
            <title>The status quo with Iran may look comfortable, but it is misleading</title> 
            <description>Analysis: The latest exchange of blows shows how a vague agreement on Hormuz, the nuclear program and economic relief left Washington and Tehran without trust, enforcement or a shared interpretation</description>
            <author>Dr. Raz Zimmt</author>
            
            <link>https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/h1csocnmmg</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 11:31:34 +03:00</pubDate>
            <full-text>The latest exchange of blows between the United States and Iran illustrated just how flawed the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries last month really was. Although it was presented as an agreement meant to stabilize the arena after months of confrontation, in practice it remained a memorandum of misunderstandings, leaving almost every major issue open to interpretation.
The crisis over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is only one prominent example. Iran claims that the passage of vessels through the Omani corridor violates the memorandum, which it says recognizes its right to formulate arrangements for traffic in the strait in coordination with Iran, and therefore also passage through the Iranian shipping lane rather than the Omani one. The United States, by contrast, completely rejects this interpretation and demands that vessels be allowed to pass through any shipping lanes of their choosing. But the dispute does not concern Hormuz alone. Almost every significant clause in the memorandum, from the nuclear issue to economic relief, is worded ambiguously.
 
Such ambiguity does not necessarily have to lead to crisis. If there were basic trust between the sides, or an agreed mechanism for settling disputes, the interpretive gaps could be managed. But neither of those conditions exists. In Tehran, there is a conviction that Washington is merely playing for time until after the U.S. midterm elections in November, in order to resume the military campaign. In Washington, meanwhile, the assessment is growing that Iran is exploiting the negotiations to buy time to rebuild its military capabilities. The monitoring mechanism that was supposed to be established under the memorandum has also not yet been created, meaning there is effectively no body capable of resolving disputes or enforcing the understandings.
Behind the technical disputes lies a much deeper gap. From Iran’s perspective, the negotiations are meant to enshrine in an agreement the achievements of the war, foremost among them the change in the status of the Strait of Hormuz. For the Iranian leadership, this is not only an economic asset, which unlike the lifting of sanctions, for example, does not depend on the changing whims of the U.S. administration, but also a principled expression of the creation of a new regional order that recognizes Iran’s upgraded status. The United States, by contrast, seeks to obtain through diplomacy what it failed to obtain through military and economic pressure, including a return to the status quo in the Strait of Hormuz and the reduction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Given these gaps, it is difficult to see how a permanent agreement between the countries can be reached in the near future. Even a detailed interim agreement currently seems an ambitious goal. Such an agreement would require decisions on highly complex issues, including how to handle the stockpile of enriched uranium, International Atomic Energy Agency inspection arrangements at nuclear facilities, the economic benefits Iran would receive, regulation of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and even the issue of Lebanon. It is doubtful whether either side currently has the willingness or desire to move toward such an agreement.
A return to full-scale war also does not appear to be the preferred option. Both sides would prefer to avoid another war, which may not achieve its goals, although that does not mean war could not reignite, especially if confrontations between the sides continue and escalate.
In this reality, the most likely scenario at this stage appears to be a continuation of the current situation: not a full-scale war, but also not a long-term diplomatic arrangement. From Israel’s perspective, this reality seemingly has clear advantages. The military option remains on the table, and Iran does not enjoy a broad package of economic benefits that could strengthen the regime and allow it to invest significant resources in rebuilding its power.
But precisely because this situation appears relatively convenient, Israel must not fall in love with it. First, it is a highly fragile reality, which could deteriorate quickly under circumstances that are not necessarily convenient for Israel. Second, time is not standing still. Reports about the rebuilding of Iranian missile and air-defense systems indicate that Tehran is using the period of calm to reestablish its military capabilities. More importantly, there is no real freeze in the nuclear field either. Recent satellite images from the American research institute headed by expert David Albright, published in recent days, raise questions about continued covert activity at the secret nuclear facility at Pickaxe Mountain near Natanz, despite the memorandum of understanding requiring Iran to preserve the current status quo of its nuclear program.
 
In the absence of IAEA monitoring, Israel and the United States are forced to rely exclusively on intelligence to track these activities. Moreover, in the months after Operation Rising Lion, Iran has worked to restore its uranium-enrichment capability at two main sites: Fordow, which was not completely destroyed, and Pickaxe Mountain. It is doubtful whether continued rebuilding efforts at nuclear sites can be prevented without a diplomatic arrangement.
Ultimately, the current status quo may be preferable in the short term to a problematic agreement or another war. However, it does not provide a stable solution, but at most a temporary pause. The more time passes without an arrangement and without effective monitoring, the greater the danger of sudden deterioration, while Iran will be able to rebuild its military capabilities in the meantime. Precisely because the status quo provides a sense of relative comfort, it is important to remember that it may be not only temporary, but also misleading.

Dr. Raz Zimmt is head of the Iran and Shiite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).</full-text>
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